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Introduction 1 
 2 
The dialogue between artistic practices and utopia has been long and fruitful. Art has been 3 
used as a powerful tool through which utopia is enacted by presenting either an explicit 4 
critique or proposal for a better society. It has served as inspiration, contestation and 5 
activist practice. The articulation between art and utopia, stemming from an imaginative 6 
and social practice, has also proven to be an important democratic, emancipatory, 7 
revolutionary and educational tool. 8 
Performances by Pussy Riot, a punk-rock activist band, have been contesting 9 
Putin’s government, demanding, through activist utopian art, democracy and freedom. 10 
Their performances usually transgress public spaces, since most Russian big centres of 11 
arts and museums have, under Putin’s government, self-censored themselves from 12 
political art with fear of repercussion. As Dorian Lynskey articulates in the The Guardian, 13 
‘by laying claim to public spaces, [their concerts] are Situationist-inspired acts of dissent 14 
even before a note has been played’ (Lynskey, December 2012). Their utopian links 15 
become apparent as activist method and their creative practices reclaim social space and 16 
reveal their critical stance as agents of utopian demand. Following the release of their 17 
song ‘Track About Good Cop’, the group released a statement describing the song as ‘a 18 
utopian dream about alternative political reality in which instead of arresting activists and 19 
putting them in jail, cops are joining activists’ (Me and the cop: Pussy Riot releases new 20 
protest song, July 2018).1 21 
In Brazil, the art of ‘pichação’ (a form of graffiti that claims the streets and the 22 
most unlikely places for the articulation of social and historical issues) makes use of the 23 
street as a space of utopian contest as a form of resistance to institutionalisation and its 24 
perceived marginalization. By doing this, pichação gives primacy to conceptual over 25 
aesthetic form in the reformulation of the city space as a space of the people (most of 26 
which have been spatially marginalised in the favela). 27 
In Artistic Utopias of Revolt: Claremont Road, Reclaim the Streets, the City of 28 
Sol, Julia Ramírez Blanco exposes the relations between utopia, art and space in what has 29 
been widely coined ‘activist art’. She begins her study with the occupation of Claremont 30 
 
1 See also Sean Michaels’ ‘An art revolution in St Petersburg’. 
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Road in 1993, aimed at preventing the construction of a roadway. During this occupation 31 
statues were turned into barricades and utopian realisation and practices enacted via the 32 
aesthetic. In her study, Blanco exposes how ordinary people and micro-structures can 33 
communicate and construct utopia through creative spatial practice. These performances 34 
invert top-down utopian movements by engaging in the deconstruction of dominant 35 
discourses and reclaiming space as individuals’ and communities’ rights. These artistic 36 
forms of utopian expression have been especially important during the 1960s’ and 1970s’ 37 
countercultural movements that sought to establish difference as an important nexus of 38 
utopian construction. 39 
On a different note, dystopias – largely in response to the form of the traditional2 40 
utopia, the consequent historical events of the WWII, and to the institutional tools that 41 
participate in the construction of holistic oppressive systems of such large proportions – 42 
recognised the value that artistic representations and spatial organisation hold in the 43 
confirmation and support of power structures.3 Consider the case of Fahrenheit 451 in 44 
which the issue of art and its spatial erasure is connected to a loss of sense of history and, 45 
consequently, of personal and collective freedom. Or the film Equilibrium in which the 46 
war on expressive freedom, emotionality and critical creativity is conveyed by a war on 47 
art, source of alternative meanings and emancipatory transgression. In both cases, art is 48 
presented, strategically, in unpleasant, hidden, dirty or intimate places, which are made 49 
public after transgression. Nevertheless, although the micro structure of society is 50 
permeated, in these societies, with oppressive, controlling, serial spaces, these spaces of 51 
 
2 I am aware that other authors have labelled these utopias as ‘canonical’, but I am using Tom Moylan’s 
terminology here. 
3 Nazi propaganda machine constructed museums for the exhibition of the ‘good’ art of the state; relations 
were made between physical dysmorphia and what was called degenerated art (such as cubism, 
expressionism, surrealism and other expressive art forms); a national art day was celebrated; and an 
architectural plan for Berlin was put into march. Sculpture and painting cherished by the Nazis exhibited a 
frozen idea of perfection of the human figure (which favoured male statuary, representations of women as 
reproductive beings and little variation among them). When faced by different representations of the body, 
the Nazis were repulsed and launched their own version of a culture war: their campaign against modern 
art stemmed from their inability to tolerate any human forms except the most familiar. In architecture, art’s 
new responsibility was towards the psychological effect of space and an ideologically disfigured notion of 
form. The emergence of this new conception of space, enhanced the earlier effects of Nazi architecture to 
mould spaces in the image of an ordered cosmos. Classic architectural style was used to impart order and 
expression to new kind of civic buildings. Hitler recognized the potential classicism held for the promotion 
of his ideologies. Because it was so distanced in history and venerated as blueprint, classic models gave the 
Nazi regime the ideal imagery to appeal to the people. Abstraction was, on the other hand, associated with 
primitivism, one which located the roots of an anti-ethical emphasis on expression instead of supposed 
ideal form. See the documentary ‘The Architecture of Doom’, Tobin Siebers’ ‘Disability Aesthetics’ or 
Nathaniel Coleman’s Utopias and Architecture. 
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art act as counter-narratives: they are subversive, free, creative and hopeful spaces, which 52 
oftentimes create heterotopias (bubbles of differentiality  whereupon dystopian meanings 53 
are contested). This concern is made perfectly clear even when art is not the main motive 54 
of these dystopias, such as is the case of 1984 and Brave New World. In these dystopian 55 
texts, art is dislocated to the considered uncivilised parts of society. In this last example, 56 
the explicit transfer of art to the proles establishes powerful psychological, social and 57 
cultural boundaries between what is and what is not socially acceptable. The proles are 58 
filthy, unsanitary, uncivilised – underdeveloped – places and their inhabitants treated as 59 
little more than animals. By being placed there, art becomes symbolic of these undesirable 60 
attributes that have been constructed institutionally. However, once Wilson transgresses 61 
normalised social praxis and is in contact with one such space of art – here taking the 62 
form of the antique shop – and uses the token he takes from that place as source for 63 
transgression, this space becomes also a space of hope, resistance and radical alterity. 64 
The utopian dimension of art has thus been widely debated and conveyed through 65 
various means and platforms. In critical theory and philosophy, we can note the influence 66 
of Ernst Bloch and Theodor Adorno; in aesthetics and spatial artistic practice, the works 67 
of Miwon Kwon, Jane Rendell and Julia Blanco; or in literary studies, Tom Moylan, 68 
Raffaella Baccollini or Ruth Levitas. These authors have, notwithstanding, limited their 69 
focus to the analysis of the artwork as conveyor of utopian meanings, outside itself as 70 
utopian object. Bloch has stressed the principle of hope – and desire – as active 71 
transformative propeller towards the Not-Yet-realised utopia; Adorno’s negative 72 
dialectics has stressed how the conflict within the artwork reveals society’s conflicts and 73 
articulates dissatisfaction with the transformation of material conditions; Kwon and 74 
Rendell wrote on the critical principle of art as a utopian emancipatory dimension for the 75 
artwork as well as the benefits of such practice in social art; and Moylan and Levitas on 76 
the function of the utopian text in its pedagogical, hermeneutic and critical scope. Despite 77 
the value of such contributions for the articulation between utopianism and art, these 78 
accounts lack articulation with each other. There is, I argue, a theoretical gap in this issue 79 
as although art is deemed utopian because of its functions, the incorporation of these 80 
functions in utopian discourse has been severely overlooked, especially if we consider 81 
the literary utopia. This theoretical absence is, by and large, the result of traditional 82 
utopian’s system tendency to holism and deactivation of dissident or critical discourses. 83 
How, then, is a text supposed to inspire towards utopia by the depiction of a utopian 84 
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society in which there is no utopian impulse, no artistic representative of utopia inside the 85 
text? How do dystopias pose a more compelling case for utopian artistic practice than the 86 
traditional utopian text? Departing from this perceived gap, these questions have evolved 87 
to: what are, after all, the main reasons for this shift in artistic utopian attitudes from 88 
utopia to dystopia? And, if it happened between the shift from traditional utopia to 89 
dystopia, does the same happen in critical utopias? What is, after all, the utopian function 90 
of art in utopia? Is it the same in traditional and critical utopia? 91 
Having established the question-problem, a methodological tool through which 92 
these functions and shifts could be analysed became necessary. Given the framework 93 
established heretofore it became clear these utopian artistic practices engaged with a form 94 
of transgression, which was mainly spatial and contestant of spatial institutions. 95 
Similarly, the utopian genre, being defined by its spatial mode or form, provided the 96 
exempt background through which these relations could be analysed spatially. In fact, as 97 
Robert Tally had argued that ‘whole genres can be defined by such a spatial or 98 
geographical character, such as the pastoral poem, the travel narrative, utopia, or the 99 
urban exposé’ (Tally, 2017, p. 1) so here is maintained that traditional and critical utopias 100 
can be defined in terms of their micro-topologies: in this case through the analysis of its 101 
spaces of art whose character and function will hopefully provide the means whereby the 102 
utopian texts can be distinguished. David Harvey suggested something similar in Spaces 103 
of Hope in which he writes: ‘any project to revitalize utopianism needs to consider how 104 
and with what consequences it has worked as both a constructive and destructive force 105 
for change in our historical geography’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 159). 106 
Thus, the first chapter of the present study is devoted to the elaboration of a spatial 107 
methodology, responsible for the articulation of art and utopia. This chapter seeks to 108 
develop a comprehensive method tracing the shift in sensibilities responsible for a 109 
transformation in the relations between art and utopia. This chapter tripartite structure 110 
follows a mode of triangulation inspired by both the main three issues here related (art, 111 
space and utopia) and by the authors included (p.e., Henri Lefebvre, Edward Soja, Doreen 112 
Massey, Jane Rendell and Peter Osborne). These authors write in the tradition initiated 113 
by the spatial turn that is argued, following Fredric Jameson, to have marked not only a 114 
shift in spatial theorisation but of a general aesthetic and cultural sensibility – termed 115 
‘postmodernism’.  116 
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Modernism is predominantly defined in terms of holistic discourses, polarising 117 
(and oftentimes prescriptive) stances on space, art and utopia, and limited in its 118 
assessment of the real social relations it is product and producer of. Postmodernism 119 
instead seeks to deconstruct in order to construct, dialectically, these binaries in order to 120 
comprehend, through ‘Othering’, how meanings are conveyed fluidly and porously 121 
through the interplay of spatial, historical, social and cultural relations.4 Thus, by 122 
embedding the present discussion in a postmodern sensibility, spatial categorisation of 123 
art and utopia can be perceived in relation and as fully social categories. This way, social 124 
relations will be perceived not only as happening in space but as product and producer of 125 
spatial configurations.  126 
Having defined both the methodologic background for the theorisation and 127 
conceptualisation of space, these spatial attitudes are applied to the space of art. The 128 
following questions are thus answered in the second part of this chapter: what is a space 129 
of art? Is the space of art produced by the work of art, through the subject or through 130 
institutions? Is there any distinction between the space of art and an art institution – such 131 
as the museum or the art gallery? Is there a proper place for art or art space proper? What 132 
kind of art can be considered spatially? Or, do all types of art produce space? Is art 133 
produced by the space of art or is the space of art produced by the artwork? How can the 134 
modern/postmodern distinction be applied to the space of art? Can we apply ‘Thirdring- 135 
as-Othering’ in the analysis of the art space? Does it constitute itself the same way other 136 
spaces do? How does the space of art interact and produce society? And what is the role 137 
of art and its space? Many other questions could be proposed in place of these ones, but 138 
for now, we will try to restrict ourselves to the realm of spatiality itself. After having 139 
traced the history of the modern museum onto the new postmodern conditions of artistic 140 
spatiality and what utopian functions they may assume in utopian texts and societies, the 141 
last part of the first chapter will shed light to how this framework will be applied, as 142 
method to the utopian texts here under analysis. 143 
Thus, comparably to what Molina and Guinard propose in their comparative 144 
analysis of art and urban space, by the end of the present study, we will hopefully be 145 
quipped to make judgements on how utopias and utopias’ spaces of art can be enriched 146 
 
4 Many other articulations could be done in this matter, such as political, economic, psychological and so 
on, however, this study – was not the literary utopia a work of art by itself – is compromised with the 
utopian possibilities of the work of art, especially how it is conveyed in spatial form. 
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by the ‘valorization or depreciation of urban spaces and art through the spatialization of 147 
art in the city’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017, para. 14). This will hopefully provide us better 148 
insight on yet another variable on utopian thought and how such variable is employed 149 
throughout utopian spectrum, namely, from traditional to critical utopia. For this reason, 150 
it becomes particularly relevant to provide a reading of those spaces of art and their role 151 
in distinct literary utopias through the analysis of two well-established canonical utopias 152 
(Looking Backward: 2000-1887 by Edward Bellamy and News From Nowhere, or an 153 
Epoch of Rest by William Morris) and two critical utopias (The Dispossessed: An 154 
Ambiguous Utopia  by Ursula K. Le Guin and Trouble on Triton: An Ambiguous 155 
Heterotopia by Samuel R. Delany). This will expectedly shed light on the nuances and 156 
intricacies that distinguish, on the one hand, and establish, on the other, different texts in 157 
the utopian genre.  158 
While Molina and Guinard ask ‘how can arts and their symbolic dimension 159 
modify perceptions, representations and social practices of urban of spaces by 160 
representing them? [And] also, how can arts – by spatialising in the cities and by 161 
coproducing [emphasis added] within the urban spaces – modify perceptions, 162 
representations and social practices of these spaces?’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017, para. 14), 163 
the present study reformulates these questions in the following terms: how can spaces of 164 
arts and their symbolic, physical and practical dimensions modify perceptions, 165 
representations and sociospatial practices by operating within and in collaboration with 166 
them? And, how can spaces of art in a tri-coproduction of space, history and society 167 
modify perception, representations and social practices at those places? And what 168 
happens when we apply these questions to the utopian genre? 169 
Finally, and because as Warf and Arias argue that 170 
so many lines of thought converge on the topic of spatiality, space is a vehicle for examining what 171 
it means to be interdisciplinary or multidisciplinary, to cross the borders and divides that have 172 
organized the academic division of labor, to reveal the cultures that pervade different fields of 173 
knowledge, and to bring these contrasting lines of thought into a productive engagement with one 174 
another. (Warf & Arias, 2009, p. 2) 175 
 176 
Likewise, the present study aims to be perceived as an interdisciplinary method that, 177 
much like the critical utopia, benefits from its character as ship instead of island, since it 178 
proposes a process rather than a blueprint. It thus intends to be read as a form of Othering, 179 
presupposing the deconstruction of disciplinary barriers and following reconstruction of 180 
a cooperative practice: open, dialectical and heterogeneous. 181 
  182 
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Chapter 1. Methodology: Space of Art as Utopia 183 
1.1 Space, Place and the Spatial Turn: A defence of the postmodern space 184 
Geography matters, not for the simplistic and overly used reason that everything happens in space, 185 
but because where things happen is critical to knowing how and why they happen (Warf & Arias, 186 
2009, p. 1) 187 
 188 
 189 
Utilised in everyday discourse, ‘space’ may refer to the material backdrop against which 190 
people and things dwell or simply happen. The term can also refer to a fixed or moving 191 
object or location, a location’s characteristics, or outer space; or it can also be used 192 
metaphorically. The same applies to ‘place’, which is usually employed as a synonym for 193 
‘space’,5 but whose linguistic uses are wider. We may say ‘I found a new place’, ‘Go to 194 
your place’, or ‘I placed the pencil on the table’. All these common-sense uses of the word 195 
connote a reference to a location or a form of being in place. The terms can thus be used 196 
in a panoply of completely distinct material contexts – or even ideal, mental or emotional 197 
context – and are often employed indifferently.  198 
The notions of space and place are so deeply entrenched in our lives that they are 199 
hardly given any thought, but are, instead, treated as givens. This naturalisation of the 200 
terms, Casey maintains, is inevitable since they are deeply connected to our way of being- 201 
in-the-world – both ontologically and phenomenologically:  202 
To exist at all – to exist in any way – is to be somewhere, and to be somewhere is to be in some 203 
kind of place. Place is as vital as the air we breathe, the ground on which we stand, the bodies we 204 
have. We are surrounded by places. We walk over and through them. We live in places, relate to 205 
others in them, die in them. Nothing we do in unplaced. (Casey, 1997, p. IX) 206 
 207 
However, despite spatial determination being fundamental to our experiences in and of 208 
the world, their role is not superfluous, univocal or neutral. In fact, the concept of place’s 209 
taken-for-grantedness – precisely because of its deep intertwinement with everyday life 210 
and common-sense knowledge – has been the reason for the ignorance on the variety of 211 
meanings it encloses. Thus, if we wish to properly discuss the role of space or place, we 212 
must first distinguish and disambiguate the terms, and then define and theoretically frame 213 
them. 214 
 
5 Most Western history has pointed to the ascendency of the notion of space over that of place, from the 
Hellenistic period, to the Renaissance, through the middle-ages, reaching its peak after Newton’s 
elaboration of the mathematical principles. This primacy was firstly connected to the infinitude of god and 
then, latter, to the mathematisation of space which would reinforce physicalist and positivist perspectives. 
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At its most basic level, place means ‘location’ – referring to the exact abstract 215 
location of something determined by either a set of measurements or distances. However, 216 
the word can also be employed to describe a physical landscape with a particular set of 217 
distinct characteristics (i.e., a relaxing place, a religious place, an intimate place), or can 218 
even be used to refer to a sense of place6 (i.e., the subjective meanings that become 219 
attached to a given location and that can arise both from an individual or 220 
cultural/collective experience, perception or representation), a concept to which we return 221 
later.  222 
Place is, thus, initially defined in the present study as in Warf’s Encyclopedia of 223 
Human Geography: ‘typically refer[ing] to a particular segment of the earth’s surface that 224 
is characterized by the unique sense of belonging and attachment that makes it different 225 
from other places around it. Thus, place is a meaningful portion of space’ (Warf, 2006, p. 226 
356). Based on this concept, ‘space’ is used as a wider concept or class in which different 227 
‘places’ may fit based on the characteristics and modes of being of the particular place. 228 
(i.e. space has a wider scope and is used to classify the larger group into which some 229 
places belong). In this way, ‘place’ refers to specific locations as they are experienced by 230 
the subject and connected to other places, whereas space’s larger conceptual scope 231 
encompasses places’ links to wider social constructs or relations. 232 
In fact, the distinction between these terms and the clear definitions provided have 233 
been the ground for some dispute among geographers, social theorists and others 234 
concerned with spatial studies. Until the 1970s, it was not only physical geographers7 who 235 
considered space exclusively in unidimensional terms. History – and time – was regarded 236 
as the main propeller and shaper of human activity, and the social sciences paid little to 237 
no attention to the role of space in shaping social structures. Space was thought of as 238 
simply ‘being there’, independent or outside of human experience. 239 
 
6 See Yi-Fu Tuan’s Sense of Place or Space and Place. 
7 In The Fate of Place, Casey traces the history of accounts on place – and, by extension, space – in 
philosophy in which, he argues, geometrical considerations have abounded until the works of Heidegger, 
in a first moment, and then in the more clearly spatial form, in the works of Guattari, Foucault, Bachelard 
and others. A number of collections and dictionaries also point to a shift in spatial consciousness during the 
1970s brought about by humanist geography discussion (See J.S. Duncan’s, N.C. Johnson’s and R.H. 
Schein’s A companion to cultural geography; Barney Warf’s Encyclopedia of Human Geography; or Dreck 
Gregory et al The Dictionary of Human Geography). In America, geographical issues were also shifting 
from the study of landscape morphology to the study of the shifts in specific nodes of space (See Don 
Mitchell’s Cultural Geography: A Critical Introduction and Roger Friedland’s and Deirdre Boden’s (eds.) 
NowHere: Space, Time and Modernity). For more on the theorization of space before the spatial turn, see 
Soja’s Postmodern Geography. 
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Furthermore, place had been largely subsumed into space in modern discourse. 240 
This situation resulted from not only the modern tendency for generalisation and 241 
abstraction, but also the historicist tradition that absorbed other ‘minor’ discourses. These 242 
tendencies8 were divided under two main theoretical frameworks: the realist and the 243 
idealist. While materialist perspectives tended to highlight the geometric, abstract features 244 
of space, idealism regarded place as a mental representation, subjective in its scope. 245 
Materialist approaches perceived place geometrically and as a part of space, 246 
defined by a single spatial metric or grid. According to this approach, place was ‘defined 247 
and understood through Euclidean geometry (with x, y, and z dimensions) and, for 248 
analytical purposes, treated as “an absolute container of static, tough movable, objects 249 
and dynamic flows of behaviour”’ (Hubbard & Kitchin, 2011, p. 4) (i.e., as a rational and 250 
fixed system whose measurability is set by its ‘order-ness’ and ‘limit-ness’ of positions). 251 
The contrary perspective, however, was equally disempowering. Although highlighting 252 
phenomenological inquiry and rescuing the subject as participant of spatial construction, 253 
it froze spatial analysis within the realm of mental idealisation. 254 
Objectivist analyses stressed the ontological primacy of geographical inquiry, but 255 
subjectivist analyses argued for phenomenological inquiry to be the only available 256 
method of geographical investigation. Thus, both streams of thought relegated place to 257 
the stage where things happen, ‘rather than [adopting]  the more holistic view of places 258 
as the geographical context for the mediation of physical, social and economic processes’ 259 
(Agnew, 2011, p. 317). 260 
Henri Lefebvre’s influential analysis in The Production of Space denounces the 261 
double illusion implicit in these perspectives – the illusion of transparency, on the one 262 
hand, and the realistic illusion (or illusion of opacity), on the other hand – contesting 263 
dualisms that oppose instead of integrate material and mental space. The French Marxist 264 
argues that epistemology is missing from the conceptualisation of space in its relation to 265 
social practices. Previously, space was overlooked as simply objective or physical – and 266 
hence treated as a given – but modern critical thinking fetishised its mental element to 267 
validate its theoretical agenda: ‘mental space then becomes the focus of a “theoretical 268 
practice” which is separated from social practice which sets itself up as the axis, pivot or 269 
 
8 Both stemmed from a Western cultural, religious and social heritage that divided, on one hand, mind and 
body, and – mainly from the Illuminism on – was, on the other hand, deeply entrenched in rational 
philosophy and optimism. 
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central reference point of knowledge’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 6). Episteme-philosophical 270 
thought9 was thus limited in the construction of a systematic account of space. This 271 
insufficiency meant that space was largely relegated to the realm of the mental, although 272 
it ought to be contemplated as a social fact. Hence, providing a generally acceptable 273 
notion of what space and place are is not enough; these concepts must be encompassed 274 
within a thoughtful and systematic approach to space that unveils its relationship to time 275 
and society. 276 
Furthermore, these attitudes towards space and place were the product of a modern 277 
Western tendency to prioritise historical progress – which in turn shaped after Western 278 
history, development and a perceived shift from barbarity to civilisation – over spatial 279 
analysis. Space’s ambiguousness, authors such as Casey and Soja argue, largely relates 280 
to the overestimation of the role of historicism. There was, Soja tells us, a rise in 281 
historicism in the last decade of the nineteenth century, whose practice ‘successfully 282 
occluded, devalued, and depoliticized space as an object of critical discourse’ and 283 
undermined ‘the possibility of an emancipatory spatial praxis’ (Soja, 1999, p. 4). This 284 
tendency was particularly visible during the nineteenth century, during which ‘space 285 
became steadily subordinated to time in modern consciousness, a phenomenon that 286 
reflected the enormous time-space compression of the industrial revolution; intellectually, 287 
this phenomenon was manifested through the lens of historicism’ (Warf & Arias, 2009, 288 
p. 2). This historical practice of ‘historicism’ – which Soja distinguishes from ‘historicity’ 289 
– places extreme and unnecessary emphasis on a historical contextualisation of social life 290 
that completely ‘peripheralizes geography and spatial imagination’ (Soja, 1999, p. 140). 291 
Non-Western spaces were theoretically assumed to be in another temporal point of 292 
development or evolution, to the extent that these spatial configurations were 293 
hierarchically organised in terms of supposed temporal progress.10 294 
 
9 Lefebvre was even more critical of semiology for not giving an encompassing theory of space and doing 
quite the opposite. He argues: ‘when codes worked up from literary texts are applied to spaces … we 
remain, as we may easily be shown, on the purely descriptive level. Any attempt to use such codes as a 
means of deciphering social space must surely reduce that space itself to the status of a message, and the 
inhabiting of it to the status of a reading. This is to evade both history and practice.’ (Lefebvre 7). This 
semiologist response not only claims that this code can and must be read but also that it is constructed, 
something which Lefebvre finds implausible. 
10 See Warf and Arias’ ‘Introduction: The reassertion of space into the social sciences and humanities’, in 
which a resumed account of modernism’s subordination of space to time is provided; and Edward Relph’s 
Place and Placeness for a deeper understanding of this relation framed in post-colonialist studies. 
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Under the modern logic, as a cultural logic,11 place is immobilised under the form 295 
of the lieu or the ‘site’: a ‘leveled-down, emptied-out, planiform residuum of place and 296 
space eviscerated of their actual or virtual powers and forced to fit the requirements of 297 
institutions that demand a certain very particular form of building’ (Casey, 1997, p. 298 
183).12  299 
 Foucault studies these sites in his examination of eighteenth century disciplinary 300 
and institutional ‘spaces’ in both The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punishment: 301 
The Birth of the Prison. These institutional places, he affirms, are homogeneous, 302 
simultaneous and serial (i.e., they successively replicate one another successively). These 303 
traits are constitutive to those sites Foucault terms ‘spaces of domination’ (Foucault, 304 
1995, p. 187), in which surveillance becomes the privileged form of social relations, 305 
‘disciplinary power manifests its potency’ (Foucault, 1995, p. 187), and space and place 306 
become fixed and, hence, sites. In these places, the individual, specifically, and social 307 
interaction, generally, are fixed in a set position, suppressing the concept of space. 308 
Therefore, an institutional space is a functional one in which the exercise of power is 309 
inflicted by the reduction of the subject’s possible locations and spatial practice, which is 310 
analytically determined. Foucault’s assessment of the panopticon follows the same line 311 
of thought on which Casey elaborates. Casey, however, is not interested in the dynamics 312 
of power and knowledge exercised at these sites, but rather in their status as built places 313 
or genuine places. Casey is also concerned with whether these sites fit the category of 314 
place altogether – given that they have no hidden places and are completely transparent. 315 
According to him, the panopticon is a perfect example of a site, for it can only be grasped 316 
in terms of ‘a generazible model of functioning’ (Casey, 1997, p. 185). The irresistibility 317 
of this conversion of place to site, Casey argues, is the product of earlier centuries’ neglect 318 
of place and emphasis on absolute space and historicism’s primacy. According to Casey, 319 
‘[a] site’s defining features of homogeneity, paniformity, monolinearity, and seriality 320 
acted to paper over the abyss; they conspired to act as tranquilizing forces in the 321 
generation of a “flat surface of perpetual simultaneity”’ (Casey, 1997, p. 186). The site 322 
destroys the place; site is the place’s antithesis or a pharmakon used as a remedy for the 323 
epoch’s absence of spatiality. What converts a ‘place’ to a ‘site’ is its ‘instrumentality or 324 
 
11 Modernism is perceived as a cultural logic of temporal supremacy the same way postmodernism is here 
theorized by Jameson, as the cultural logic of late capitalism, giving rise to a supremacy of space. 
12 Casey assumes this to be the result of Leibniz’s ‘new discipline of analysis situs’ (Casey 183). See The 
Fate of Place. 
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functionalism’ (Casey, 1997, p. 185), with modern space being the result of an imposition 325 
of external logic. Although bound to a historical superimposition, the modern space is not 326 
yet the same as the non-place that fetishises and replicates ad infinitum a spatial logic – 327 
and spatial configuration, as some authors in the postmodern era, such as Soja and 328 
Harvey, argue. Still, by being solely constituted on a horizontal axis, modern space 329 
neutralises difference by negating opposing discourses and dialectical nuance. 330 
Critical rationality was hence commonly regarded as dominated by the historical 331 
and neglectful of geographical imagination. As Soja maintains, radical criticism must 332 
therefore recognise that space hides consequences from us, as much as or even more than 333 
history does: ‘how relations of power and discipline are inscribed into the apparently 334 
innocent spatiality of social life, [and] how human geographies become filled with politics 335 
and ideology’ (Soja, 1999, p. 6). The spatial turn has, in this respect, ‘dislodged a putative 336 
nineteenth-century dominance of the time in the humanities (whether historical, social 337 
scientific or literary) to reintroduce . . . the apparently elided element of space and 338 
geography’ (West-Pavlov, 2017, p. 291). 339 
What has been generally coined the ‘spatial turn’ not only changed the paradigm 340 
concerning the importance of space and its denunciation of historical hegemony in critical 341 
theory – how space and place were defined and how analytical inquiry was performed 342 
thereafter – but also brought together previous unidimensional and static perspectives of 343 
space under an empowering analysis that encompassed rather than polarised spatial 344 
discourse. The spatial turn thus encompasses that reaction that sought to rescue space and 345 
spatial inquiry as a category that, as with time, is interwoven in the social fabric and to 346 
reclaim material space, the individual’s experience of space and sociability as 347 
fundamental subjects for geographical inquiry. Soja identifies two main drives of the 348 
spatial turn: a) the rapprochement of physical space and those who inhabit it – de- 349 
bipolarising previous conceptions of space and place; and b) a reaction against the 350 
supremacy and hegemonic canonisation of the historical rhetoric (Cf. Soja, 1999).  351 
The spatial turn rephrased modern discourse on space, delimitating – without 352 
subsuming – space and place, and announcing not only a new form of spatialisation and 353 
spatial analysis, but also a ‘new aesthetic sensibility that came to be understood as 354 
postmodernism’ (Tally, 2017, p. 2). Certainly, as Skordoulis and Arventis point out, 355 
‘originally the transformation of space was a constitutive feature of modernism 356 
(Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 106)’, and spatial conceptualisation was therefore 357 
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endorsed by both modern and postmodern thought. However, by the 1980s, spatial 358 
conceptualisation began to be perceived as properly characteristic of postmodernism. 359 
Modernism was labelled as temporal and postmodernism as spatial:  360 
modernism was valorised as dynamic, the site of history, narrative and memory, in short 361 
as the potential for change. Postmodernism is characterised as the site of pure immanence, 362 
immediacy, stasis, and above all a disorienting and disempowering realm of space. 363 
(Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 106) 364 
 365 
Fredric Jameson, in Postmodernism, or, the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism, advocates 366 
that a – if not the – crucial characteristic of postmodernism – which he assumes to be the 367 
cultural logic of late capitalism – is the transition from a temporal paradigm to a spatial 368 
one. Jameson relates this characterisation to the fragmentation of the subject in 369 
postmodernism. According to Jameson, social life was not always defined by space, but 370 
rather that this shift was the result of the new postmodern identity, which is primarily 371 
characterised by a mutation in objective space – a mutation not accompanied by the 372 
subject. The subject who inhabits postmodern space is one whose spatial perceptions and 373 
habits are formed in an older form of space – that of modernism.13 374 
This generalisation is founded on Jameson’s crucial premise that through 375 
technology, space has become ‘postmodern hyperspace’, whose existence has superseded 376 
the subject’s ability to change spatial perception to such an extent that human dwelling 377 
and humans’ relations to space become irrelevant in an analysis of postmodern space. 378 
Time is said to confer stability and narrative continuity, to which the subject can refer 379 
back and situate himself or herself as a unitary individual, and the means for subjects to 380 
map themselves along a chronological narrative (i.e., in time). However, in 381 
postmodernism, temporal continuity collapses – or, as has been announced by the most 382 
well-known trope of postmodernism, all narratives end – and space becomes the only way 383 
humans can map and situate themselves. Yet, Jameson maintains, this task proves to be 384 
increasingly difficult when the expansion of globalisation and networks exposes a greater 385 
world space, to which the individual, whose spatial knowledge can only be employed 386 
locally, can never completely refer back. This is the spatial logic of late capitalism,14 he 387 
 
13 Jameson speaks of ‘high modernism’ elsewhere but, for coherence sake, this space of high modernism is 
here labelled as ‘modern space’ since it is encompassed within the terms modern space is theorised in the 
present study. 
14 Jameson identifies two previous phases in the spatial logic of capitalism: the first is the spatial logic of 
the grid under market capitalism in which space is perceived as organized and geometrical; the second is 
figurative (representational) space under monopoly capitalism. See more in Jameson’s Postmodernism, or, 
the Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism. 
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maintains, whose conceptual space is characterised by simultaneity – at once 388 
homogeneous and split – and which is often attached to the notion of hyperspace in 389 
Jameson’s accounts. 390 
Jameson’s exhaustive analysis of the elements of the Bonaventure Hotel in Los 391 
Angeles aims at deciphering the building and its architect John Portman as postmodern. 392 
Jameson highlights how the building and the architect’s vision are simultaneously 393 
stripped of their material and subjective connotations ‘and treated as a collection of signs 394 
presumably inscribed by the creator to a certain audience, who may or may not be able to 395 
interpret them correctly’ (Lungu, 2008, p. 5).15 Jameson contrasts the elitist, separating 396 
character of modern building and the postmodern building, which is designed to be 397 
popular, destined for mainstream consumption and comprised of pieces that form a 398 
‘chaotic depthlessness . . .. [F]or Jameson it is – once again – a formulation which deprives 399 
the spatial of any meaningful politics’ (Massey, 1994, p. 251). This perspective, however, 400 
Lungu argues in ‘Marx, Postmodernism and Spatial Configuration in Jameson and 401 
Lefebvre’, stems from a universalising and totalising view of urban space in which the 402 
perspective of the city planner, architect, designer or theorist is given primordiality over 403 
that of the subject who dwells in the city. Accordingly, she states that ‘there is little reason 404 
to generalize this observation at the level of the hotel guests and staff, whose perception 405 
would undoubtedly be shaped by a wider variety of factors, among which [is] their own 406 
cultural background as well as the social role they accomplish within that space’ (Lungu, 407 
2008, p. 6). Through this generalisation, Jameson privileges abstract over inhabited 408 
space.16 In fact, although the mutations in architectural space and the organisation of cities 409 
‘offer valuable insight to the nature of the society inhabiting it’ (Lungu 5), Jameson 410 
systematically prioritises the perspective of the designer over concrete practice, 411 
homogenising human experience under an abstract categorisation.17 These 412 
oversimplifications, Lungu maintains, would be acceptable if Jameson had reserved his 413 
 
15 Moreover, by attempting to analyse the hotel narratively and making this analysis the ‘cornerstone of his 
spatial system’ Jameson ‘infringes upon the democratization of the sign (Lungu, 2008, p. 5) given that ‘if 
architecture is to be interpreted as a language … [it] should necessarily make room to a variety of 
perspectives’ (Lungu, 2008, p. 6). Moreover, Lungu argues, by founding his analysis of architecture and 
space in narrative and sign-value theories, Jameson’s commitment to a sociologic and materialist (Marxist) 
perspectives are jeopardized. 
16 What is more, Lungu explains, ‘although Jameson rejects the principles of semiotics, his analysis of 
individual building seems to be deeply indebted to them’ (Lungu, 2008, p. 2).  
17 Moreover, his analysis can only be reproduced locally despite its pretence of a universalising analytical 
spatialisation. 
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conclusions for the field of architecture and only applied them locally; however, the critic 414 
expands his conclusions to psychology, universalising the spirit of postmodernism at the 415 
level of subjective experience. 416 
In his analysis, Jameson disregards both the subjective logic of the architect in the 417 
process of creation and the change of sensibilities that ‘triggered the demand for a new 418 
spatial configuration’ (Lungu, 2008, p. 6) and occasioned a transformation in space. The 419 
countercultural movement of the 1960s and 1970s, for example, gave a voice to 420 
marginalised groups who demanded the mutation of the existing spatial organisation,18 421 
which was often binary and segregating in terms of gender, race, sexual orientation, and 422 
so on. Those movements prompted ‘the emergence of a new type of building – more 423 
transparent, more accessible, less centralized’ (Lungu, 2008, p. 6). As becomes evident 424 
later, in his attempt to develop a comprehensive theory19 of the new urban condition (i.e., 425 
the postmodern), Jameson neglects social construction and the relational character of 426 
space. Mediating practices and the exercise of individuality and sociality in the production 427 
of differential spaces in this new postmodern city’s construction must thus be reintegrated 428 
into the construction of space, which can only be built dialectically – top-down and 429 
bottom-up. Critical of the fragmentation and heterogeneity of postmodern spatial 430 
configuration, Jameson’s cognitive mapping – which should guide the subject through 431 
the miscellaneous character of postmodern hyperspace – imagines a space constructed 432 
independently of the subject. Jameson empties space – and spatial production – and 433 
instead produces an abstract space later inserting the subject back into it. However, space, 434 
Lefebvre affirms, can never be emptied and reduced to abstract space; it embodies 435 
meaning since it is socially produced through practices that encode social meanings. As 436 
a result, abstract (or absolute) space cannot exist in human landscapes. In contact with 437 
social relations, space becomes relativised, historicised, a ‘social product’. Instead of a 438 
mere container or innate pre-given, space is made possible only via human production. 439 
Drawing on Marx’s view of the relations of production in society, Lefebvre theorises how 440 
space is socially constructed via praxis. Consequently, spatial layouts and organisation 441 
are a result of the superstructure that includes social relationships. He explains: 442 
 
18 What Doreen Massey calls ‘power geometries’. See ‘Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of 
Time-Space’ or Spatial Division of Labour.  
19 In his attempt to form a totalising theory of postmodern space, Jameson severely underplayes the powers 
that participate in the transformation of spatial configuration, homogenising it and depriving it from the 
fundamental spirit of postmodernism. 
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Space is not produced in the sense that a kilogram of sugar or a yard of cloth is produced. . .. Is 443 
space a social relationship? Certainly – but one which is inherent to property relationships . . . and 444 
. . . the forces of production . . .. Here we see the polyvalence of social space, its “reality” at once 445 
formal and material. Though a product to be used, to be consumed, it is also a means of production; 446 
networks of exchange and flows of raw materials and energy. (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 85) 447 
 448 
Social space is dynamic and revealed in its particularity when undistinguishable from 449 
abstract and mental space. Lefebvre intends to prove that such social space ‘is constituted 450 
neither by a collection of things or an aggregate of (sensory) data, nor by a void packed 451 
like a parcel with various contents, and that it is irreducible to a “form” imposed upon 452 
phenomena, upon things, upon physical materiality’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 27). Instead, 453 
space is constituted socially and therefore also politically. Although space is shaped and 454 
moulded by historical and natural elements, that transformation is a political process. 455 
Space is material, but it is also politically and ideologically constituted. There is even an 456 
ideology of space, for despite space’s homogeneous and objective appearance as pure 457 
form, it remains a social product. If space were not socially constituted or constitutive, 458 
our birthplace would not shape our vision of the world, nor would our daily activities be 459 
circumscribed and affected by its dispositions. Space would remain natural and neutral.20 460 
In fact, Lefebvre21says, each society throughout all of history has possessed a spatial 461 
configuration particular to its organisation – its modes of production, social relations, 462 
representations and so on.  463 
The notion of ‘social space’, however, is complex, as it must assign appropriate 464 
spaces to the panoply of ‘social relations of reproduction’ (i.e., the way people interact 465 
based on their class, gender, sexuality, race, religion and so on) and the ‘relations of 466 
production’ (i.e., divisions of labour and hierarchised social functions). In addition, social 467 
space also encompasses its specific representations, as well as those of the ‘social 468 
relations of reproduction’ and the ‘relations of production’. These spatial categories 469 
provide society with its specific configuration and ensure its cohesion via the adherence 470 
of its members who act and move according to these conventions. To address these 471 
relations properly, Lefebvre proposes a conceptual triad of space that articulates the 472 
 
20 The transition from nomadic ways of life to sedentary, for example, is demonstrative of these relations. 
21Lefebvre and David Harvey do not work within postmodern spatiality per se given that their 
Marxist/materialist genesis recuperates a modern tendency to subtract diverse discourses under one single 
narrative. However, as will be proposed later, Lefebvre reveals, with his trialectics and dynamic 
conceptualisation of space, the path for postmodern thinking. In addition, although his approach is not 
postmodern, the spaces he envisions take the embryonic shape of postmodern spaces as they will be defined 
later. 
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different types of space and ways of grasping them both ontologically and 473 
phenomenologically, which is constituted by: spatial practice (or lived space), 474 
representations of space (or perceived space) and representational spaces (or conceived 475 
space) (see Annex A). 476 
Perceived space is ‘a space of surfaces . . ., material, socially produced and 477 
empirically verified’ (Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 108), as well as the physical 478 
processes that serve as backdrop for the constitution of the other two types. Conceived 479 
space is, on the other hand, the mental and conceptual representation of the subjects’ 480 
production of space. Finally, lived space is the space of everyday life, experienced 481 
through the symbols and meanings that a specific social group ascribes to them, 482 
representing how people dwell and ascribe meaning to the other two types of space. Lived 483 
space is thus where our spatial perceptions are contested, debated or resisted. Lefebvre’s 484 
unitary theory of space gives way to a sociospatial dialectic, as Soja terms it, between the 485 
diverse structures of human activity and social relations, and which can be summarised 486 
by the term ‘historic-geographic materialism’. This term serves to conceptualise space as 487 
historically embedded and sociospatially practised: It is not monadic but constitutes itself 488 
dialectically. 489 
Thus, I argue that although Lefebvre’s trialectics has a Marxist, materialist 490 
foundation and therefore presupposes a totality that is associated with the modern 491 
emphasis on grand narratives his trialectic analysis enables a postmodern methodology 492 
within spatial conceptualisation. That approach allows for the participation of multiple 493 
discourses on space that are dialectically related to one another.  494 
It follows from this perspective that space opens new possibilities because it 495 
carries the meaning of not only spatial location, but also of the social and cultural order 496 
to such an extent that different places create different patterns with diverse meanings 497 
through which groups organise, identify and distinguish themselves.22 As space is socially 498 
constructed, it must also be assume that it is socially operative: Everyday life activities 499 
are localised in space and endow it with ontological and phenomenological consistency. 500 
 
22 People cherish the idea that everything has its place, where it belongs so much so that ‘relationships 
between an object and where it belongs is not simply fortuitous, or a matter of causal forces, but it is rather 
intrinsic or internal, a matter of what that thing actually is. When things are not where they belong, when 
they are out of place, they cannot truly be themselves’ (Curry 48). This relates to what Yi-Fu Tuan coined 
‘sense of place’. This theory maintained that spatial meaning is attributed through subjective experience – 
which is, in turn, constituted by a number of feelings, emotions, senses and memories. People can, therefore, 
become emotionally attached to places. Notions such as that proposed on this note are, if we accept Tuan’s 
assessment, of this kind. 
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Social place produces and is produced by concrete and abstract activities such that they 501 
permanently shape each other’s configuration. For the analysis of space and – most 502 
importantly for the present study – the distinction between modern and postmodern space, 503 
we must recognise this dialogue between society’s micro- and macro-structures. 504 
In this way, social space is understood as ‘inherently composite, mingling 505 
heterogeneous space together in one physical location’ (Thacker, 2003, p. 18). Pieces can 506 
be analysed individually – as Bachelard’s topoanalysis23 does – but they may vary in 507 
meaning and are intertwined in a constant flux. This flux is theorised briefly by Lefebvre, 508 
who states that ‘social spaces interpenetrate one another and/or superimpose themselves 509 
upon one another. They are not things, which have mutually limiting boundaries . . . in 510 
fact what exists is an ambiguous continuity’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 87). Through the concept 511 
of Lefebvre’s social space, even the minutest, most private place is articulated with other 512 
spaces – and places. Hence, places cannot be sharply distinguished from spaces; instead, 513 
particular places should be understood in a constant dialogue with the wider economic, 514 
political, cultural and historical meanings of social spaces. What is more, they reflect – 515 
despite their single form and particularities – the various existing discourses of social 516 
space. This interpenetration and superimposition of places and spaces implies that the 517 
analysis of any fragment of space entails a complex network of social relations. This 518 
perspective is evocative of both Bachelard’s topoanalysis and the later formulation of 519 
Soja’s nodality. 24 520 
The critique of historicism must thus be accompanied by an analysis that 521 
reconciles space-time with the social and with everyday life, whose productions of 522 
meaning and identity cannot be compounded under a single monolithic narrative. In fact, 523 
the shared operational focus of the theories reveals the need for ‘the construction of places 524 
through social practices’ (Agnew, 2011, p. 326) perceiving place as fluid, dynamic, 525 
interconnected, diverse and characterised by permeable boundaries.25 526 
 
23 See Gaston Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space. 
24 Topoanalysis consists not merely on the general investigation of a given place but of all that topos’ details 
and particulars. Topoanalysis refers to the analysis of intimate space, in specific, and the poetic, feeling-
based way we know places. The first place we know, he says, the house, is filled with emotional content 
that is inseparable from the experience of space that becomes imbued in the ways we identify and give 
meaning to space. (See Bachelard’s The Poetics of Space.) Soja’s notion of nodality argues that nodes 
enable urban societies to situate and contextualize themselves by giving material form to essential social 
relations. 
25 As Lagopolous refers, the split in spatiality between the Marxist and the humanistic geographic traditions, 
bespeaks of the ‘pertinence of the signifying dimension for the field of geography’ (Lagopolous, 1992, p. 
255) that must be able to analyse the roles of social space and attribution of meaning. 
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Postmodernism, in its suspiciousness of grand narratives that suppress multiplicity 527 
and alterity, understands space in its simultaneity, plurality and dislocation. Place is open 528 
to different articulations, connections and significances since its experience differs 529 
depending on the person and group who experience and dwell in it. Place is considered 530 
progressive and relational, and its reassertion ‘is as much a political as an intellectual 531 
move’ (Agnew, 2011, p. 325). Recurring to performative spatiality, place is regarded as 532 
associational and never complete, for it weaves together all types of spatial and temporal 533 
configurations in further, still non-existent associations (Cf. Agnew 2011). Places are 534 
historically specific, and spatial configurations are the product of agents’ intersections. 535 
Because of these aspects, feminist and postcolonial theorists, for example, have been 536 
largely integrated into the postmodern movement. Doreen Massey, for example, points 537 
out that introducing ‘into the concept of space that element of 538 
dislocation/freedom/possibility’ would ‘enable the politicization of space/space-time’ 539 
(Massey, 1994, p. 263). 540 
If we accept Jameson’s method, the consequence is that we must recognise that 541 
there is a major (modern) narrative to which all others must refer back to in order to map 542 
themselves. Cognitive mapping is a method that aims to chart the subject along a vertical 543 
axis through the use of a solely horizontal one, in turn ‘based on the acceptance of the 544 
concept of social totality’ (Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 110). Jameson attacks spatial 545 
representability on the grounds of its simultaneity, as if that would necessarily result in 546 
loss. However, in consequence of Massey’s argumentation, I argue that space’s 547 
simultaneity escapes representability only when representation means linearity. The 548 
consequence of such an analysis, Massey argues, is that ‘not only does this reduce space 549 
to unrepresentable chaos, it is also extremely problematical in what it implies for the 550 
notion of time’ (Massey, 1994, p. 264). This view disregards space as relational and as 551 
having boundaries that are not strictly defined – as modernism’s historical rationale 552 
suggests. That is not to say that space is uprooted, but rather that it cannot be fully 553 
encompassed within ‘a grandiose scheme of . . . pure spatiality’ (Massey, 1994, p. 264). 554 
Space is thus perceived as the unrepresentable, the chaotic, the plural that must be tamed 555 
under historical congruency. 556 
This position becomes extremely problematic when the question of the subject’s 557 
identity is posed. Cultural geography becomes especially prolific for the postmodern 558 
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debate in this respect, stressing the importance of articulating the consequences of actual 559 
experience with issues of cultural and social difference.26 Massey explains: 560 
If simultaneity was to be annulled under an historical, ‘comprehensive’ – because linear – 561 
narrative, ‘ethnic identities’ and ‘fundamentalisms’ would have to be (re)placed in the past so that 562 
one story of progression between differences, rather than an account of the production of a number 563 
of different differences at one moment in time, could be told. This uniformity of presumed spatial 564 
experience is what Derek Gregory, in Geographical Imaginations, calls the modernists world as 565 
exhibition. That this uniformity cannot be achieved is the real meaning of the contrast between 566 
thinking in terms of three dimensions plus one and recognizing fully the inextricability of the four 567 
dimensions together. What used to be thought of as ‘the problem of geographical description’ is 568 
actually the more general difficulty of dealing with a world which is 4-D. (Massey, Space, place, 569 
and gender, 1994, p. 268)  570 
 571 
What Massey means is that historical, spatial or social coherence annuls differences and 572 
stultifies identities by seeking to homogenise theory into a single discourse. Critical 573 
analysis must, however, be sensitive towards the porous character of space, time and 574 
society to the extent that it must be inclusive of the compasses of everyday life that 575 
absolutist explanations fail to account for – this is what she refers to when speaking of a 576 
4D epistemology. These spatial attitudes, she argues, tend to oversimplify space and 577 
conceal the fact that space is socially constructed, as well as ‘differential, conflictual and 578 
contradictory’ (Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 108). What is missing from previous 579 
accounts, whether spatially or historically orientated, Massey argues, is the integration of 580 
all four characteristics of social life: space, time, social relations and cultural forms. 581 
Instead of creating new dualisms or static analyses that are useless to everyday life 582 
practices, spatiality studies should recognise and welcome ‘that element of the chaotic, or 583 
dislocated, which is intrinsic to the spatial [and which] has effects on the social 584 
phenomena that constitute it’. Alternatively, ‘spatial form as “outcome” (the 585 
happenstance juxtapositions and so forth) has emergent powers which can have effects 586 
on subsequent events. Spatial form can alter the future course of the very histories that 587 
have produced it’ (Massey, 1994, p. 268). 588 
Soja’s Thirdspace presents an analytical tool that is comprehensive of the 589 
necessary interlocking between space, time, society and practice, upsetting traditional 590 
spatial accounts. It is in this theoretical context that Soja’s ‘thirdring-as-Othering’ thrives 591 
 
26 In Cultural Geography: A Critical Dictionary of Key Concepts, the authors reflect on how ‘cultural 
geography has been at the forefront of disciplines relating these experiences and their consequences for 
thinking society and the global circumstance. Cultural geography, articulating post-structuralist and 
postmodern critiques, has encouraged the telling of rich and multiple stories of difference (sexualities, 
genders, ‘racings’, ethnicities, ages) that would otherwise be excluded, by omission or commission, by 
dominant narrations of modernism’ (Atkinson, Jackson, Sibley, & Washbourne, 2005, pp. 161-162) 
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as a synthetic and dialectical analytical tool that allows for both a) the integration of the 592 
four dimensions Massey introduces and b) the creation of a radical new alternative that 593 
encompasses spatial praxis. Hence, Soja does not propose abandoning previous 594 
theorisations of space that were the origins of spatial dualisms, but instead rejecting binary 595 
ways of thinking, subjecting them ‘to a creative process of restructuring that draws 596 
selectively and strategically from these two opposing categories to open new alternatives’ 597 
(Soja, 1996, p. 5). Committed to the postmodern project, Thirdspace allows for the 598 
reconciliation of space and time in postmodern spatiality. His postmodern stance, 599 
however, is not an anti-modern one that threatens to obliviate previous accomplishments, 600 
but one that denounces and deconstructs conventional modern epistemologies and moves 601 
beyond simplistic dichotomies. As he points out: 602 
Singling out a radical postmodern perspective for particular attention is not meant to establish its 603 
exclusive privilege in exploring and understanding Thirdspace. It is instead an efficient invitation 604 
to enter a space of extraordinary openness, a place of critical exchange where the geographical 605 
imagination can be expanded to encompass a multiplicity of perspectives that have heretofore been 606 
considered by the epistemological referees to be incompatible, uncombinable. It sees a space 607 
where issues of race, class, and gender can be addressed simultaneously without privileging one 608 
over the other; where one can be Marxist and post-Marxist, materialists and idealists, structuralist 609 
and humanist, disciplined and transdisciplinary at the same time. (Soja, 1996, p. 5) 610 
 611 
The disciplinary tendency to focus on the outcomes and consequences ‘deriving from 612 
processes whose deeper theorization was left to others’ in ‘an infinite regression of 613 
geographies upon geographies’ (Soja, 1999, p. 38) has been one of the major obstacles to 614 
the constitution of an integrated spatiality. Soja opposes a synthetic and more 615 
comprehensive concept of Thirdspace in which previous perspectives are recombined in 616 
radical new ways, beyond dualistic terms that fall under the fallacy of the false dilemma.27 617 
Most of the endeavour of Postmodern Geographies is devoted to establishing ‘the 618 
conceptual ground for a spatialized, postmodern theory within the broad relations of 619 
historical materialism’, that ‘concludes with two chapters that illustrate what an 620 
empirically informed postmodern account might look like’ (Hubbard & Kitchin, 2011, p. 621 
382) and that focus on Los Angeles – a perceived privileged place as a template of the 622 
new postmodern world. However, Soja’s following accounts not only focus on the 623 
experience of everyday life as theoretical and empirical analysis, but also make that 624 
experience truly humanised by spatial praxis. Thirdspace and Postmetropolis refine his 625 
 
27 The false dilemma fallacy, as theorized by Aristotle, confines discussion to two alternatives when there 
may be more in actuality. 
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sociospatial dialectic into the notion of trialectics of being, recognising ‘the insight that 626 
the ontology of being can only be interpreted by examining the interlocking of spatiality, 627 
historicality, and sociality’ (Hubbard & Kitchin, 2011, p. 384). With this, Soja confirms 628 
how historical materialism is integral to ‘spatialized reconstruction through a critical 629 
engagement with postmodernism’ (Gregory, Johnston, Pratt, J.Watts, & Whatmore, 2009, 630 
p. 568).  631 
Consequently, Soja’s work reflects awareness of the active production of spaces 632 
through social and cultural practices and processes. As Lefebvre argues, social relations 633 
– whether of power, knowledge, culture, economics, politics or other domains – are 634 
operative, constitutive and constructive of space and, hence, of spatial practices. These 635 
dimensions are co-dependent and establish themselves only dialectically; any attempt to 636 
separate them would provide only an incomplete and implausible analysis. Thus, the 637 
crucial concerns of ‘thirdring-as-Othering’ are not only ontological and epistemological, 638 
but also phenomenological. Place thus equally refers to the world as a form of perception 639 
and a form of knowledge – both established by practice. Hence, instead of opposing 640 
previous perspectives and forming new binaries, Thirdspace relies on them for the 641 
construction of a new kind of spatial awareness. Soja’s trialectic does not aim to be ‘an 642 
additive combination of its binary antecedents but rather . . . a disordering, deconstruction, 643 
and tentative reconstitution of their presumed totalisation producing an open alternative 644 
that is both similar and strikingly different’ (as cited in Hubbard and Kitchin 2011, p. 645 
282). Thirdspace’s radical difference is grounded on its triple trialectics, which can be 646 
divided as follows:  647 
 648 
Spatial Trialectic Theoretical Trialectic Trialectic Framework 
First space Ontological Historical 
Second space Epistemological Social 
Thirdspace Phenomenological Spatial 
Table 1. Soja's “triple” trialectics, applied across different spectrums of analysis. 649 
 650 
Thirdspace encompasses while it transposes and moves within the first space and second 651 
space that represent a traditional binary opposition. Following Lefebvre’s line of thinking, 652 
Soja’s spatiality reflects on the interplay of spatial practices, representations of space and 653 
spaces of representation. Thirdspace dialectically interrelates real and imagined spaces, 654 
forming a third pole or space. Thirdspace ‘is a metaphorical site of what is produced by 655 
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the real/imagined binary. It is the site where social difference is produced. It also 656 
“represents social power differentials that exist before constructing what is the real-and- 657 
imagined conceptualization of space”’ (Skordoulis & Arvanitis, 2008, p. 110). Thirdspace 658 
replaces and deconstructs the binaries of first (objectivist/materialist) and second 659 
(subjectivist/idealist) space that constitute, Soja tells us, a tool of control through which 660 
knowledge, space and power are divided. Thirdspace thus refers to spatial praxis – to how 661 
people actually move in space, making use of both material space and geographical 662 
imagination. It results, then, from hybridity,28 which enables the enactment of new 663 
identities. In its simultaneity, Thirdspace is both real and imagined, mutating into 664 
something more with critical potential: ‘it is more because each both contains binary ways 665 
of thinking about space but also exceeds them with a lived intractability to interpretive 666 
schemas that allows for potentially emancipatory practices’ (Atkinson, Jackson, Sibley, 667 
& Washbourne, 2005, p. 754). 668 
Comparable to Lefebvre’s differential spaces, Soja’s Thirdspace is critical of the 669 
attribution of hegemonic meanings derived from first space for being unable to fully grasp 670 
social difference. Lefebvre’s criticism – opposing structuralist and poststructuralist 671 
conceptions that regard space in terms of its discursive connotations – points to the 672 
attribution of spatial meanings as a theoretical shortcoming of actual spatial praxis. While 673 
spaces are imbued with constructed meanings, they cannot be reduced by or to them. 674 
Instead, the notion of abstract space is connected to hidden ideological content that exacts 675 
a discreet but important influence on the members of society.29 Bearing this in mind, 676 
Lungu states: 677 
Lefebvre draws attention to the deceitful blankness of all representations of space such as maps, 678 
transport networks, and city plans which ultimately aim to project this fake homogeneity upon the 679 
representational or lived space. This constructed erasure of difference prevents the natural 680 
expansion of he calls “differential space” – one celebrating the palpable presence of living bodies, 681 
whose diversity of experience undermines centralized discourse. (Lungu, 2008, p. 7) 682 
 683 
Modern urban planning is imposed upon the subject’s motion, through space and the 684 
construction of differential spaces, an unnatural rationale that prevents the freedom of the 685 
living body. This type of planning does not aim for the dynamic interaction of individuals, 686 
 
28 The concept of hybridity as it is employed to the notion of Thirdspace is made explicit by Homi Bhabha 
in The Location of Culture. 
29 Hence, such space represents not only ideological hegemony exercised by institutions and the bourgeoise 
class ‘but also the patriarchal values underpinning capitalist society, expressed in the ‘phallic erectility’ of 
towers and skyscrapers, symbols of force, of male fertility, and of masculine violence’ (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 
176). 
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but rather the imposition of a static hierarchical spatial configuration, which inevitably 687 
constrains social relations. The subversive character of differential space is hence taken 688 
as an important form of empowerment and evasion of the rational structure of 689 
representational space. The point is then not ‘to argue for an upgrading of the status of 690 
space within the terms of the old dualism. . ., but to argue that what must be overcome is 691 
the very formulation of space/time in terms of this kind of dichotomy’ (Massey, 1994, p. 692 
260) while making room for a true spatial alternative able to encompass the multi-layered 693 
connections between space and society. Similarly, the Thirdspace concept proposes a 694 
theorisation of space that is operative in terms of people’s livelihoods and the production 695 
of counter-discourses. It is also in this manner that Thirdspace becomes fully committed 696 
to the postmodern debate. 697 
Thirdspace, as a postmodern analytical tool or concept, provides us with an 698 
operative methodology that places a spatialised trialectic at its core. Additionally, it 699 
informs us on the particular texture of everyday life spaces that surpasses the incomplete 700 
knowledge of modernism as a conventional universalising social theory. Although a 701 
slippery term, Thirdspace can be said to represent the privileged space of analysis, 702 
moving beyond first space and second space. As Soja clarifies: 703 
Everything comes together in Thirdspace subjectivity and objectivity, the abstract and the 704 
concrete, the real and the imagined, the knowable and the unimaginable, the repetitive and the 705 
differential, structure and agency, mind and body, consciousness and unconsciousness, the 706 
disciplined and the transdisciplinary, everyday life and an unending history. (Soja, 1996, pp. 56- 707 
57) 708 
 709 
Thirdspace is constructed such that social theory can rest on a triangular foundation that 710 
is consummated in social praxis. Social praxis in turn destabilises homogenising and 711 
bounded notions of social, spatial and historical theory, opening up spaces while radically 712 
transforming and integrating them. Analogous to Postmodern Geographies, both 713 
Thirdspace and Postmetropolis – once more focusing on Los Angeles – account for a 714 
theoretical, analytical and empirical inquiry.  715 
I argue that in addition to incorporating spatial praxis and, with it, social and 716 
cultural difference, Soja’s trialectics fully embodies what Massey theorises as the 4D 717 
dimension of critical thinking. Bearing this in mind, practical deconstruction can occur 718 
through the operationalisation of Foucault’s concept of heterotopia.  719 
As Foucault maintains in his lecture ‘Of Other Spaces’, places are defined by the 720 
particular set of relations they present, but some places connect to other places so as to 721 
invert, contradict or confront them. This confrontation can be of two types, he tells us: a) 722 
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by presenting an unreal place of perfection that stands as complete antithesis of actual 723 
places (i.e., utopia) or b) by presenting a real space that acts as a counter-site and that 724 
involves the process of moving from the real to the unreal (i.e., heterotopia30). A 725 
heterotopia proposes a form of transgressive spatial practice involving a re- 726 
conceptualisation of time, Soja asserts. It is a counter-site in which real sites are contested, 727 
resisted or inverted. Henceforth, a heterotopia is an imaginative conceptualisation that 728 
can nonetheless be enacted locally, in materiality. What Soja calls ‘heteropologies’ are a 729 
form of Thirdspace that offer a journey ‘into the spaces that difference makes, into the 730 
geohistories of otherness’ (Soja, 1996, p. 162) and that are informative of the ‘assertion 731 
of alternative envisioning of spatiality’ that ‘directly challenges (and is intended to 732 
challengingly deconstruct) all conventional modes of spatial thinking’ (Soja, 1996, p. 733 
163). 734 
In Soja’s formulation of Thirdspace, the concept of heterotopia is imbued with 735 
systematic analysis, used to refer not only to alternative places per se but also to 736 
geographical imaginations and practices that seek to destabilise traditional ways of 737 
thinking spatially and to thus identify new ways of expanding ‘the scope and critical 738 
sensibility of our already stablished spatial or geographical imaginations’ (Soja, 1996, p. 739 
1). Based on this account, via ‘thirdring-as-Othering’, boundaries diffuse into each other 740 
through the free movement of the individuals attributing a relational, heterogeneous and 741 
dynamic character to postmodern space. This practice challenges spatial, temporal and 742 
social abstract configuration and representation so much that space-time becomes a 743 
strategy of negotiating practices. However, given the fluid and porous character of places, 744 
heterotopian logic finds itself intertwined with the overall social fabric. Soja’s concept of 745 
Thirdspace is permissive of this intertwining: Through spatial praxis, heterotopia can be 746 
enacted in mobility. The deconstructive character of this practice is essential to the 747 
(re)construction of an alternative analysis based on social space-time. Although social 748 
blueprints try to manipulate and normalise certain modes of behaviour, subjects enact 749 
such blueprints in new, unpredictable and creative ways through spatial praxis. Michel de 750 
Carteau31 uses the concept of ‘strategy’ to make sense of and describe these social 751 
 
30 Heterotopias, he averts, are not necessarily positive places nor just spaces of resistance per se. Their 
importance resided in their performative and dialectical abilities. 
31 De Carteau is here used to make a point about spatial practice, theoretically only: for as much as in de 
Carteau admits space is dynamically constituted via practice, in The Practice of Everyday Life, place 
appears as passive and fixed. 
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blueprints of space-time practices. The concept of ‘tactics’ is employed, on the other 752 
hand, to refer to the appropriation of time and space circumstances for unconventional 753 
and idiosyncratic ends. ‘Tactics’ allow for the transgression and disruption of strategies, 754 
fragmenting and communicating their meanings through the movement of the city walker 755 
or the flâneur. Analogous to the Thirdspace conceptualisation, small-scale tactics subvert 756 
overarching strategies; through practical knowledge, such a tactic: 757 
transforms and crosses spaces, creates new links, comprising mobile geographies of looks and 758 
glances as people walk through and walk by these given places. Strategy claims territory and 759 
defines place; tactics use and subvert those places. 760 
The strategic vision of power and theory are thus transformed by small-scale tactics. (Hubbard & 761 
Kitchin, 2011, p. 109). 762 
 763 
Hence, it is possible to reclaim the power of the city through inhabitation. It follows that 764 
the whole is made from regional pieces assembled together. Although made an apparent 765 
totality, actual space is a mashup of different perspectives that, although apparently 766 
clashing, are dialectically constructed.  767 
Thirdspace is an empirical analysis and methodology that points to and enables 768 
practices through the recognition of the mobile and relational character of place. 769 
Postmodern spaces, as they are presently considered, are, unlike their modern counterpart, 770 
not closed, sealed things formed solely from internal processes. Instead, such spaces are 771 
the product of a connection to other places through communication, mobility and co- 772 
dependence. This does not mean that these spaces are innately ‘good’ or ‘desirable’ – or 773 
that difference is not often fetishised in postmodern buildings – but these places are the 774 
product of the intersection of movements and practices, instead of an unconnected island 775 
rooted in a sole internal logic. However, ‘postmodern spaces’ or ‘spatialities’ should not 776 
be confused32 with postmodern buildings. Instead, these spaces refer to a way of being of 777 
and in places, and they suggest a radical way for analyses to track spatial, social, historical 778 
and cultural differences – which may in turn be applied to specific places. ‘Thirdring-as- 779 
Othering’ enables the inclusion of these differences and lateral excursions to other places, 780 
times and social situations. 781 
 
32 Similarly, the present concept of postmodern space is not used as a periodizing concept but instead as a 
conceptual one: postmodern space is the antithesis of the site, while being comprehensive and inclusive of 
some of its features, via, again, ‘thirdring-as-Othering’. 
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Accepting Soja’s – and Massey’s33 – premise that space is relational does not 782 
mean, however, that we must abandon other conceptions of space but, rather, that we 783 
must integrate them dialectically. ‘Place’ still means ‘location’, but this location presumes 784 
both that spatial interaction occurs between places (through the mobility of people, 785 
objects, ideas, relations and so forth) and that social relations must be understood flexibly, 786 
through the series of locales where everyday life takes place. However, space also 787 
presupposes a sense of place, through which meanings and identities are constructed and 788 
articulated. Moreover, it must be recognised that place mobility is an important tool of 789 
sociality. In For Space, Massey asserts that this spatial connectedness is heterogeneously 790 
constituted. Space is open, relational, multiple and unfinished. Her spatial analysis is 791 
devoted to the recognition of difference and alterity in spatial constitution. Hence, Massey 792 
demands not only a comprehensive spatial methodology but also a conceptualisation of 793 
space and place that integrated perception and meaning attribution in social space: ‘how, 794 
in other words, one formulates the concept of space or place radically shapes one’s 795 
understanding of the social world and how to effect transformation in and of it’ (Hubbard 796 
& Kitchin, 2011, p. 299). Epistemological and ontological accounts of space must thus 797 
be aware of their role in the production of spatial knowledge and, consequently, of social 798 
practices, seeking to encourage and empower such knowledge and practices. This 799 
intersectionality enabled by Thirdspace as a postmodern practice aims at the dissolution 800 
of rigid representations of space; of inequalities, segregation and exclusion34 permitted 801 
by established power geometries35; and is guided by emancipatory spatial praxis, place 802 
and the configuration of contextual changes. New technologies should thus be integrated 803 
and regarded as part of new ‘place-making projects’ (Green, Harvey, & Knox, 2005, p. 804 
807), rather than disregarded as uprooted or defective sociospatial imagination and 805 
mapping – as Jameson’s explanation of postmodern ‘hyperspace’ does. 806 
As suggested by Skordoulis and Arvanitis – although their aim is pedagogical – 807 
postmodern curricula can change sociospatial critical-thinking, as well as create spaces 808 
of and for transformation by using Soja’s Thirdspace methodology (i.e., spatial praxis). 809 
Spatial praxis offers a new theoretical and conceptual framework through the 810 
 
33 In The Spatial Division of Labour, spatial analysis is focused on the investigation of objects – people, 
events, identities, social relations and so forth – relationally. These are always localised and are product of 
the interchangeability and communication between places. 
34 See ‘Increasing the Openness of Thirdspace’ in Soja’s Thirdspace: Journeys to Los Angeles and Other 
Real-and-Imagined Spaces 
35 See Doreen Massey’s Imagining Globalization: Power-Geometries of Time-Space. 
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operationalisation of Thirdspace in the deconstruction of dominant discourses, such as 811 
the historical one, as well as by rethinking issues such as place identity, social difference 812 
and transformation and by mapping the subject. Massey says, in this respect: 813 
You're taking a train across the landscape - you're not traveling across dead flat surface that is 814 
space: you're cutting across and myriad the stories going on. So instead of space being this flat 815 
surface, it's like a pink pincushion of a million stories: if you stop at any points in that walk there 816 
will be a house with a story. Raymond Williams spoke about looking out of the train window and 817 
there was this woman clearing the grate, and he speeds on forever and in his mind, she’s stuck in 818 
that moment. but actually, of course, that woman is in the middle of doing something, it's a story. 819 
maybe she's going away tomorrow to see her sister, the really before she goes, she really must 820 
clean that grates out because she's been meaning to do it for ages. So, I want to see space as a cut 821 
through the myriad stories in which we are all living at any moment. space and time become 822 
intimately connected. (Massey, Doreen Massey on Space, February 1, 2013) 823 
 824 
What this means is that space is inherently simultaneous in its formulation, presenting us 825 
with the existence of the Other – the subject Other, the historical Other, the cultural Other, 826 
and so forth. Perspectives condemning or denying the simultaneity and multiplicity of 827 
space nullify difference and dilute it in a linear historical trajectory. The possibility of an 828 
alternative can only be theorised if one accepts the porous nature of space. Globalisation 829 
makes this recognition urgent because place can no longer only ‘be defined as a distinct, 830 
coherent, and bounded locale, associated with a culturally given community’ (Antonsich, 831 
2011, p. 334). Space must be constructed dialectically as a product of real-and-imagined 832 
spaces, encompassing the modes of production, reproduction and distribution; historical, 833 
material, social and cultural conditions; and voices that demand transformation through 834 
transformative differential spatial practice. 835 
An alternative mode of analysis is thus necessary: one that not only rescues space 836 
from temporal hegemony, but also integrates human sociality. Space must be considered 837 
a ‘meeting-place, the location of the intersection of particular bundles of activity spaces, 838 
of connections and interconnections, of influences and movements’ (Massey, 1991, p. 28) 839 
that come together at a particular point in time. 840 
The postmodern treatment of space, as comprehended in this study, incorporates 841 
this synthesis that Massey speaks about between historicity and spatiality. It is grounded 842 
in spatial praxis (Thirdspace), encompassing both the overall, abstract perspective of the 843 
city with a specific spatial organisation (first space) and the representations of space by 844 
its inhabitants (second space). In contrast to the modern tendency to categorise and 845 
generalise concrete experience into abstract terms or to jeopardise analytical thought and 846 
spatial empowerment by relegating space to the realm of the mental, postmodern analysis 847 
invests in the synthesis of the two, opening to the living experience of actual people and 848 
 29 
 
providing both analytical and concrete foundations. It is the actual effects of the places 849 
that matter when conceptualising place on an abstract level: Place is used as ‘a meta- 850 
concept that allows for the telling of particular stories associated with specific places’ 851 
(Agnew, 2011, p. 318). This new possibility enables the production of place in 852 
multiplicity through the rhythms of being that constitute and are constituted within it. 853 
 854 
 855 
1.2 Spaces of Art: Postmodernism and the utopian impulse 856 
I have been told there are no more unknown islands and that, even if there are, they would not be 857 
the ones to be taken from the quiet of their homes and the ferryboat’s good life to go on oceanic 858 
adventures, seeking an impossible, as if we were still in the time of the tenebrous sea, And did you 859 
not tell them about the unknown island, How could I tell them about an unknown island, if I don’t 860 
know it, But you are sure it exists, As sure as the sea being tenebrous. (Saramago, 2007, p. 27)36 861 
 862 
Although there is much literature devoted to the space in art, this study is devoted to the 863 
study of the artwork in space. Art is socially produced, and thus, if we accept the claims 864 
of the previous chapter, the artwork condition of happenstance in space must always 865 
generate a type of space that is the product of an encounter between social, spatial, 866 
historical and cultural relations – or, at least, that is one of the claims this chapter makes. 867 
Thus, very simply and broadly put, the space of art primarily refers to the space where art 868 
presents itself ontologically as ‘being-in-the-world’:37 The artwork must be placed 869 
somewhere, and that somewhere is here termed the ‘space of art’. The space of art can 870 
be, for example, a museum, art gallery, library, street or studio. However, although it is 871 
generally recognised as fundamental as background, the space – in its full Lefebvrian or 872 
Sojian form – of the work of art was hardly admitted previously to what was 873 
unsystematically called the ‘spatial turn’ and, in a more accepted way, ‘the urban turn’ in 874 
art and aesthetics.  875 
To be fair, place has more or less been considered essential in performance art, 876 
such as dance or theatre; other types of art, such as painting, music and literature, 877 
however, have been mainly theorised in terms of their temporality in modernism: painting 878 
as a static representation of time; music as unfolding in time; and literature as featuring a 879 
 
36 Original text: “Disseram-me que já não há ilhas desconhecidas, e que, mesmo que as houvesse, não iriam 
eles tirar-se do sossego dos seus lares e da boa vida dos barcos de carreira para se meterem em aventuras 
oceânicas, à procura de um impossível, como se ainda estivéssemos no tempo do mar tenebroso o, E não 
lhes falaste da ilha desconhecida, Como poderia falar-lhes eu duma ilha desconhecida, se não a conheço, 
Mas tens a certeza de que ela existe, Tanta como a de ser tenebroso o mar”. 
37 Borrowing Heidegger’s term. 
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linear, chronological narrative. However, as far as space has been theorised, every type 880 
of art produces space. The space of art is artistic in itself ‘because it has not lost touch 881 
with the non-artistic space. The work of art’s autonomy is a dialectical moment of its 882 
heteronomy’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 93). What seems to divide theorisations – similar to 883 
what the first part of this chapter has noted – is the type of space art produces: either ideal 884 
(mental, imaginary) or material (abstract, real). Once more, it is this modern dualist 885 
construction of space that we try to deconstruct. These aesthetic attitudes towards artistic 886 
spatialisation before the revision of the art space, especially the museum and art gallery, 887 
are coined the ‘modern space of art’, following the distinctions made in the previous 888 
chapter. It follows that modern spaces of art, similar to other spaces before the spatial 889 
turn, were mainly horizontal, homogeneous, bounded and institutionalised.  890 
In the idealist school – largely inspired by Hegel – historical attitudes were mainly 891 
those of historicism, and aestheticism was perceived as bound to the placement of the 892 
subject – not a socially, historically and spatially bounded subject and not just any subject, 893 
but an ideal subject whose character was reduced to that of the Eye.38 The materialist 894 
perspective’s historical attitude, on the other hand, placed great emphasis on material 895 
reality, paying increasing ‘attention to perceptual detail for its own sake’, to which was 896 
accompanied ‘a tendency toward superficiality, a reluctance to present grand 897 
philosophical ideas, and an increasing disengagement from moral issues’ (Davies, 898 
Higgins, Hopkins, Stecker, & Cooper, 2009, p. 56). This overinvestment in the formal 899 
qualities of the object as functional aesthetic by its mere existence as an ontological 900 
category imbues the subject with little to no autonomy of his or her own. Recalling both 901 
Lefebvre’s and Soja’s critiques, these attitudes’ deep entrenchment in historicism 902 
expresses the double illusion of transparency and opacity. These attitudes’ full neglect of 903 
spatiality makes their blockage even more explicit. Although aiming for universality, 904 
these attitudes fall far from their original intentions by often disregarding spatiality, non- 905 
Western historicity, modes of production, social relations, the average social individual 906 
and so on. This is not to say that the debate altogether dismisses the question of the space 907 
of art, but that modern thought is not preoccupied with spatiality, such as the field Soja 908 
proposes in Postmodern Geographies: Art space, as it is positioned at the intersection of 909 
the spatiality of the city or the urban, must necessarily shape art’s role and perception 910 
 
38 O’Doherty refers to the Eye as the disembodied, abstract mode of perception that is super-imposed in the 
white cube. 
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and, consequently, social relations. As far as the artwork always comes into existence 911 
materially, it is bound to material (physical or real) space. In a similar fashion, as art 912 
always comes into existence in society and as a product of society, it is bound to social 913 
space. In this respect, Didier Maleuvre states that ‘art never occurs in an absolute 914 
contextual vacuum’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 33). Conversely, art cannot be reduced to a mere 915 
idea – or to an ‘image’ or ‘fiction’, as Hegel suggests – as this would mean that art would 916 
never appear materially or that the artwork would have the ability to abstract itself from 917 
the empirical framework. The immediate consequence of this notion is that the modern 918 
museum or gallery wall must mediate between the artwork and material reality, as these 919 
topos must provide the minimum amount of context in their detachment from other 920 
spaces. The modern art space, as built and theorised, nevertheless cultivates a form of 921 
being and identification that is concealed by what they lack, which is attached to both 922 
space and the artwork, producing history ‘in an essentially different way than other 923 
artefacts do’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 3). With this remark, Maleuvre alludes to the modern 924 
museum, but his statement could also serve to critique spatial analysis and artistic practise 925 
in modernism in a broader form. In fact, the modern museum provides an exemplary case 926 
for the theorisation of the modern space of art,39 which is why it is used, along with the 927 
modern art gallery, as a case study. 928 
Bearing this in mind, one can note that the museum as modern space is not only 929 
homogeneous and historicist in its spatiality, but that ‘from its official inception near the 930 
turn of the nineteenth century . . . has manufactured an image of history’ (Maleuvre, 1999, 931 
p. 1). Therefore, the museum’s spatial configuration and the type of spatial practices it 932 
produces are horizontally orientated and bounded: In the search for an internal logic that 933 
would preserve art as either a formal or ideally detached object – despite imposing on its 934 
mode of exposition and surrounding environment an external historical, ideological and 935 
identitary logic – the museum severs the artwork from space and society, deeming it 936 
‘cultural in the sense suggested by the [modern] work of art: a liberation from “culture”’ 937 
(Maleuvre, 1999, p. 4). Hence, despite the previously suggested theoretical differences 938 
regarding the status of the space of art, spatiality was mostly excluded from the 939 
discussion; time was the supposed foundational axis on which all space was considered. 940 
 
39 The modern museum and art gallery are produced both by the idealist and materialist schools as it is the 
very creation of a fissure and the illusion of dichotomy that produces the modern space of art as result of a 
conflict that denote the same historical and spatial disconnectedness and that, thus, imbue art and space 
with their own univocal, ideological identities. 
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This temporality and historicism produced by the art space was nevertheless somewhat 941 
particular to it. According to Brian O’Doherty in Inside the White Cube: The Ideology of 942 
the Gallery Space, the modern space of art tried to serve as the background for the 943 
unfolding of history, history was perceived in stativity, and the artwork was preserved as 944 
an eternal nomad. The modern space of art provided not only a vision of history and time 945 
through space, but also an ideological, identitary vision that negated the possibility of 946 
change of its own conditions. The artwork was permanently frozen in space, and the space 947 
of art was permanently frozen for the preservation of the artwork. This movement 948 
denaturalised both artwork and art space as social fact – both as product and as producer. 949 
To be sure, the museum first appeared as a de-privatisation movement in the 950 
nineteenth century. Museums sought to obtain artworks from private owners, landlords, 951 
noblemen and clerics and to make them national property, cared for by expert scholars 952 
and connoisseurs. However, the modern museum formed a new elite, and the artworks 953 
remained private40 objects – even if available to a larger circle. The spatialisation of art 954 
within the museum space, museifies it, reducing it to a mere object rather than praxis, or 955 
even a social fact.41 The context or space of the modern museum or art gallery is one that 956 
expects the lack of that context. 957 
In the first part of Inside the White Cube, O’Doherty describes this space as one 958 
that seeks to simultaneously keep the artwork in and the outside world out. He states that 959 
‘The outside world must not come in, so windows are usually sealed off. Walls are painted 960 
white. The ceiling becomes the source of light . . . the art is free, as the saying used to go, 961 
“to take on his life”’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 15). By extricating art from life, its relation to 962 
history becomes problematic; the museum preserves history as a ‘residue or ruin’ 963 
(Maleuvre, 1999, p. 9), not for the consumption of the present but for posteriority. 964 
Historicity gives way to historicism42 in the modern art space, as ‘art exists in a kind of 965 
 
40 ‘Historically’, Sheikh says, ‘the art institution, or museum, was the bourgeoisie public sphere par 
excellence, a place of rational – critical thought and (self) representation of the bourgeoisie class and its 
values’ (Sheikh, Public Spheres and the Function of the Progressive Art Institutions) 
41 Initial criticism of the museum included its uprootedness, elitism, detachment from everyday life and 
lack of authenticity: the museum was said to endanger ‘artistic and cultural authenticity by removing 
artworks and artifacts from their original location and placing them in galleries where they can only be 
gawked at , and never . . . lived with. Loss of contexts, loss of cultural meaning, destruction of a direct 
connection with life, promotion of an esthetically alienated mode of observation, instigation of a passive 
attitude towards the past and debilitating mood of nostalgia’ (Friedland e Boden 1) were some of those 
preoccupations. 
42 Similarly to Soja’s criticism of modernism’s obsession with historicism rather than historicity in the 
social sciences, which circumscribed both time and space theorisation, so too Maleuvre makes a connection 
between the modern museum tendency to exclude the artwork from space and from time via its removal 
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eternity of display. And though there is lots of “period” (late modern) there is no time. 966 
This eternity gives the gallery a limbolike status; one has to have died already to be there’ 967 
(O'Doherty, 1986, p. 15). This form of eternity and historicism is typical, he argues, of 968 
religious buildings, which are also built to be isolated from the outside world, refusing 969 
otherness. These spaces are ‘specially segregated’, a ‘kind of non-place, ultra-place or 970 
ideal space where the surrounding matrix of space-time is symbolically annulled’ 971 
(McEvilley, 1986, p. 8). Such buildings cease, in this matter, to be space as a trialectic 972 
product and are instead converted into sites. In parallel, as the space gives way to the site, 973 
the artwork gives way to the monument, and aesthetic autonomy gives way to a modern 974 
exclusive sensibility: ‘monumentality surrounds the artwork with the ceremonial aura that 975 
keeps the spectator at bay’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 58). Although spatial, the monument 976 
inflicts a temporal, social and aesthetic disjunction, as it makes room for an absence. The 977 
artwork as monument stands equally distant from the past and the present, no longer 978 
presenting ‘an esthetic experience’ but a ‘model of subjectivity caught in history’ 979 
(Maleuvre, 1999, p. 6).43 The museum is crucial to this reduction, as it severs art from 980 
experience to ‘serve as insignia of taste and certificates of special culture’ (Dewey, 1980, 981 
p. 9). 982 
This space requests not only the immortalisation of the aesthetic, but also a type 983 
of sensibility: ‘by suggesting eternal ratification of a certain sensibility, the white cube 984 
suggests eternal ratification of the claims of the caste or group sharing that sensibility’ 985 
(McEvilley, 1986, p. 9). The ideal, eternal character of what O’Doherty calls the ‘white 986 
cube’44 grants its sameness, homogeneity, boundedness and muteness to other spaces. In 987 
its pursuit to establish an ideal, mental or imaginary space for art to be freed from culture 988 
for the sake of its autonomy, the white cube stands as a perfect site; it ‘censors out the 989 
 
from history. He says: ‘In lifting art out of the hurly-burly of historical survival, the museum strips the 
artwork of its historical existence. It replaces historicity with historiography’ (Maleuvre 57). 
43 Maleuvre proceeds: ‘Tipped to the side of the object, culture in Balzac emerges essentially as a culture 
of death’ (Maleuvre 6). As John Dewey claims, by removing the artwork from its original status, the artwork 
is reduced to fine art. Fine art is, according to him, a reduction of the artwork’s status for, rather than 
elevating art to the autonomous state, it alienates it from its source and transforms it into the product of 
elitist contemplation. 
44 The ‘white cube’ refers to the typical art gallery space, whose lack of context is assumed, in modernism, 
to provide the fewer context possible to the artwork so that it is made truly ideal and the cut between its 
perceived interior properties be severed from the outside world. 
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world of social variation, promoting a sense of the sole reality of its own point of view 990 
and, consequently, its endurance or eternal rightness’ (McEvilley, 1986, p. 9).45 991 
The museum testifies to institutional validation in the same way Foucault’s46 992 
account of institutions does. Modern spaces of art are institutional per se, if we accept 993 
Foucault’s use of the term,47 since they order the practices and discourses allowed within 994 
them, classifying both art and space according to a set of specific rules that validate art 995 
through its emplacement and the type of spatial practices allowed within these spaces. In 996 
its search to accommodate art’s autonomy, the modern space of art annuls that autonomy 997 
under institutionalisation. The bounded character of the modern art space and its seriality 998 
as a quasi-religious institution of horizontal and ideal permanence ‘gives the space of 999 
presence possessed by other spaces where conventions are preserved through the 1000 
repetition of a closed system of values . . . So powerful are the perceptual fields of force 1001 
within this chamber that, once outside it, art can collapse into secular status’ (O'Doherty, 1002 
1986, p. 14). Furthermore, these places for art, via the fabrication of history through the 1003 
chosen form of exhibition, gather people towards an identity that does not assume itself 1004 
to be such. Denying ideology, identity, space, history and society for the sake of art’s 1005 
autonomy, the museum space remains ideological, identitary, spatial, historical and 1006 
social, despite being constituted by the curator and sameness instead of practice, plurality, 1007 
alterity and difference. The artwork is denied its autonomy in the very constitution of 1008 
space. It is assumed to be unable to produce its own space; therefore, space constitutes an 1009 
external part of its ontology that is injected into it – on a white canvas or in a white cube 1010 
– in which the artwork is removed from the world and lacks agency apart from individual 1011 
or elitist representation. 1012 
 
45 It could also be argued that without the museum, ‘the idea of art as a cross-cultural, transhistorical 
phenomenon, which underpins even Dewey’s account, would not have achieved social visibility’ (Mattick 
432) and would be relegated to the status of mundane object or artefact. So, what is implied here, is not that 
the museum removes art from itself , but rather that before accommodating the notion of the spatiality of 
the artwork besides itself, the museum ‘commodified’, homogenised and stultified art as a token of a given 
society and a given class sensibility: as a historical and ideological symbol whose social connections were 
solely defined by an elitist and negative aesthetic that was not self-reflexive. Art’s autonomy an even its 
negative aesthetic was jeopardised and limited given their ideological co-option. 
46 Museums shared the qualities of Foucault’s and Casey’s sites being instrumental and functional, ‘capable 
of inducing a reform of public manners’ (quoted in Naylor and Hill 71) to which the autonomy of art was 
oftentimes the prescription of, via the exercise of institutional power over artistic form. Surely, this is not 
a completely linear prescription and as Foucault’s concept of heterotopia or De Carteau’s tactics, these 
perspectives are always resisted in one way or another by the practices of the public. 
47 See Foucault’s The Birth of the Clinic and Discipline and Punish for primary resource and Mark Yount 
and John D. Caputo’s (eds.) Foucault and the Critique of Institutions or Miloje Grbin’s ‘Foucault and Place’ 
for further reading. 
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There are one or more assumptions about sociality and identity inherently 1013 
involved in the process of the institutionalisation of the modern art space in which the 1014 
spectator is disembodied as the Eye,48 as O’Doherty discusses. The spectator is expected 1015 
to comply with the role and consequent spatial practices he or she has been assigned. The 1016 
frame strives to contain the picture as the art space strives to contain the viewer. 1017 
O’Doherty says, in the words of McEvilley, regarding the expected spatial practices of 1018 
the white cube (returning to the analogy between modern spaces of art and religious 1019 
spaces or sites): 1020 
In classical modernist galleries, as in churches, one does not speak in a normal voice; one does 1021 
not laugh, eat, drink, or sleep; one does not get ill, go mad, sing, dance, or make love. Indeed, 1022 
since the white cube promotes the myth that we are there essentially as spiritual beings . . ., we are 1023 
to be understood as tireless and above the vicissitudes of chance and change (McEvilley, 1986, p. 1024 
10) 1025 
 1026 
Instead of the artwork being a productive force for the construction of the space of art, it 1027 
is devoured by that space, becoming it. In fact, the quest to clear the space of context and 1028 
expose the artwork in a vacuum for the preservation of the same artwork constitutes the 1029 
downfall of modern artistic attitudes and discourses, as made explicit in the various waves 1030 
of institutional critique movements that followed. The stress on de-contextualisation is 1031 
formative of an ideology of the artwork (and its space), whose ontology consequently 1032 
depends on the context-premise – or its negation. However, the negation of context 1033 
negates itself: if the artwork is independent of context, its ontological status of being art 1034 
is thus dependent on the lack of context. This lack necessarily defines it if we agree with 1035 
the presupposition of the autonomous artwork. This relationship is problematic in two 1036 
distinct ways: not only is the white cube, despite its lack of complex visual stimuli, a 1037 
context in itself, but by being defined in terms of the negation of context, the context – or 1038 
the lack thereof – also defines the artwork, whose definition requires annulment.49 The 1039 
modern space of art’s lack of context is then merely superficial:  1040 
The white wall's apparent neutrality is an illusion. It stands for a community with common ideas 1041 
and assumptions. Artist and audience are, as it were, invisibly spread-eagled in 2-D on a white 1042 
ground. The development of the pristine, placeless white cube is one of modernism's triumphs – a 1043 
development commercial, esthetic, and technological. In an extraordinary strip-tease. The art 1044 
within bares itself more and more, until it presents formalist end products and bits of reality from 1045 
outside. (O'Doherty, Inside the White Cube 79) 1046 
 
48 The modern museum rejects the Spectator of its intrinsic qualities as sentient and empowered subject and 
reduces it into an abstraction from which the artwork and the space of art lives without. 
49 For Heidegger49, for example, the aesthetic, musified perception of art declares the triumph of the object 
over the real ontology of the artwork (or the ‘work-being’), it is reduced to mere form – the inverse move, 
however, produces the same consequences. 
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Since the lack of context condition cannot be fulfilled, there cannot be art in the sense 1047 
proposed by the modern idealist conception. As Simon Sheikh, in a recent review of 1048 
O’Doherty’s text, so persuasively puts it, ‘the spatial arrangement overdetermines – 1049 
consumes – the works . . . to the degree that context becomes content’ (Sheikh, 2009, 1050 
n.p.). In place of this, O’Doherty explains, both abstraction or mental space and real or 1051 
abstract space should be implicated in the space of art since the ‘exclusive division 1052 
between them has blurred the fact that the first has considerable practical relevance – 1053 
contrary to the modern myth that art is “useless”’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 38). Arriving at 1054 
the same conclusions Lefebvre does regarding the double illusion of modern thinking 1055 
about space, the critic contends that these modern discourses have resulted in a 1056 
theorisation of art that removes it from space, history and society. Although deeply 1057 
embedded in a temporal narrative, the modern art space negates the concept of the artwork 1058 
as historically founded. Although a space, the modern art space negates the artwork’s 1059 
spatiality. Moreover, although orientated towards the formation of a specific society – as 1060 
all spaces are, according to Lefebvre – the artwork is deemed asocial, useless or an end 1061 
in itself. 1062 
Although necessary at some historical point for salvaging the artworks from 1063 
private collections, the modern art space, as it has been defended in the form of the 1064 
museum or art gallery, alienated the artwork from space and society. In trying to elevate 1065 
it to a transcendent, ideal realm, freed from materiality, the modern art space instead 1066 
quarantines the artwork, as Maleuvre expounds: 1067 
This quarantining of art constitutes a political feature because it defines social spaces, their mode 1068 
of integration and their content . . . [they] remove artworks from involvement in the polis, 1069 
neutralize their political thrust, freeze their contents as esthetically remote forms. By its very 1070 
existence, the museum legislates against the direct participation of art in the polis. (Maleuvre, 1071 
1999, p. 39) 1072 
 1073 
On that matter, O’Doherty points to the anti-formalist tradition, presented in works such 1074 
as Duchamp’s 1200 Coal Bags (1938) and Mile of Strings (1942). In these works, 1075 
Duchamp seeks to destabilise the traditional spatial conception and heralds the 1076 
spatialisation of art practices and discourses. He also seeks to occupy and transform the 1077 
space of art itself and to defy it as an ideal abstraction of space. In 1200 Coal Bags, 1078 
Duchamp subverts the usual spatial configuration by ‘traversing the space from floor to 1079 
ceiling . . . design[ing] the doors leading in and out of the gallery’, installing ‘revolving 1080 
doors, that is, doors that confuse inside and outside by spinning what they trap. This 1081 
inside-outside confusion is consistent with tilting the gallery on its axis’ (O'Doherty, 1082 
 37 
 
1986, p. 68). Thus, Duchamp exposes the issue of context in art, ‘of the container and the 1083 
contained’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 68). This invention – attributed by O’Doherty to 1084 
Duchamp – reportedly initiated a series of practices inside the gallery and a growing 1085 
awareness of a ‘seepage of energy from art to its surroundings’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 69). 1086 
That shift accelerated the spatialisation of art, on the one hand, and decreased the 1087 
mythification of the modern art space, on the other hand. This movement found deeper 1088 
expression during the 1960s and 1970s with the emergence of the institutional critique 1089 
and the postmodern debate. 1090 
Yet, the first discourses that aimed to challenge the modern art space, such as 1091 
Duchamp’s, only made sense inside that space and, to that extent, maintained it. However, 1092 
these attempts worked at the level of transforming these spaces and initiated50 a discourse 1093 
that could then be made spatial, rather than fixed under the old notions of art and art space 1094 
conceptualisation. Andy Warhol’s Brillo Boxes (Soap Pads) (1964), for example, 1095 
exposed not only that the artwork is situated in place, but also that it is fundamental to 1096 
the constitution of that place. The artwork thus ‘molds the space around it, gives it texture 1097 
and visibility, and situates us in that space. Warhol’s Brillo boxes ask us to consider the 1098 
esthetic space of art not as something extraneous to the work of art, but rather an effect 1099 
of the work, one of its creations’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 56). These artistic practices, despite 1100 
being implemented from inside the modern institution of art, were transformative, 1101 
tentative51 and inclusive, and they proposed an alternative that did not seem ‘to occur to 1102 
idealist and radical social planners’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 86). 1103 
Thus, it is no surprise that the institutional critique was both ‘a critical method’ 1104 
and ‘an artistic practice’ of the modern institution of art – mainly the modern museum, 1105 
but also galleries and collections – that took the form of artistic practices, criticism and 1106 
activism. Initiated as ‘a critique of their [art institutions] ideological and representative 1107 
social function(s)’ (Sheikh, 2009, p. 30), and their self-proclaimed status as the neutral 1108 
 
50 Criticism took some time to accompany what had already been taking place for a long time. The case is 
in point when we look at the spatial critique that has been taking place by artists, such as Duchamp or 
Mondrian, well before the 1970s and the accompanied spatial turn – although still framed within that 
discourse it tried to critique. William Morris, whom will be analysed later, provides a sharp example of 
such artistic sensibility, predicting realities to come. 
51 The architecturalisation and spatialisation of the arts – in its various forms – surpassed the modern white 
cube as they create a new reality for the artwork: no longer would ‘painting and sculpture . . . manifest 
themselves as separate objects, nor as ‘mural art’ which destroys architecture itself, nor as ‘applied’ art, but 
being purely constructive [would] aid the creation of a surrounding not merely utilitarian or rational but 
also pure and complete in its beauty’ (O'Doherty, Inside the White Cube 85). 
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container of art’s perceived essence of autonomy, the institutional critique sought to 1109 
denounce the art institution’s production and reproduction of a form of being and identity 1110 
that often nullified the artwork. Instead of preserving the artwork, as Robert Smithson 1111 
argues, they acted as spaces of ‘cultural confinement’ that threatened the aesthetic, 1112 
political, social and theoretical status of art. The whiteness of the white cube did not make 1113 
it neutral, but sterile.  1114 
There was then an awareness – as David Livingstone argues in Putting Science in 1115 
its Place – that museum architecture is not simply devoted to solving specific social or 1116 
practical problems, as architects or designers usually do – but to constructing a ‘symbolic 1117 
writing of space’ (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 38). The museum’s layout, content, order of 1118 
display, boundaries, light, location and so on have often been used to impose cultural or 1119 
ideological values onto those spaces – especially, as the institutional critique and other 1120 
postmodern positions claim, if we consider the museum’s modern function, which 1121 
comprised the reinforcement of an established historical narrative of progress and 1122 
hegemony of Western countries, whose annulment of spatial difference was enacted via 1123 
institutions, such as the traditional modern museum, and other spatial forms. 1124 
Naylor and Hill refer to Lewis Mumford, who, as early as 1938,52 spoke about 1125 
how the museum represents ‘the most typical institution of the metropolis, as 1126 
characteristic of its ideal life, as the gymnasium was of the Hellenistic city or the hospital 1127 
of the medieval city’ (as cited in Naylor and Hill, 2011, p. 66) and how this was central 1128 
to the reinforcement of the modern project. Object disposition in the modern museum, 1129 
for example, ‘operate[s] like a map – bringing “the world into an apparent single, rational 1130 
framework, with unified, ordered and assigned relationships between nature, the arts and 1131 
cultures”’ (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 68); offering a static and apparently coherent vision 1132 
of the world; and ordering the gaze and movement of the visitor in alignment with a 1133 
historical or ideological narrative. The organisation of objects53 is aimed at the reflection 1134 
 
52 See Lewis Mumford’s The Culture of the Cities. 
53 Naylor and Hill tell us: ‘by the late nineteenth century the display of human history was organized around 
the temporal development of people and their possessions’ (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 69) denoting a tendency 
by the museums ‘to impose a temporal history onto human history (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 70)’  – one of 
progress – not only through architecture, object displaying and spatial layout, but also through a set of 
‘exhibitionary policies’ (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 70). Object display by the beginning of the twentieth 
century was ‘reorganized into a typological schema where objects of the same type from different places 
was grouped together and then arranged in a sequential order, with objects considered ‘more natural’ and 
organic at the beginning of a series and more specialized and ‘complex’ at the end, such that an evolutionary 
progression of material culture was suggested’ (Naylor & Hill, 2011, p. 70). This emphasis on temporal, 
historical narrative of progress disregarded the spatial and identitary qualities of the displayed objects, 
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of a specific set of beliefs: It is always identitary in this respect, but also personal – 1135 
reflecting the curators’ set of values or beliefs. Maleuvre states that ‘however neutral the 1136 
museum estheticization of art appears, it is nonetheless fraught with political overtones. 1137 
Art is not the only thing the museum neutralizes’ (10-11). The museum neutralises 1138 
aesthetic contemplation, spatial practices, social relations, an image of history and the 1139 
status quo. The emptying of space and the apparent liberation of art from culture 1140 
transforms it into a recipient of a unilateral and unidimensional vision. This attitude is 1141 
largely what the institutional critique stands against. 1142 
The institutional critique54 thus established new links and modes of inquiry 1143 
between artistic practices and spatial discourses, announcing a closer relationship 1144 
between artistic and geographic inquiry. As Sheikh states, ‘one can then see institutional 1145 
critique not as a historical period and/or genre within art history, but rather as an analytical 1146 
tool, a method of spatial and political criticism and articulation that can be applied to the 1147 
artworld, but to the disciplinary places and institutions in general’ (Sheikh, 2009, p. 32). 1148 
This view promoted the institutional critique as demanding the cooperation and 1149 
interdisciplinarity of art practices, especially geography and art. 1150 
All these new conditions have propelled, as Soja tells us in ‘Taking Space 1151 
Personally’, a ‘sort of’ spatial turn (Cf. Soja, 2009) in the arts. Jane Rendell adds that: 1152 
The turn to spatial theory in the late 1980s and early 1990s highlighted the importance of space 1153 
rather than time in the postmodern period. Academics from all kinds of disciplines, from art history 1154 
to cultural studies looked to geography for a rigorous and theoretically informed analysis of the 1155 
relationship between spatial and social relations, and of place and identity. (Rendell, 2006, p. 35)55 1156 
 1157 
 1158 
This spatial turn considered that most essentialist modern art forms ignored in their 1159 
construction as art-things the sociospatial demands in which the works of art were 1160 
 
which bespoke of a historicist tendency to homogenise social relations under a grand modern modus 
operandi. 
54 The institutional critique not only was made from the outside of the art space but also from the inside, by 
curators and critics besides artists. Sheikh says: ‘Analysed in terms of negative dialectics, this would seem 
to indicate the total co-option of the institutional critique by the institutions’ (Sheikh, Notes on Institutional 
Critique , 2009, p. 31)thus making it futile, as would argue critics such as Adorno. However, ‘such a 
conclusion would hinge around notions of subjectivities’ that would confirm the status of authenticity of 
the artist and reaffirm the ideas the institutional critique tried to deconstruct. In fact, ‘if institutional critique 
was indeed a discourse of disclosure and demystification of how the artistic subject as well as object was 
staged and reified by the institution, then any narrative that (again) posits certain voices and subjects as 
authentic’ (Sheikh, Notes on Institutional Critique , 2009, p. 31) would turn the critique back on itself by 
co-opting their ideological and ideal discourse that created the institutionalisation of the artwork in the first 
place. 
55 See Michael Keith’s and Steve Pike’s Place and the Politics of Identity for a more detailed analysis on 
the relationship between identity and space. 
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included in their ontological and phenomenological status. The artwork is nevertheless 1161 
constituted in and of a triad that implicates the art space.56 Once time, as a source of 1162 
representation, becomes insufficient in the production of value, a crisis in ‘almost every 1163 
other form of representation [follows]: language unhinges from the objective world of 1164 
linguistics, the realist narrative line is abandoned in literature, homogeneous, 1165 
perspectivist space is replaced by relative and heterogeneous spaces in arts (cubism and 1166 
collage) and science (relativity)’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p. 31). More importantly, 1167 
this new approach has allowed, Warf asserts, for aesthetic-spatial investigation to explore 1168 
the spatialities of artistic practice where artistic practice, and not just the artwork, is 1169 
deemed to be meaningful in its own right. In this sense, ‘artistic practice not only is a 1170 
means by which art is produced but also constitutes particular sociospatial networks’ 1171 
(Warf, 2006, p. 14) This new consciousness decentralised spatial practices that sought to 1172 
somehow remove art from the dualist conceptions of modern space integrating both art 1173 
and geography.57 These ‘critical creative spatialities’,58 as Harriet Hawkins calls them, 1174 
not only aim to critique dominant ways of thinking about space and culture – calling into 1175 
participation the autonomous, negative character of the aesthetic – but also, in a 1176 
reconstructive59 postmodern manner, ‘offer the potential to think (and practice) space 1177 
differently’ (Hawkins, 2011, p. 468).60 1178 
The geographical interpretation of art itself has come a long way from modernism 1179 
to postmodernism via the spatial turn, shifting from an iconographic approach – 1180 
highlighting the study of symbolical meanings represented in landscape art61 – devoted 1181 
to interpretations of the internal structures of the artwork, its reception and its relation to 1182 
 
56 See Osborne’s ‘Non-places and art spaces’. 
57Movements such as the feminist landscape, public or site-specific art demanded a less institutionalised, 
more social space of art that would emancipate it by making it inclusive of different types of discourses. 
58 Soja’s ‘thirdring-as-Othering’ would represent, in this way, a critical-creative spatiality in the sense 
Hawkins propose it – issue to which we will be returning. 
59 It was not the white wall of the modern space of art that needed to be transgressed but the territoriality 
the artwork demanded to produce its own space and for this space to be fully understood through spatiality. 
60 They rise issues and questions such as: ‘how much space should a work of art have . . . to breathe’, if 
artworks determined ‘their own terms of a occupancy’, how could they declare this occupancy, where 
should artworks be and how should they dictate what other works could take place in the same place as 
they do, and so forth. 
61 The term was coined by Dennis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels, following the cultural turn in geography 
which allowed for an interpretative method of art to rise. Differing from previous geographical approaches 
to art, iconography did not seek to establish general rules about landscape and identity (i.e., for a sole, 
definite truth in landscape art but rather to deconstruct its meaning). Besides the immediate content of the 
work of art, iconography examined the artist’s choice of colour, technique, texture, perspective and scale 
in order to get a deep understanding of the work’s relations to the broader social, cultural and political 
contexts. See ‘Geography and Art’ entry in Barney Warf’s Encyclopedia of Human Geography. 
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its environment. This change, Hawkins claims, meant ‘a shift from examining “a view of 1183 
the world” to exploring “a point of view in it; a foregrounding of the experience of being- 1184 
in and moving-through landscapes rather than understanding their symbolic content”’ 1185 
(Hawkins, 2011, p. 466). The shift meant a move from mapped, static perspectives to 1186 
dynamic ones that regard both culture and spaces as plurally constituted. Don Mitchel62 1187 
discusses these other types of visions, such as the iconographic tendency to reinforce the 1188 
dominant ideological discourses and the erosion of difference from meaning constitution 1189 
and physical production of space. In the landscape, the outside is framed by the horizon, 1190 
O’Doherty tells us, so much so that ‘such pictures . . . are poised between infinite depth 1191 
and flatness and tend to read as pattern’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 19). Now, pattern involves 1192 
a symbolic interpretation that excludes otherness, and consequently investigation may be 1193 
jeopardised. Moreover, with the spatial turn brought about by new global spatial 1194 
conditions, such a mode of inquiry becomes theoretically insufficient. 1195 
This shift, argue Friedland and Boden, was heralded by a change in perspective 1196 
within visual representation itself, which moved from a linear perspective to experiments 1197 
with the fragmentation of light, colour and line, ‘making the spatial dispositions arrive 1198 
from the modulations of colour’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p. 2). This shift especially 1199 
applied to cubism,63 which ‘fractured the space-time barrier itself, providing 1200 
simultaneous images of the same moment from different points in space and multiple 1201 
views of a single scene at various points in time’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p. 2). The 1202 
cover of the two authors’ book, NowHere: Space, Time and Modernity, is no coincidence 1203 
in this respect. In The Red Bridge (1989), Hockney challenges the fixed point and its 1204 
relation to its static spectator and instead depicts the tension between ‘everywhere’ and 1205 
‘nowhere’ – between presence and absence – assuming ‘a painter/observer who is an 1206 
embodied subject in motion, involved in a temporal relationship with the objects, the 1207 
picture and the fiction itself’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p. 2). Hockney’s painting 1208 
incorporates different perspectives and points to a spatiality that is now practised and 1209 
embodied, cross-sectioned among a multitude of references (i.e., spatial, historical and 1210 
social): ‘now connects to then, here to there’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, p. 3). Time and 1211 
 
62 See Don Mitchel’s Critical Geography: An Introduction. 
63 Here, cubism is not being defended as a spatial practice or even a spatial in itself since, following 
O’Doherty, this ‘Attack on painting in the sixties failed to specify that it wasn't painting but the easel picture 
that was in trouble’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 25). In fact, this movement failed so much that this critique of the 
easel and of the space outside the painting – which constituted the institutional critique agenda – that, to 
some extent, only ended up postponing the institutional crisis we would witness later. 
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space cannot be fully separated from each other – and this claim is transdisciplinary in its 1212 
scope. The failure to accommodate such a perspective in both the arts and the construction 1213 
of the space of art results in the emptying out of both concepts. However, the new global 1214 
conditions imply precisely the connection between ‘local times, spaces and people with 1215 
global agendas, standardized time horizons and constantly shifting spatial arrangements’ 1216 
(Friedland & Boden, 1994, pp. 3-4), translating to a spatial turn not only in the social 1217 
sciences, but also throughout an array of fields. While geography considered itself 1218 
confronted with the challenges posed by its newfound interdisciplinarity, art history, 1219 
criticism and practice faced a shift via emerging movements and discourses,64 whose 1220 
demands were both spatial and social.  1221 
This mode of inquiry brought about by postmodernism and the new global spatial 1222 
conditions contended that the interpretation of the work and the space where artistic 1223 
practice took place were constitutive of the work. The mode also allowed for a new 1224 
relationship between geography and art, unmediated by the work’s content. 1225 
(Presupposing the spatiality of the work of art has allowed for geography’s engagement 1226 
with other types of artistic production, in addition to the study of landscape art or positive 1227 
and negative space.65) The production of alternative links between geography and art 1228 
‘offer[s] an implicit critique of the conditions of distance, objectification and control that 1229 
were central to the interpretation of classic landscape images’ (Hawkins, 2011, p. 467).66 1230 
This new geographic perspective (sometimes referred to as ‘new cultural geography’67), 1231 
in addition to the (often feminist) postmodern critique, provided a new take on the 1232 
interpretation of art that focused on how art and society simultaneously affect each other 1233 
– in other words, how art is constructed by and constructive of social relations.  1234 
 
64 Such as some of the avant-gardes, the institutional critique, minimalism (and postminimalism), public 
art, land art, social art, installation art, feminist art and others. 
65 In art theory, positive space refers to the space occupied by the subject of the artwork – be it a person, an 
animal, a vase, etc. – while ‘negative space’ refers to the space between the artwork’s subject and the world. 
The definition of ‘negative space’ is not a consensual one, especially if we consider the variety of types of 
works of art that are passible of having one (consider, for example, the case of sculpture in which ‘positive 
space’ would be the sculpture in itself and ‘negative space’ that part of the sculpture that has no material, 
meshing with the surrounding space). 
66 New developments on geography and art has, thus, progressively given emphasis to the relation between 
art and visual culture. In fact, production, reproduction and distribution of visual imagery is power connoted 
so much so power relations are forged in both representations and interpretation of art. Power relations 
between genders, for example, can be extrapolated from Western art long history of female representation 
that usually portrayed women as naked, fragile, innocent, passive and beautiful: a perfect container for the 
male gaze. This type of representation of women were symptomatic of social relations: of the subordination 
of women and their domestic enclosure and of male identity in the construction and viewing of art. 
67 See entry on ‘Cultural Geography’ on The Dictionary of Human Geography. 
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It was thus inevitable for artists, curators, art critics and geographers alike to ignore that 1235 
art was ‘an integral part of the urban fabric’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017, para. 1). This 1236 
condition was exacerbated by time-space compression, as Harvey puts it, in the post- 1237 
industrial era. Hence, spatiality discourses68 redefined not only ‘spaces and places in the 1238 
city’, but also their ‘functions and relations to the urban environment. Consequently, one 1239 
can wonder to what extent art – in its various forms (sculptures, murals, performances, 1240 
etc.) – is urbanized in that process and the degrees to which cities are subsequently 1241 
aestheticized or “artialized”’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017, para. 1). The spatial turn has thus 1242 
been produced from both within and ‘without’ artistic production, stemming from the 1243 
new social, spatial and historical conditions and demands, as well as from artistic practice 1244 
itself, which revises its own happenstance as artistic practice. Molina and Guinard add 1245 
that ‘with the – mostly urban – spatial turns of arts initiated in the 1970s in European and 1246 
North American cities, a new porosity appears between art worlds and urban worlds, 1247 
creating a dynamic coproduction between arts, societies and cities. Thus, art is made “in” 1248 
and “with” urban spaces’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017,  para. 9) Miwon Kwon notes, 1249 
however, that the immediate consequences69 of the traditional critique resulted in a 1250 
materialist view of space as an isolated construct in the search for a break with the 1251 
historicist and ideological axis of the modern space of art. Later movements sought, on 1252 
the other hand, to recuperate this dimension, allying it with the new progress – mostly 1253 
made by the minimalists, who emphasised the role of experience in epistemologies of 1254 
space and place – and with society. This is where we can trace the spatial turn proper and 1255 
the consequent establishment of the postmodern space in and of art. Kwon explains: 1256 
 
68 The connection between geography and arts remain, notwithstanding, a fragmentary form of inquiry, 
with little systematization, and the Spatial Turn is a movement that although significant – and most 
frequently put under the label of ‘Urban Turn’ – in artistic expression and practice, lacks theoretical 
elaboration. Urban studies about the role of art and art spaces have been mainly concerned with the issue 
of gentrification, highlighting the interactions between artworks and city rather than to the internal 
organisation of the spaces of art. the exclusion a coherent assessment on the internal organisation of these 
spaces are, then, often times, fragmented, reason why they will not be given a greater entry fees on the 
present study. 
69 As Rendell points out placement outside the gallery or the museum – Robert Smithson calls the site – 
does not mean that art cannot be commodified or co-opted by institutional and monetary power. What is 
important in this critical moment if the questioning of the limits of the modern art space and the traditional 
status of the artwork. Later, the notions of site an off-site as they were proposed by land art would be called 
into question – as some of them created another type of social exclusion centred around mobility. The point 
is, hence, not the placement of art outside the gallery space per se but the transformation of spatial and 
artistic spatialisation: in fact, these places play an important role both in the placement of art and its 
differentiation from the everyday, which has allowed for it to survive the perils of time and history. The 
subsequent reformation of museums and galleries has allowed for a restructuration of their spatial qualities 
so to open up space to society and plurality and move beyond modern spatial logic.  
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‘dispersed across much broader cultural, social, and discursive fields, and organised 1257 
intertextually through the nomadic movements of the artist – operating more like an 1258 
itinerary than a map – the site can now be seen as various . . . it can be literal, like a street 1259 
corner, or virtual, like a theoretical concept’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 3). The definition of site- 1260 
specific art put forward by Kwon makes this theoretical shift evident: while art produced 1261 
in the aftermath of the institutional critique of the 1960s and 1970s needed the spatial 1262 
permanence of artwork, and while that static notion of space was perceived to confer 1263 
ontological stability to the artwork, more contemporary approaches to site specificity 1264 
‘imply not the permanence and immobility of a work but its impermanence and 1265 
transience’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 4). These approaches also suggest its relation to social space, 1266 
rather than just abstract or mental space. 1267 
Following Peter Osborne’s definition of contemporary art, I argue that this new 1268 
spatial paradigm is postmodern in both a constructive and reconstructive manner, being 1269 
critical of the linearity of the modern space and establishing a dialectic between modern 1270 
art and the new global conditions. The postmodern space, which extends through the 1271 
entire social sphere, has been particularly expressive in the space of arts, shifting the 1272 
ontological status of the artwork itself. In fact, we can no longer speak only in terms of 1273 
an ontology of the artwork, but of a phenomenology. The artwork no longer only becomes 1274 
in the space of art but happens, is and co-produces that space. Again, a dialectic is 1275 
established between place as a location and place as a process – between place as static 1276 
or dynamic, as material, ideal and practised. Opposite to the empty, bounded abstraction 1277 
of the modern white cube supposed to grant autonomy to the artwork (the space makes 1278 
art), contemporary art not only happens in space but also ‘make[s] space happen’ 1279 
(O'Doherty, 1986, p. 39). 1280 
The artwork’s autonomy no longer results from a frozen nominalism and 1281 
aestheticism of modern art stabilised by a space produced outside of it. Rather, it is in the 1282 
production of space that art becomes autonomous, critical, subversive and disruptive of 1283 
everyday life. The postmodern art space70 no longer simply labels the artwork as such, 1284 
 
70 Postmodern spatiality in art, of course, encompasses various arts forms (from post-minimalism to 
installation arts, from the avant-garde critique to contemporary arts), labelling a form of thinking - or even 
aesthetic attitude as Jameson would have it – that defies modern historicism, institutionalisation and 
ideological assumptions of the artwork that would have spatiality and sociality removed from artistic 
practice. The postmodern space of art can, yet, assume the form of the museum or the art gallery – indeed, 
the history of the museum showcases just how diverse it is its nature in present time, the institutional 
critique was successful so far. Modern spaces did not cease to exist, but now their variety has grown in 
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but, aware of the limits of those assumptions, creates a ‘place of display of objects by 1285 
their shared character as “works of art”’ (Mattick, 2009, p. 432). Although largely critical 1286 
of the modern overemphasis on autonomy in its aesthetic and spatial attitudes, 1287 
contemporary art in postmodern space remains autonomous, but its autonomy is distinct: 1288 
it is derived from the entropy announcing modern art’s destruction beyond its 1289 
nominalism. Contemporary art, aware that space is both produced and producer, although 1290 
able to be materialised ‘anywhere’, binds artistic production and happenstance to its 1291 
specific place – which can be forever moving. Autonomy thus depends on the fact that 1292 
the artwork is not merely an ideological piece, meant to be isolated or protected from the 1293 
world. Instead, the artwork is a tool through which that world is transformed. The 1294 
theoretical discourse’s recent emphasis on practice testifies to this newfound spatiality. 1295 
Far from removing autonomy from art, conceptualising these spaces as postmodern 1296 
recognises their autonomy, but not for autonomy’s sake.  1297 
Modern autonomy has, in turn, conferred on the modern gallery, O’Doherty 1298 
argues, a sort of religious status of spatiality. The search for the artwork’s autonomy as a 1299 
sort of divine, eternal and/or unchanging category implies an underlying ‘political interest 1300 
of a class or ruling group attempting to consolidate its grip on power by seeking 1301 
rectification from eternity’ (McEvilley, 1986, p. 8), promoting spatial – and, hence, status 1302 
quo – stativity via the promotion of artistic values. On the other hand, in the postmodern 1303 
space of art as theorised in this study, although an autonomous work of the artist, the 1304 
artwork is always localised within Thirdspace, at the intersection of space as location and 1305 
space as process. As long as art always happens somewhere, and as long as spatiality is 1306 
ontologically inseparable from it or necessary to it (although the location may vary), it 1307 
must be productive and produced by social relations. What the postmodern space has 1308 
granted to art and its space is its release from the modern site and passivity: it is not only 1309 
art as far as mental or second space that is autonomous, but also as first space and 1310 
Thirdspace. This regained autonomy allows art to reach its full utopian capacity. As Zsolt 1311 
Czigányik makes clear, ‘a work of art that criticizes a certain political reality will not be 1312 
fully understood unless that reality is taken into consideration’ (Czigányik, 2017, p. 7). 1313 
Therefore, the artistic practices enabled by the postmodern space are self-reflexive in 1314 
mediating among social, spatial, subjective and historical relations. The space of art 1315 
 
order to accommodate the new demands brought by new forms of spatialisation, on one hand, and artistic 
practices, on the other. 
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becomes real, imagined and real-and-imagined space. Space is clarified not only in the 1316 
picture, but also in the place where the picture hangs.71 Postmodern space joins the picture 1317 
plane as a unit of discourse.  1318 
Consequently, the space of art unwraps itself to encompass the particular 1319 
epistemologies of the spectator, who has been increasingly perceived as emancipated.72 1320 
This shift has been accompanied by the reorganisation of the art space as spatial layout 1321 
and object display, bringing awareness to the multitude of stories that can be told in this 1322 
space. 1323 
Thus, postmodern artworks obtain this classification (postmodern) not only based 1324 
on their spatial practices but also on their critical practices. Lefebvre’s production of 1325 
space, De Carteau’s tactics, Massey’s progressive sense of place and Soja’s Thirdspace 1326 
are attempts to grasp the new conditions hidden by space. As Kwon expresses,73 site 1327 
specificity should be accommodated ‘as an analogous artistic endeavour’ that ‘can be 1328 
seen as both compensatory symptom and critical resistance’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 8). Abstract 1329 
space, says Lefebvre, ‘tends towards homogeneity, towards the elimination of existing 1330 
differences and peculiarities’, as does the narrative of modernism, which – located 1331 
between an idealist and materialist view of the world – annuls difference under sameness 1332 
or identitary compulsion. He continues: ‘a new space cannot be born (produced) unless it 1333 
accentuates differences’. In other words, whatever space follows that of modernism must 1334 
be embedded in the radical notion that space, history and society are differential and 1335 
constituted through a panoply of sometimes divergent discourses and stories. Kwon 1336 
elaborates, adding that ‘if the universalizing tendencies of modernism undermined the old 1337 
divisions of power based on class relations fixed to geographical hierarchies of centres 1338 
and margins only to aid in capitalism’s colonization of ‘peripheral’ spaces, then the 1339 
articulation and cultivation of diverse local particularities is a (postmodern) reaction 1340 
against these effects’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 157). 1341 
 
71 O’Doherty asks: ‘the fragment from the real world plunked on the picture’s surface is the imprimatur of 
an unstoppable generative energy. Do we not, through an odd reversal, as we stand in the gallery space, 
end up inside the picture, looking out at an opaque picture plane that protects us from the void? . . . As we 
move around that space, looking at the walls, avoiding things on the floor, we become aware that that 
gallery also contains a wandering phantom frequently mentioned in avant-garde dispatches – the Spectator’ 
(O'Doherty, 1986, p. 39). 
72 See Jacques Ranciére’s The Emancipated Spectator. 
73 In One Place After Another: Site-Specific Art and Locational Identity, Kwon makes use of critical theory, 
postmodern thought and debates on identity politics and public sphere in order to deconstruct identitary 
notions of spatiality and spatially-oriented artistic practices such as phenomenological formulations of 
sense of place and critiques on displacement and placelessness that make use of the identitary argument. 
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For Kwon, then, site-specific art emerges as a recent attempt to rehabilitate the 1342 
institutional and anti-idealism critique of the 1960s and 1970s. This critique ‘incorporated 1343 
the physical conditions of the particular location as integral to production, presentation, 1344 
and reception of art’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 1), while improving their positivist formulation via 1345 
the reformulation of artistic practice. At the core of this revitalisation are the co-option 1346 
and absorption of the term by institutions and readymade notions that spatial awareness 1347 
is an automatic signifier of criticality or progressiveness. Site specificity is not, however, 1348 
employed here ‘exclusively as an artistic genre but as a problem-idea, as a peculiar cipher 1349 
of art and spatial politics’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 2), framing the artistic problematic properly 1350 
under the spatio-political one – and this is what is of particular significance for this study. 1351 
Rosalyn Deutsche has labelled this process an ‘urban-aesthetic’ or ‘spatial-cultural’ 1352 
discourse of art, which relates ‘ideas about art, architecture, and urban design, on the one 1353 
hand, with theories of the city, social space, and public space, on the other’ (Deutsche, 1354 
Evictions: Art and Spatial Politics, 1996, p. XI). Consequently, it is not simply the 1355 
positioning or self-awareness of the role of space in artistic practice that makes it critical 1356 
per se. In fact, the first wave of site-specific art cultivated a space that was bounded and 1357 
homogeneous; its dialogues were closed and difference muted, fostering a modern spatial 1358 
logic. To avoid this situation and to emphasise the crucial role of understanding spatiality 1359 
trialectically, Kwon refers to Homi Bhabha’s concept of ‘relational specificity’ to 1360 
demonstrate how objects, people and places relate to each other, recognising – similarly 1361 
to Massey – both the relational and mobile character of and within spaces. Rendell 1362 
explains that ‘akin to James Clifford’s notion of site as a mobile place, located between 1363 
fixed points, Bhabha’s concept suggests an understanding of site that is specific but also 1364 
relational’ (Rendell, 2006, p. 32). Accordingly, artistic practices must be constituted and 1365 
produced dialectically with space, history and the subjects, recognising the relationality 1366 
of both art practice and the heterogeneous, transient character of the borders of its spaces.  1367 
Following Kwon’s analysis, Rendell unites artistic processes and practices with 1368 
space, revisiting the role of the subject (as both artist and viewer) and the role of the 1369 
specific stories associated with the spatial matrix. Spatial practices become places of 1370 
evasion and subversion of the modern art space (and world), as well as of the economic 1371 
and political structures that seek to reify and neutralise artworks by stabilising and 1372 
standardising their institutionalisation. Postmodern art places, Rendell suggests, interact 1373 
with other places and society’s macro- and micro-structures through spatial practice: that 1374 
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of the artwork itself, that of the artist, that of the (it is hoped, emancipated) spectator and 1375 
that of the communities with which they interact. Spaces of art are thus not, I argue, 1376 
differential or heterotopian in the sense envisioned by Lefebvre and Foucault, 1377 
respectively: they are not counter spaces per se, although the concept aids their negative 1378 
(critical) conceptualisation. Rather, it is more useful to think of them as relational. This 1379 
does not mean that art and art places do not produce differences – indeed, they are 1380 
differential. Instead, in that relationship they are not limited to an internal, negative logic: 1381 
they are progressive places, in the middle of the space of flows, and their theorisation 1382 
implies both interiority and exteriority. Kwon’s and Rendell’s investigations of artistic 1383 
practices in situ allow us to conclude that these spaces form a type of constellation, 1384 
proving correct Massey’s assessment of place as ‘unfixed, contested and multiple’. 1385 
Although the space of art can occupy a specific spatial moment in the social relations 1386 
network, this apparent immobility is contingent, unbounded and amenable to change. 1387 
Unquestionably, this relational character of postmodern spatiality does not dispense with 1388 
the need to recognise spatial specificity and its abstract qualities but demands an 1389 
investigation of such qualities be made with a comprehension of space within a network 1390 
of spaces. The goal here is thus not to deny the need of the space of arts or to deprive it 1391 
of its material or mental conditions.  1392 
However, when artistic practices move beyond traditional spatiality, Rendell 1393 
states that ‘the parameters that define it are called into question and all sorts of new 1394 
possibilities for thinking about the relationship between art and architecture are opened 1395 
up’ (Rendell, 2009, p. 1). However, this social positioning does not necessarily mean that 1396 
art or the spaces of art need to produce a solution to existing social problems; rather, they 1397 
can adopt a critical attitude. While acting in social space,74 these artistic practices, by 1398 
engaging in critical thinking, are capable of a double critique: an outward critique of 1399 
social space and an inward critique due to its embeddedness in social space. Therefore, 1400 
Rendell proposes that we call this critical function of art in public space ‘critical spatial 1401 
practice’.75 This practice permits transformation rather than mere description: ‘If we can, 1402 
then, only talk about the public sphere in plural, and in terms of relationality and negation, 1403 
it becomes crucial to understand, situate and reconfigure art’s space – institutions – as 1404 
 
74 Critical spatial practices have, Rendell tells us, been variously described (and inscribed) ‘as contextual 
practice, site specific art and public art’ and in architecture as ‘conceptual design and urban intervention’ 
(Rendell, 2006, p. 12). 
75 This critical practice is influenced by De Carteau’s tactics and Lefebvre’s representations of space. 
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public spheres’ (Sheikh, 2006, n.p.). To do this, one must recognise, on the one hand, that 1405 
the space of art is a relational, heterogeneous space where points of view and perceptions 1406 
are confronted with and beyond one another; they are a battleground, according to Pierre 1407 
Boudierre and Hans Haacke. On the other hand, those spaces are not autonomous or 1408 
neutral, as they claimed to be under modernism. Rather, they are inserted in the space of 1409 
flows and are social spaces that interact with and are produced by other spaces, a 1410 
characteristic evidenced ‘in critical theory and critical, contextual art practices’ 1411 
(Friedland & Boden, 1994, pp. 3-4). These practices are admittedly interdisciplinary, 1412 
‘almost anything can be considered an art object in the appropriate context, and . . . more 1413 
than ever before work with an expanded praxis’ (Friedland & Boden, 1994, pp. 3-4), 1414 
dialoguing with architecture, design, philosophy, politics, sociology, science, and so 1415 
forth.  1416 
Admittedly embedded in Soja’s method of ‘thirdring-as-Othering’,76 critical 1417 
spatial practice is said to confer the artwork with a spatial, historical and social dimension. 1418 
Comparable to Soja’s approach, Rendell’s theorisation of art practices and spaces seeks 1419 
to deconstruct binaries and move beyond preconceived polarisations. What happens 1420 
phenomenologically and functionally is that some supposed binaries benefit from being 1421 
employed co-operatively rather than concurrently – as do Lefebvre’s, Soja’s and 1422 
Massey’s accounts. ‘The radical move deconstruction offers’, Rendell upholds, ‘is to 1423 
think “both/and” rather than “either/or”, putting deferrals and differences into play and 1424 
suggesting instead “undecideability” and slippage’ (Rendell, 2006, p. 25). As Molina and 1425 
Guinard note, ‘the role played by other artistic or cultural forms which are still more 1426 
marginal, discreet or recent has given rise to an emerging body of research’ (Molina & 1427 
Guinard, 2017, para. 9) This role is aided by the integration of postmodern discourses and 1428 
theorists (e.g., Soja and Massey) highlighting how marginal discourses can be integrated 1429 
within an inclusive, plural, heterogeneous, porous, relational and mobile spatiality. The 1430 
alterity of these factors is not achieved by the negation of materiality and location, but 1431 
via the integration of apparently binary relations, features and modes of being in a 1432 
relational (and even trialectic, we may be so bold to state) framework. 1433 
Artistic practice thus demands a dialectical move that unites the practice of design 1434 
– and its functionalism – and the aesthetic autonomy of fine arts, proficiently constructing 1435 
 
76 Reason, she reveals, of the tripartite structure of her book. 
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a series of differing reactions to space. Art, of course, is not functional in a traditional 1436 
way, but its role resides in its criticality, self-reflexivity, emancipatory thrust and 1437 
‘wishing-in-practice’ character enabled by its engagement with spatial discourse. Utopian 1438 
possibilities, unravelled in the artwork, are enacted and find practical/critical realisation 1439 
in (trialectic, postmodern) space. Thus, art’s critical practice ‘serves to describe both 1440 
everyday activities and creative practices which seek to resist the dominant social order’ 1441 
(Rendell, 2009, p. 2). As a critical theory, art’s critical spatial practice aims not only to 1442 
prove a specific hypothesis or a particular methodology, but ‘in myriad of differing ways 1443 
. . . [to] offer self-reflective modes of thought that seek to change the world’ (Rendell, 1444 
2009, p. 3). 1445 
Considering this, we are apt to suggest that artistic practice in postmodern space 1446 
is, in the terms presented in this analysis, always radically compromised by this critical 1447 
practice. Spaces are, furthermore, postmodern since they are vertical in addition to 1448 
horizontal, physical in addition to mental, same in addition to other; they allow for 1449 
plurality, relations, multiplicity and dialogue to be established. They do so by bringing 1450 
the social – both its macro- and micro-structures and modes of being – to the art space 1451 
and by bringing the artwork to society, without placing it in particular hands. As 1452 
O’Doherty puts it, ‘with postmodernism, the artist and the audience are more like each 1453 
other’ (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 76), revealing the social factuality of the artwork and making 1454 
room for utopian realisation and alterity. 1455 
Spatial critical artistic practice involves a ‘transgression’, a removal ‘of perceptual 1456 
constants’, a ‘dissociation of the senses’, a radical dialogue and sometimes even boredom. 1457 
Such practice establishes radical, in the sense of alternative and open to difference, spaces 1458 
that engage with society and history, not just artistically but through sociospatial practice. 1459 
Such created spaces ‘are, then, metaphors for consciousness and revolution’ (O'Doherty, 1460 
1986, p. 76) and are thus compromised by the emancipatory imagining of alternatives – 1461 
or utopian methods. 1462 
Rendell states that if, in fact, ‘there is such a practice as public art . . ., then I would 1463 
argue that public art should be engaged in the production of restless objects and spaces . 1464 
. . that provoke us, that refuse to give up their meaning easily but instead demand that we 1465 
question the world around us’ (Rendell, 2009, p. 1). It is precisely this characteristic that 1466 
marks the artwork as utopian. This function, as theorised by Rendell, has more to do with 1467 
critical utopia than its traditional counterparts, given their continuing and constitutive 1468 
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processual nature that demands the impossible through practice. Nevertheless, a 1469 
distinction of the utopian functions of art is overdue. Certainly, both modern and 1470 
postmodern art – and thinking – are utopian; however, each approach’s to utopianism – 1471 
and utopia – is largely distinct in nature. Ernst Bloch has been one of the most influential 1472 
and most cited authors on the role of utopia in art, which is regarded as constitutive of 1473 
artistic practice altogether. For Bloch, the utopian impulse is both an anthropological and 1474 
ontological contingency of all artistic and cultural production in its longing for a better 1475 
world that is not-yet, but whose mere existence as utopian discloses its own possibility as 1476 
a function of desire. This utopian impulse is, for Bloch: 1477 
ubiquous in human culture, but its expression is necessary historically variable, and often oblique 1478 
and fragmentary. Among the varied social forms that have a utopian content, Bloch discusses not 1479 
just fairy tales and myths, but alchemical quest for a process that will transmute metal to gold, 1480 
travellers’ tales, . . .. Bloch argues that there is a generic utopian content in this, a vital attempt to 1481 
grasp the possibility of a radically different human experience. (Levitas, 2007, p. 53) 1482 
 1483 
 1484 
Sousa Dias upholds a similar perspective in his article ‘A utopia intíma da arte’, which 1485 
he opens with the following sonant lines: 1486 
the artwork creates, simultaneously to its own reality, its own possibility, and there is no art, no 1487 
art criteria, outside that creation, that delimitation, of that extension of the horizon of possibility. 1488 
Art is the confrontation of an impossibility and the realization that, without it, it would have 1489 
remained not only unrealized but impossible. (Dias, 2000, p. 75)77 1490 
 1491 
By this, the author implies not only that the utopian considers itself realised in art, but 1492 
also that art, in its very creation, necessarily creates the utopian that enables the creation 1493 
of the artwork altogether. Art is the creation of a utopian possibility, which in turn permits 1494 
the creation of art. If we ask which was created first, we find ourselves confronted with 1495 
our own inability to provide a definite answer due to the very structure of the two objects 1496 
– art and utopia. The constitution of each implies the other. There is, Sousa Dias 1497 
continues, a fundamental utopia in the happenstance of the art practice, be it implicit or 1498 
explicit, which is the product of the intersection of not only socio-historico-spatial 1499 
relations and dialogues, but also artistic practice and creation (i.e., utopia can only assume 1500 
form as/in the artwork). Their relation is thus biconditional in addition to necessary. Sousa 1501 
Dias states that ‘precisely, as possibilities entail creation, those possibilities could not 1502 
 
77 Original text: “A obra de arte cria, ao mesmo tempo que a sua realidade, a sua própria possibilidade, e 
não há arte, não há critério de arte, fora dessa criação, dessa delimitação, dessa extensão do horizonte do 
possível. A arte é o afrontamento de uma impossibilidade e a realização do que, sem ela, teria permanecido 
não só irrealizado como impossível  
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preexist that act of creation; they did not exist already as pure possibilities. On the 1503 
contrary, they were strictly impossible, and without that creation they would never even 1504 
be conceivable’78 (Dias, 2000, p. 75). 1505 
Osborne, tracing the history of contemporary art through the various artistic 1506 
movements that gave rise to it and regarding the new spatial conditions of urban life 1507 
brought about by globalisation, defines contemporary art as a synthesis of previous 1508 
movements; it is both conceptual and aesthetic – and contextual. Derived from the 1509 
conceptual art critique of the aesthetic essentialism of modernism, conceptual art 1510 
maintains aestheticism, but no longer as a necessary condition for the artwork’s 1511 
ontological status. Similarly, conceptualisation by itself is no longer enough in the eyes 1512 
of contemporary art, which now demands the synthesis of aestheticism and 1513 
conceptualism. These concepts serve as materials, Osborne explains, while space serves 1514 
as the medium. Thus, aestheticisation and conceptualisation concern the artwork’s static 1515 
being, whereas space has the phenomenological condition of coming into possibility. 1516 
Reflecting on both Osborne’s theorisation of contemporary art and Sousa Dias’s – and 1517 
Bloch’s – defence of the utopian dimension as ontologically necessary for the artistic 1518 
moment, I argue that both the aesthetic and conceptual dimensions are different modes of 1519 
the utopian function in art. As Levitas argues, following Bloch’s account, utopia is 1520 
essentially a method – which she names the ‘imaginary reconstitution of society’ (IROS) 1521 
– for artistic/literary practice and critical study that is enacted on impulse. This impulse 1522 
may express itself differently in its function,79 not fixating on this or that utopian form. 1523 
Instead, ‘it provides a way of addressing the utopian aspects of a variety of cultural forms 1524 
and expressions’ (Levitas, 2007, p. 53)Although seemingly fragmentary and episodic, 1525 
this broad definition, Levitas says, enables us to consider how cultural aspects and 1526 
artefacts denote shifts in ‘utopian energies’ (Levitas, 2007, p. 54). 1527 
 
78 Original text: ‘precisamente como criação que é, esses possíveis não preexistiam essa realização, não 
existem já como puras possibilidades. Pelo contrário, eram rigorosamente impossíveis, e sem essa criação 
jamais seriam, sequer, concebíveis’. 
79 Utopian function may be, moreover, rhetorical or revolutionary, especially when one considers artistic 
critical spatial practices. For more on the rhetorical function of art see Marlana Portolano’s The Rhetorical 
Function of Utopia: An Exploration of the Concept of Utopia in Rhetorical Theory; for the revolutionary 
role of utopian artistic practices see Julia Ramírez Blanco’s Artistic Utopias of Revolt: Claremont Road, 
Reclaim the Streets, the City of Sol. 
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From this point of view, one could argue that aestheticism and conceptualisation 1528 
constitute two distinct functions of utopia in art: positive and negative,80 respectively. 1529 
Under this polarisation, the synthesis of the two would imply a new utopian function 1530 
encompassing both and moving beyond them which is here being coined ‘critical spatial 1531 
practice of art’, borrowing Rendell’s term.81 1532 
Art’s positive function represents utopia rather than being utopian itself; it aims 1533 
to inspire us in the ‘utopian program’ (Jameson), which is presented as perfect. This 1534 
function is more related to traditional utopian writings and idealisation – regarding both 1535 
art and utopia. Utopia becomes prescriptive and is presented as an ideal vision of what a 1536 
perfect society would look like. This utopia can be either aesthetic or conceptual, but is 1537 
usually the first, in which the artwork’s meanings are closed off, as aesthetic pleasure is 1538 
perceived to be constitutive of utopian society. This utopia has been tendentially deemed 1539 
compensatory, as Levitas argues in The Concept of Utopia, as it tends towards abstract 1540 
form or static blueprints permeated with ‘wishful, but not will-full, thinking’ (Levitas, 1541 
2010, p. 144). Modern art as ideal- or aesthetic-orientated promotes an ontology of artistic 1542 
production around the notion of creativity, which is supposed to ‘effectuate a radical 1543 
break with the past . . . and by doing so to give a new start to a new future’ (Groys, 2008, 1544 
p. 90). Moreover, according to this ideological stance, modern artwork is supposed to 1545 
establish a ‘conduit between the self and his imagination’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 210) and 1546 
the Platonist world of ideas, in which the artwork is thought to reside. The artwork is a 1547 
representation of itself and links to the subject as representation: the aesthetic subject 1548 
believes that the work of art is thus a ‘mere extension of his psyche. Down-graded to a 1549 
plaything, the work of art is a receptacle of subjective projections’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 1550 
211). The particularities of the artwork and its relation to material conditions and social 1551 
relations are disregarded and overshadowed by the possible ideological meanings 1552 
extractable from the artwork (similar to what iconographic inquiry was said to do). The 1553 
utopian then becomes static in the modern work of art. Hence, despite the efforts to fight 1554 
the dominant discourse and ideology, these attitudes are reactionary rather than 1555 
 
80 This distinction is inverse to the one Levitas’ elaborated in The Concept of Utopia, in which she identifies 
the negative function of utopia as obstructive of revolution and the positive function of utopia as the one 
that instigates transformation (such as is the utopian function defended by Bloch). My inversion here has 
to do mostly with Adorno’s formulation of negative aesthetics, as becomes evident later. 
81 Further could be said about utopian function and, perhaps more importantly, about the utopian function 
of art, but we will here restrict ourselves to those that relate specifically to the ones that can be correlated 
to the modern and postmodern debate, on one hand, and/or to spatial studies, on the other. 
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sensitising, tending to neutralise differences and poles under figurative representation.82 1556 
The neutralisation process is also one of deterritorialisation of the ‘ideological 1557 
parameters’ of one social situation, which gives way to the construction of something 1558 
new. 1559 
The negative83 conceptual function allows for the instigation of utopian 1560 
transformation and practice, providing ‘the basis of a new thinking of time and history’ 1561 
(Wegner, 2007, p. 119). For Bloch, who stands on the optimist side of the spectrum, this 1562 
(negative) utopian function constitutes art’s raison d’être, as it is responsible for ‘the 1563 
imaging of a different world’ or of ‘anticipatory illumination’, which unravels the 1564 
condition of possibility ‘for rearranging social and political relations to produce Heimat, 1565 
Bloch’s word for the home that we have all sensed but have never experienced or known’ 1566 
(Ashcroft, 2012, p. 5). Art serves as an analytical and revolutionary tool for education in 1567 
utopian desire of the ‘Not-Yet present’. This characterisation of the utopian dimension of 1568 
art as negative allows the impulse and opens up desire for utopia, representing the horizon 1569 
towards which human society must walk towards; in other words, art ‘presents imaginary 1570 
realizations of what is Not-Yet-Actual’ (Zabel, 1990, p. 83). Art’s negative dialectic 1571 
permits art’s utopian function as critique to be articulated in a third moment of utopian 1572 
function – and form. In this respect, art criticises the present to build the future. This 1573 
exposure of the present order is essential for the construction of utopian projects; art is 1574 
‘the social antithesis of society’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 8). Thus, artworks can have a social 1575 
function – they are social monads whose internal conflicts expose those of society – and 1576 
a mode of investigation of the causal functions between artworks and their social contexts  1577 
This reflection is what Adorno calls the ‘negative dialectics’ of the artwork, whose 1578 
status as both a concept and a social fact reflects that perceived opposing forces meet 1579 
within the artwork. The ‘truth content’ of the artwork permits precisely the realisation of 1580 
a lack, negatively depicting reality, challenging it while leaving it (materially, at least) 1581 
unaltered. Although material, the artwork critiques the very material conditions that gave 1582 
it origin, necessitating a space that is cohesive with the lack of context that the artwork 1583 
needs to detach itself from society and politics and to avoid being co-opted by either.  1584 
 
82 See Louis Marin’s Utopics: Spatial Play. 
83 Also termed as facilitating or emancipatory by Levitas and as heuristic by Miguel Abensour. 
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What Adorno’s considerations lack, despite his efforts to critique the idealist 1585 
traditions,84 – and thus to tip the discussion towards materialism and hence to the side of 1586 
the object85 while maintaining it as an autonomous and social entity – is the integration 1587 
of the spatial dimension of the artwork. This implies, then, a neglect of a constitutive 1588 
feature of the artwork as a dialectical and critical monad and, simultaneously, the 1589 
construction of an alternative to the production of autonomous art. According to Adorno, 1590 
although social, the artwork must preserve the autonomy of its own production. This 1591 
means that both the artwork and artist, although influenced by social relations, must be 1592 
severed from these relations in order to create a ‘truthful’ artwork. The artwork becomes 1593 
social, not in a critical, spatial or active form, but in a reflective one. The problem, Ray 1594 
reports, can ‘be traced to a theoretically unjustified overinvestment in the work-form of 1595 
modernist art’ (Ray, 2009, p. 83). 1596 
As has been argued, the ideal perspective on the space of art – as much as the 1597 
materialist, whose expression was secondary in modernism – not so much protects art 1598 
from politics as protects politics from art. Art’s utopian dimension, the imaginary and 1599 
critical ability or function of creating an alternative that is Not-Yet, resides precisely, 1600 
Maleuvre states, in its ‘place of its appearance’. He continues, in a witty tone: 1601 
Outside the polis – in the museum, for instance – the image-making aspect of artistic mimesis is 1602 
benign because it is perceived as unambiguously illusory and apocryphal; in the forum it is easily 1603 
mistaken for politics, that is, for the ‘real’ production of reality. As the creation of museums: they 1604 
do not so much protect earth from politics as politics from art. (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 41) 1605 
 1606 
The idealist notion of art’s autonomy – as creative and negative – is fixed on its 1607 
paradoxical self-reference. In ‘The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Production’, 1608 
Walter Benjamin speaks of the loss of aura as a loss of the original context of the artwork 1609 
in the space of flows, which, according to him, imposes a displacement on the artwork 1610 
via the networks of mass communication, production and reproduction and negates the 1611 
artwork’s aura. Borys Groys, in turn, reiterates that perhaps it would be more coherent to 1612 
theorise the aura not as lost in this space of flows, but as only capable of being theorised 1613 
in this new context. ‘In fact’, he asserts, ‘the aura, as described by Benjamin, only comes 1614 
into being thanks to the modern technique of reproduction’ (Groys, 2008, p. 73). It is 1615 
 
84 Of Kant, on the one hand, that distinguishes noumena from phenomena, and Hegel, on the other, in the 
construction of the absolute spirit 
85 For Adorno, the very materiality of the object serves as counter-pressure and critique of the materialistic 
conditions of society: its ‘power of resistance is that a realized materialism would at the same time be . . . 
the abolition of the domination of material interest’ (Adorno, 1997, p. 40). 
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precisely via this ‘inclusion in a certain context, in a certain installation, through its 1616 
topological description’ (Groys, 2008, p. 74) that originality is established in postmodern 1617 
artistic practices, and not through its formal features. He suggests that what has often been 1618 
theorised as the loss of the authenticity or autonomy of the work of art concerns the fact 1619 
that new spatial, historical and social relations of production and reproduction have 1620 
allowed not for the displacement of the work of art but for its dislocation. Artworks are 1621 
no longer bounded to abstract or mental space but are productive of a trialectic art space. 1622 
This new topology is not synonymous with a loss of autonomy, but with a dialectical 1623 
movement that no longer binds art – or utopia – to normative logic. Indeed, the ‘topology 1624 
of today’s networks of communication, of generation, translation, and distribution of 1625 
images is extremely heterogeneous . . . In this sense, a copy is never really a copy, but 1626 
rather always a new original in a new context. Every copy is by itself a flaneur’ (Groys, 1627 
2008, p. 75). The space of art is radically produced by ‘proposing the new criteria for 1628 
telling a story’ (Groys, 2008, p. 76), for establishing, through critical spatial practice or 1629 
through ‘thirdring-as-Othering’, the trialectic between the past, the future and the present, 1630 
thereafter proposing a true radical alternative.  1631 
Groys goes further, arguing that ‘we have no outside position in relationship to 1632 
installation practice. That is why the installation is so pervasive and avoidable . . . and 1633 
that is why it is also truly political’ (Groys, 2008, p. 77): it demands that spatial decisions 1634 
be made actively, and it is a ‘space of decision making’ in its trialectic resolution. In its 1635 
negativity and radical commitment to authenticity and autonomous debates, the modern 1636 
artwork is paradoxically negated in its claim to truth; the modern artwork excludes itself 1637 
from reality and hence is dispossessed of real action.  1638 
Indeed, this tendency to detach art from life and compromise it with an ideal 1639 
reflection of society is why art must truly become social. Social art, contrary to both the 1640 
idealist and materialist schools, does not reinforce the status quo but reflects and acts on 1641 
it. Social art’s mode of action may be implicit – as it instigates change – or explicit – 1642 
when art is used as a weapon of resistance and revolution to combat present conditions. 1643 
Social art becomes utopian dialectically; it reflects society and hence reflects on its own 1644 
conditions, being able to critically transform its own matrix at every step. In contrast to 1645 
the modern view of art’s utopian functions – namely, that this function can only be 1646 
exercised on the condition that artistic practice remain immutable – it was the inherent 1647 
stable autonomous conditions of the artwork that permitted its negative reflection on 1648 
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society as a detached, hovering, transcendent presence. Postmodern attitudes and critical 1649 
spatial practices contend that the artwork’s utopian critical function and active 1650 
engagement with transformation demand that artistic practice revise itself and accompany 1651 
the changes happening in society. As art is understood relationally, it must be permeable 1652 
to dialogue to be practised critically and utopian-ly.  1653 
This leads us to our final utopian function, the critical spatial function, which is 1654 
posited as being committed to spatiality, specifically a postmodern spatiality. The purpose 1655 
of these utopias is not to provide a blueprint or to just instigate change through a negative 1656 
dialectics, but rather to synthesise utopia as method and utopia as picture. Critical utopias 1657 
are ‘open-ended situation[s]’ (Bauman n.p.), recognising their own conditions of 1658 
instability through which they can be founded on the real life and experience of their own 1659 
time. These utopias do not present static, perfected blueprints of anthropological 1660 
optimism, but base their vision on the utopian impulse as an active and continuous 1661 
forcefield of utopian society. Critical utopias (or the utopian function) are pedagogical in 1662 
scope, as they demand political responsibility for ‘what is to be done, and how it is to be 1663 
done (Moylan, 2014, p. XIV)’. Here, utopia represents a constant process of 1664 
transformation and the integration of difference, rather than offers a ‘fixed blueprint’ 1665 
(Moylan, 2014, p. XIV) in which ‘one size fits all’. Peter Filing, Tom Moylan tells us, 1666 
highlights how these critical utopias are organised around the politics of everyday life 1667 
and revolutionary transformation. Hence, in the critical utopia people do not need to fit 1668 
themselves into a homogeneous, recognisable mass; instead, society’s transformation 1669 
accompanies the diversity and plurality of its constitutive agents. The term ‘agents’ is 1670 
used because these actors are called to action to develop and maintain that society. As 1671 
Fitting so aptly argues, the critical utopia offers the reader ‘the look and feel and shape 1672 
and experiences of what an alternative might and actually be, a thought experiment or a 1673 
form of “social dreaming”’ (Fitting as cited in Moylan, 2014, p. XVI). Thus, 1674 
deconstructing traditional utopian functions and modes, the critical function of utopia 1675 
synthesises the positive and negative functions. Its utopian role is constitutively 1676 
methodological, plural and heterogeneous. 1677 
The u-topos of utopia becomes a topos of a real-and-imagined social space of 1678 
freedom and difference. Once more, the agglomerating movement that has been pervasive 1679 
throughout this study emerges and is, at last, encompassed as the critical utopian function. 1680 
The critical function thus highlights the spatial character of utopia and, in parallel, the 1681 
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utopian character of art practices as critical spatial practices. Comparable to postmodern 1682 
art spaces, they are not absolute but relational. Thus, one could argue that the critical 1683 
utopia and/or critical utopian function is that which is proper to artistic practice and that 1684 
cannot be enacted in any way other than spatially. 1685 
‘The porosity between material and symbolic spaces [of art], between worlds 1686 
represented in/by art and the worlds of social groups (symbolic world represented in art 1687 
being inspired by social representations of their context of production and reception) 1688 
participate to the minority’s identity building and claiming’ (Molina & Guinard, 2017, 1689 
para. 18). This capability is crucial for the integration of spaces of art in utopia, as it 1690 
creates the framework for the establishment of difference and, hence, of an alternative. It 1691 
not only may be integrated in utopia but also is utopian itself – actively participating in 1692 
the deconstruction of dichotomies and the construction of u-topia. 1693 
 1694 
 1695 
1.3. A geocritical approach to the spaces of art in utopia: Methodology and the 1696 
Practice of Space in Utopian Texts 1697 
The undiscovered island is something that does not exist, it’s just a creation of your mind, the 1698 
King’s geographers have seen the maps and declared that there are no more islands to discover, 1699 
that has been over for a long time . . . We’ve been looking for a better place to live and decided to 1700 
take advantage of your trip. (Saramago, 2007, pp. 36-37) 86 1701 
 1702 
 ‘Theory’ only makes sense as an attitude; otherwise the generalization of the very concept of 1703 
‘theory’ is pointless. Part of that attitude is the endorsement of interdisciplinarity, of the need to 1704 
think through the relations between areas where a specific theory can be productive, and of the 1705 
need to think philosophically about even the most practical theoretical concepts, so called ‘tools’. 1706 
(Bal & Inge, 1994, p. 8) 1707 
 1708 
Having thus defined how art relates to space and utopia, affording a privileged medium 1709 
for the theorisation of utopian function and the (more evident) relation between space and 1710 
utopia, we must establish a coherent approach to the literary texts under scrutiny – 1711 
namely, Bellamy’s Looking Backward: 2000-1887 (LB), Morris’s News from Nowhere, 1712 
or an Epoch of Rest (NFN), Le Guin’s The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia (TD) 1713 
and Delany’s Trouble on Triton: An Ambiguous Heterotopia (TOT) – based on the 1714 
conclusions made so far. The issue shifts from art as utopia to art in utopia, and a new 1715 
trialectic is recognised. 1716 
 
86 Original text: “A ilha desconhecida é coisa que não existe, não passa duma ideia da tua cabeça, os 
geógrafos do rei foram ver nos mapas e declararam que ilhas por conhecer é coisa que se acabou desde há 
muito tempo . . . Andávamos à procura de um sítio melhor para viver e resolvemos aproveitar a tua viagem”. 
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The choice of ‘modern’ and ‘postmodern’ spaces as definitions and tools for the 1717 
distinction of space and spatial attitudes before and after the spatial turn is not 1718 
coincidental in this matter: as ‘the aftermath of the spatial turn, a “planetary turn” has 1719 
caused many traditional discourses within modern language and literary studies to make 1720 
fascinating connections among the local, regional, and global circuits of cultural 1721 
production’ (Tally, 2017, p. 4). Hence, literary production within utopia has shifted as 1722 
well. 1723 
All literary texts, Robert Tally claims, provide the reader with ‘descriptions of 1724 
places, situating them in a kind of imaginary space’ that helps them ‘understand the world 1725 
in which they live’ or even how ‘others [emphasis added] have lived, currently live, or 1726 
will live in times to come’ (Tally, 2017, p. 2). Spatiality is always explicitly (using maps, 1727 
references to real spaces or itineraries) or implicitly (through the activation of imaginary 1728 
spatial relations) present in the text. Tally contends, in this respect, that ‘creative writers 1729 
engage in a form of literary cartography by which they figuratively map the real-and- 1730 
imagined spaces of their worlds, both within and with reference to a space outside the 1731 
text’ (Tally, 2017, p. 8). To this engagement the prefix ‘critical’ should be added ‘to stress 1732 
the distance from an effortless mapping of represented landscapes in literary texts’ 1733 
(Thacker, 2017, p. 33) to the articulation with more complex issues, such as to ‘how space 1734 
and geography affect literary forms and styles’ (Thacker, 2017, p. 33). This critical 1735 
attitude towards the relations established between space and text – contrary to 1736 
geographical and geopoetics87 approaches – provides an analysis of the representation of 1737 
space and the interpretation of its signification or role in the text itself. This critical notion 1738 
of literary geography thus focuses not only on the spatial form or spatial representations 1739 
of the text, but also on its social relations and its political impact on the literary production 1740 
of space, which distinguish it from a mere inventory of how literature represents these 1741 
realities. 1742 
Embedded in such ‘geocritical practice’, as Tally defines it, the present study 1743 
recognises interdisciplinarity not only as necessary but also as a contingent tactic for 1744 
analysing the selection of utopian texts chosen, bringing together art history and criticism, 1745 
geography and literary studies. This geocritical approach is postmodern since it ‘work[s] 1746 
to map possible worlds, to create plural and paradoxical maps, because it embraces space 1747 
 
87 The geographical approach focuses on the context in which the texts were produced and geopoetics on 
the form of space creation. 
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in its mobile heterogeneity’ (Westphal, 2011, p. 73).88 In the utopian genre in particular89, 1748 
this heterogeneity is achieved through the act of the artist who ‘pretends that things known 1749 
to be impossible are not only possible but real, which creates mental spaces redefining – 1750 
or pretending to redefine – the impossible’ (as cited in Tally, 2013, p. 147). This approach 1751 
implies that the spatialities of the text require two journeys: from the real to the imagined 1752 
and, back again, from the imagined to the real. Consequently, the literary geographical 1753 
imagination, although other to the geospace, cannot be completely severed from it, 1754 
interweaving real and imagined into a creation of a real-and-imagined space, a whole new 1755 
world that may serve as a lens for examining and thinking critically about real space, time 1756 
and society. The utopian format is exempt from this encounter with the Other in a 1757 
privileged spatial mode.  1758 
From utopia’s point of origin – as becomes obvious after the deconstruction of the 1759 
word ‘utopia’ itself (u = no; topos = place) – the act of narration is spatial in essence. 1760 
Although utopian spatial form has evolved from an imaginary island to whole countries, 1761 
continents, the world or even other worlds, and although its spatial fix is a highly variable 1762 
one, utopia, as a literary genre, is one whose ‘imaginary restructuring of society’ is always 1763 
articulated with a spatial imagination that seeks to articulate real, imagined and real-and- 1764 
imagined space through and for transformation. The utopian space does not reproduce the 1765 
real, but ‘actualises new virtualities that had remained unformulated, and that then go on 1766 
to interact with the real . . ., fiction detects possibilities buried in the folds of the real, 1767 
knowing that these folds have not [yet] been temporalized’ (as cited in Pietro, 2011, p. 1768 
20). In fact, literary production’s true value, Westphal maintains, ‘does not limit itself to 1769 
the mimesis of reality, but it actualizes new virtualities hitherto unexpressed, which then 1770 
interact with the real according to the hypertextual logic of interfaces’ (Westphal, 2011, 1771 
p. 73). Despite describing and taking place in places that are not, utopia is produced by 1772 
real space and aims at its transformation. Thus, utopian space, situated at or just beyond 1773 
the margin of our own environment, constitutes the archetypical real-and-imagined space 1774 
of Soja’s formulation, as it annexes the real-and-imagined conditions of space and offers 1775 
an alternative to them and to the present social relations in a new spatial axis. Even when 1776 
 
88 For Westphal postmodernism and the spatial turn have brought about a more complex and dynamic view 
of space which allows for the transgression of the traditional geographical practice between real and 
imagined space. As Tally explains: ‘Wesphal maintains these three broad categories: spatiotemporality, 
transgressivity and referentiality’ (Tally, 2013, p. 141). 
89 Although a similar argument could be made for fantastic and science fiction literature. 
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the spaces or places of utopia do not hold an explicit reference to real spaces or places in 1777 
the world – as with most critical utopias whose hybridity with science fiction sometimes 1778 
implies the construction of a wholly different world, as in Le Guin’s and Delany’s utopias 1779 
– utopian space is always, at least implicitly, embedded in real spaces:90 there are still at 1780 
least the mental spaces of the school, hospital, house, park, studio, investigation centre 1781 
and others, even when their reformation is complete. 1782 
The utopian text, Tally argues, although dependent on a greater level of 1783 
suspension of disbelief, can only be established based on the presumption that a genre’s 1784 
rules are adhered to. He persuasively makes this case by referring to the fantastic space 1785 
of The Hobbit’s Middle Earth: 1786 
the Lonely Mountain is a single mountain arising from relatively flat surrounding lands, the Misty 1787 
Mountains are enshrouded in mist, Mirkwood is a rather murky forest, Rivendell is set in a valley 1788 
through which a river flows, and Hobbiton is a town of Hobbits . . .. The generic place-names in 1789 
The Hobbit suggest that its narrative takes place not in a particular, identifiable region, but in some 1790 
kind of generic space that the knowing reader can recognise [....]. Within the fairly limited and 1791 
mostly circumscribed space of Tolkien’s Middle-earth, the imaginary places are accorded almost 1792 
the same level of reality as many ‘real’ places, of the kind that is to be found in historical romances 1793 
or medieval literature. (Tally, Spatiality 151-152) 1794 
 1795 
Similarly, utopian spatiality survives and is linked to the readers’ and author’s geospace 1796 
despite having no visible connection to it, being solely imaginary in this respect. This, 1797 
Johannes Riquet maintains in ‘Island Spatialities’, ‘points us to an important departure of 1798 
many utopian islands, namely the illusion of a pure space untouched by reality’ (Riquet, 1799 
2017, p. 218),91 to the extent that utopia’s temporal and spatial forms are often opposed 1800 
to those of daily life, whose lack of one or the other lies at the core of utopian form. 1801 
Defining the spatial conditions of utopia and the spatial-utopian dimension of art, 1802 
the spaces of art are distinguished according to their artistic spatial modern or postmodern 1803 
attitudes. Unilaterality, functionality, boundedness, horizontality, univocal/identitary, 1804 
homogeneity, stativity and neutrality (via institutionalisation), which are the 1805 
characteristics attributed to the modern space (of art), will, it is hoped, be proven to be 1806 
characteristics linked to the traditional utopia; and trialecticality, unboundedness, four- 1807 
dimensionality, plurality/multiplicity, heterogeneity, dynamism and progressivity (space 1808 
as process). These are the physiognomies attributed to postmodern spatiality, which are 1809 
 
90 Or, as Tolkien puts it: ‘creative fantasy is founded upon the hard recognition that things are so in the 
world as it appears under the sun; recognition of fact, but not a slavery to it’ (Tolkien, 2001, p. 55). 
91 The utopian production of pure space via the island mode of space is not exclusive, Riquet makes explicit 
in her broader analysis of islands in text form, to the genre but is part of ‘the persuasive textuality that 
characterizes many Western island narratives’ (Riquet 219). 
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hypothesised as being more pronouncedly present in the critical utopia, distinctions are 1810 
made in the text via a quasi-topoanalysis92 of the spaces placed in one category or another, 1811 
as follows: 1812 
 1813 
Modern Space of Art Postmodern Space of Art 
Unilateral – The space of art is described in terms 
of its formal material qualities (as abstract space) 
or in terms of the ontological status of the artwork 
(as mental space). Both these approaches are 
normative upon spatial relations and practices. 
Trialectic – The space of art is not described 
through opposition between material and 
metaphysical perspectives but as integrating these 
with spatial practices. 
Functional – Space of art functions either as 
aesthetic space, in which art is gawked at but not 
lived with (in the sense of actively engaged); or as 
functional space in which it serves as setting for 
some other activity, to testify society’s utopian-
ness or as adornment. 
Critical – Space of art functions not only as space 
of aesthetic contemplation or as formal or 
functional entity but also as critical practice, being 
actively engaged with the utopian society and its 
citizens. 
Bounded93 – The space of art obeys a specific 
layout that serves to present the artwork in a rigid 
way (following the author’s or the society’s 
aesthetic judgement on what should be consider a 
proper art form). They are closed to alternative 
artistic or social practices, discourses or identities. 
These boundaries may be mental or psychological 
or appear as having clear physical limitations that 
exclude certain identities, objects or practices. 
Unbounded – The space of art does not have fixed 
borders but is malleable to the social, spatial and 
artistic practices of the utopian citizens. It is not 
exclusive to particular art forms, identities or 
practices. This character also confers flexibility to 
space, which can be opened to other spaces and 
worldviews. This unboundedness can express itself 
physically (allowing for the free mobility and 
dwelling) or mentally/psychologically. 
Horizontal – Art spaces obey an historical logic of 
perceived linear progression or development to a 
point of eternalisation. They are to be achieved via 
the enactment of an ideological or material ideal 
and then maintained as quasi-religious entities.  
4D – Besides progressive in time, art spaces are 
shaped after social relations and material 
conditions. Space is not constituted horizontally, 
but vertically and diagonally, constantly adapting 
to changes in the network of spaces, histories and 
societies [and forming constellations]. 
 
92 In The Poetics of Space Bachelard defines topoanalysis as ‘the systematic psychological study of the sites 
of out intimate lives’ (8). Here, however, I refer to topoanalysis not as a psychological study but as a study 
of the particularities of a space via thirdring-as-Othering. The term is, thus, here used, ad verbatim. 
93 This is not a synonym of closed space, the same way ‘unbounded’ is not an automatic signifier of open 
space. 
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Univocal/Identitary – Space of art is to be 
experienced as an identitary entity that assumes a 
hegemonic aesthetic perspective on artistic 
practice that is assumed to be shared, universally, 
by everyone. 
Plural/Manifold – Space of art is produced and 
perceived through the practices and discourses of 
different, multiple perspectives.  
Homogeneous – Space of art has no recognisable 
distinctive trait that allows differentiation with 
other art spaces (due to its unilaterality). At the 
same time, artworks are fixed according to an 
external logic and separated from the space they 
occupy. 
Heterogeneous – Space of art is constituted without 
a superimposed order or organization and, hence, is 
distinctive in itself. The artwork and its space are 
seen constitutively produced and productive of 
each other. 
Static – The artwork and its space are maintained 
as fixed entities, immutable to change, apart from 
society’s transformations or compasses. Their 
utopian functions are either positive or negative 
but not critical. 
Dynamic/Processual – The artwork and its space 
interact with society: they are product and 
producers of social relations. Their utopian 
functions are critical, besides positive and negative. 
Neutralising (Institutional) – Space of art is 
ideologically charged, neutralising forcefields 
that cancels the artwork as object in itself. It does 
not stimulate transformation or critical thinking 
but an ideologically charged view of the space of 
art and the artwork whose normative character 
reinforce the status quo, which is offered as 
perfected vision or blueprint. 
Progressive (Relational) – The space of art relates 
to other places and object, as method or tool, 
recognising its simultaneous Sameness and 
Otherness. Its unboundedness permits mobility and 
fluidity and, hence, change. It stimulates difference, 
resistance and transgression of its own conditions 
and the conditions surrounding them. It is not 
defined in terms of location but in terms of process, 
mobility and dialogue. 
 1814 
Finally, some practical distinctions must be made before proceeding to the analysis of the 1815 
texts: first, what will be here considered as art or artistic practice; second, what spaces 1816 
will enter the category of art space based on the previous delineation; and, finally, how 1817 
will data be gathered in order to elaborate a convincing explanation for the claims made 1818 
so far. 1819 
Regarding the first issue, art is distinguished from both design (or ‘craft’, as 1820 
Morris also calls it) and artefact. Art is regarded as an object by itself (which can be 1821 
aesthetic, conceptual or both) that may or may not detach itself from the background and 1822 
demand a response (e.g., psychological, political, cultural or social) and that can assume 1823 
the form of a painting, sculpture, mural, poem or even building. In contrast, design, which 1824 
can assume the form of any decorative object, is defined in terms of its solution-based 1825 
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aestheticism. Finally, an artefact may assume the form of an ordinary object or a design 1826 
piece symbolic of a given era, culture or society. The space of art is, accordingly, the 1827 
space where art is, in a very crude, logical, positivist manner.94 This being said, the space 1828 
of art can appear as the setting, zone of action, projected space, marker or route, based 1829 
the descriptions of Patti et al. (See Annexe B). 1830 
Finally, the data acquired and the analysis of the spaces of art in the utopian text are 1831 
interpreted in the conclusion both in quantitative and qualitative terms. The quantitative 1832 
analysis is based on the number of occurrences and mentions of overall spaces of art, 1833 
modern spaces of art and postmodern spaces of art, which are indicative of the level of 1834 
spatial criticality employed in the role of art in utopia. The qualitative analysis departs 1835 
from the description of the space of art as modern or postmodern and of its relation and 1836 
function in relation to the utopian text’s formal qualities. Inspired by Franco Moretti, the 1837 
quantitative approach submits the texts to a ‘process of deliberate reduction and 1838 
abstraction’ (Moretti, 2005, p. 1) to produce explanations rather than simply 1839 
interpretations. The present study’s commitment to both quantitative and qualitative 1840 
analysis aims at confirming that the study of the space of art, due to the characteristics 1841 
and relations established so far, functions as a system of the genre – and subgenre – it is 1842 
connected to. 1843 
 1844 
 1845 
  1846 
 
94 This relation may be, as we have seen, more complicated than in the terms here described but in order to 
facilitate the analysis, this was considered the most useful definition. 
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Chapter 2. Art in Utopia: The case studies of Bellamy, Morris, 1847 
Le Guin and Delany 1848 
2.1. The modern space of art from traditional to critical utopia: the cases of Edward 1849 
Bellamy’s Looking Backward: 2000-1887 and William Morris’ News from Nowhere, 1850 
or, An Epoch of Rest 1851 
To search for the undiscovered island, the man answered, What undiscovered island, the king 1852 
asked masking his laughter, as if a madman stood in front of him, of those that had the mania of 1853 
navigation, and with whom it would do no good to contradict right from the beginning, The 1854 
undiscovered island, the man repeated, Nonsense, there are no more undiscovered islands, Who 1855 
told you, King, that there are no more undiscovered islands, they’re all on the maps, In the map 1856 
there’s only known islands, And what undiscovered island is that that you are looking for, If I 1857 
could tell you, then it would not be undiscovered. (Saramago, 2007, pp. 14-15)95 1858 
  1859 
Falling asleep in the Boston of 1887, Julian West wakes up in the Boston of 2000 to find 1860 
himself in the midst of a utopian society whose bases are industrial, equalitarian and 1861 
solidary. In this new city of Boston, plenty and harmony abound, poverty and inequality 1862 
have been eradicated, industry has shifted from private to public ownership, education 1863 
assumes a crucial role and is equally available to all citizens, human solidarity has become 1864 
a basic maxim, and overall improvement in apparently all sectors of society has been 1865 
made to the point of perfection concerning both material conditions and social relations. 1866 
This new, transformed Boston is the product of Bellamy’s concerns about the unequal, 1867 
chaotic and capitalist society in which he himself lived; the new Boston provides an 1868 
astounding solution to what he perceived as the major problems of the nineteenth 1869 
century’s first years of industrialisation. Coming from an aristocratic background himself 1870 
and confronted with the unjust conditions in which the working class lived in the nearby 1871 
mills, Bellamy sought in LB not to overthrow this industrial society, but to turn it into 1872 
what he saw as the natural result of its just, humane management.96 Faith in the progress 1873 
of science and the sheer logic of economics, paired with anthropological optimism, was 1874 
 
95 Original text: “Para ir à procura da ilha desconhecida, respondeu o homem, Que ilha desconhecida, 
perguntou o rei disfarçando o riso, como se tivesse na sua frente um louco varrido, dos que têm a mania 
das navegações, a quem não seria bom contrariar logo de entrada, A ilha desconhecida, repetiu o homem, 
Disparate, já não há ilhas desconhecidas, Quem foi que te disse, rei, que já não há ilhas desconhecidas, 
estão todas nos mapas, Nos mapas só estão as ilhas conhecidas, E que ilha desconhecida é essa que queres 
ir à procura, Se eu to pudesse dizer, então não seria desconhecida”. 
96 The utopia of LB stands as: ‘plea for the rule of expertise, . . . hope for a disciplined and dispassionate 
elite of professional managers, . . . scorn for capitalism, . . . critique of democratic politics, . . . rejection of 
proletarian or revolutionary socialism, . . . admiration for technology, . . . insistence on a planetary utopia, 
. . . dismissal of the possibility of alternatives to the advancing utopian society. Reason, common sense and 
history made the scientocratic utopian inevitable’ (Wagar, 1988, pp. 116-117). 
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the catalyst of Boston’s change from 1887 to 2000. He expected that transformation 1875 
would not occur following a great revolution, but as the necessary consequence of the 1876 
growing dissatisfaction of all sectors of society with the industrial system that had gained 1877 
the material and monetary means to guarantee everyone’s quality of life and push 1878 
humanity towards its utopian future. Consequently, the Boston of 2000 is said to be the 1879 
end result of the transition from capitalist to nationalist (which, for Bellamy, meant 1880 
socialist97) society; the improved management of resources and waste, achieved through 1881 
a healthier relationship between human progress and nature; and the consequent 1882 
improvement of basic human conditions, which in turn meant the betterment of 1883 
humankind as a whole.  1884 
Arriving in this new Boston, Julian West finds that the city where he was born 1885 
and lived all his life has become irrevocably foreign. In fact, if not for the natural 1886 
landscape and the preservation of most of the streets’ layout, he would remain 1887 
unconvinced that this was indeed Boston at some other point in time. Bellamy’s 1888 
traditional utopia is thus one in which spatial re-ordering orients the journey through 1889 
utopia, with the improvement of society made evident through the shift in spatial 1890 
organisation.98 John Mullin and Kenneth Payne argue that the most interesting 1891 
contribution of LB is its ‘devotion to the urban’ (Mullin & Payne, 1997, n.p.) and the 1892 
conviction that planning, as a governmental activity, could improve social wellbeing, 1893 
further political responsiveness and result in greater freedom. Hence, for Bellamy, 1894 
improving material conditions via industrial power and the consequent urban form is 1895 
seemingly the most effective method for achieving equality, solidarity and freedom. 1896 
Therefore, ‘his Boston of the year 2000 is dense, highly developed and full [of] 1897 
magnificent boulevards, parks, fountains, and shopping districts of great cities’ (Mullin 1898 
& Payne, 1997, n.p.). The ‘great city’ (Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 55) constitutes the spatial 1899 
fix of Bellamy’s utopian society – the central focus and ordering force of the utopian 1900 
model. As Mullin reminds us in ‘Edward Bellamy’s Ambivalence: Can Utopia be 1901 
Urban?’, ‘there is scarcely a mention of the suburbs or the countryside in the book: the 1902 
 
97 In the introduction to the Penguin edition of Looking Backward, 2000-1887 by Cecelia Tichi, she refers 
how nationalism meant the nationalisation of industry and the equal division of resources for the population, 
which are the basic principles of socialism. This socialist stance, also called Fabianism, was a prominent 
in Britain in 1880s. 
98 According to Mullin and Payne, LB is, through and through, ‘a city planning text’ since it deals with 
issues such as ‘land use, industry, commerce, housing, open space, amenities and the environment’ (Mullin 
& Payne, 1997, n.p.). Although I agree with this perspective, what Mullin’s and Payne’s accounts lack, in 
my opinion, is the articulation of the spatial (not urban) issue with the form of the utopian genre in general. 
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city was to serve as the central place for government, culture, recreation and shopping’ 1903 
(Mullin, 2000, p. 52). 1904 
The pervasive themes in Bellamy’s spatial-utopian transformation are ‘the need 1905 
to break up the monotony of the city, to create environments where nature and technology 1906 
could co-exist, and to ensure that parks, open squares, sculptures, and fountains were 1907 
plentiful, for both aesthetic and health reasons’ (Mullin & Payne, 1997, n.p.). Bellamy 1908 
focuses on the need for ‘broad streets’, ‘large open squares’, ‘streets shaded with trees’, 1909 
‘building enclosures that stretch in every direction’, ‘statues [that] glistened and fountains 1910 
[that] flashed’ and ‘public buildings of colossal size and architectural grandeur’ (Bellamy, 1911 
1986 (1888), p. 55). All these spatial remarks point to how urban form is connected to his 1912 
utopian vision in which space is open, green, natural, regularised, ordered and large 1913 
enough to fit everyone. For Mullin, these urban attitudes could point to the fact that ‘the 1914 
city is simply not a place of utility: it is a grand place where the people are celebrated’ 1915 
(Mullin, 2000, p. 52), being the industrial district (of which we know nothing except its 1916 
utility) the functional counterpart of the city. This view points, however, to a structural 1917 
lack in Bellamy’s account of utopian space: although apparently solidary, free and 1918 
inclusive, these spaces are hardly ever inhabited, except for Julian West and the Leete 1919 
family itself, and the description of the population seems to homogenise it into a coherent, 1920 
recognised middle-class crowd whose wants and wills have been distilled into a single 1921 
narrative. The absence of spaces of art or alternative spatial practices testifies to this point. 1922 
The city may be for the people, but ‘people’ is used homogeneously and abstractly. Space 1923 
is not lived space but the abstract space of the city planner. The Boston of 2000, Mullin 1924 
adds later, is ‘a cold place’, reflecting Bellamy’s ‘distinct dislike of the crowd’ (Mullin, 1925 
2000, p. 54). While most of West’s depictions of the nineteenth century’s portray its 1926 
spaces as awfully overcrowded and its inhabitation as decadent, the twentieth century 1927 
Boston is ‘architectonic’, as it is ‘ordered, straight and proper. It is almost a stage setting 1928 
or a backdrop for human interaction that is to occur privately’ (Mullin, 2000, p. 53). The 1929 
contrast between the amount of space devoted to descriptions of private versus public 1930 
space is astounding. Bellamy’s city of 2000 is still a modern city in which abstract space 1931 
takes priority over mental and social space. It imposes an order upon the gaze, 1932 
representation and spatial practice. Mullin contends that ‘Bellamy seems quite 1933 
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comfortable with some of the military concepts that were used to develop the Castrum,99 1934 
standardization, repetition, regularization and a sense of strong centralized control’ 1935 
(Mullin, 2000, p. 54).100 Casey’s and Foucault’s accounts of modern institutional 1936 
spaces/sites may come to mind while reading these descriptions. Indeed, Bellamy’s faith 1937 
in scientific, industrial and human evolution clarifies his modern stance. In LB, city space 1938 
is abstracted upon an ordered, univocal gaze and not through the spatial practices of its 1939 
inhabitants. 1940 
Morris’s critique of Bellamy’s utopia is directed towards this ‘un-mixed modern’ 1941 
temperament, which results in a utopia that is both ‘unhistoric and unartistic; it makes its 1942 
owner perfectly satisfied with modern civilization, if only the injustice, misery and waste 1943 
of class society could be got rid of’ (Morris, 2004b, p. 354). Although in this remark 1944 
Morris is referring to the positivist and industrial character of modernism, I want to follow 1945 
up on some of its consequences. Bellamy’s overemphasis on the modern form is what 1946 
renders it perhaps unconvincing and cold. In his planning, Bellamy perfectly organises 1947 
relationships, space, the economy, labour and education under a definite, bounded system 1948 
so as to correspond to a vision of the world. However, it is precisely this modern attitude 1949 
that maintains the very society he is trying to criticise, immobilising it. To prove this, I 1950 
will now focus on the spaces of art and their function in the utopia depicted by Bellamy. 1951 
Three main spaces are considered for this analysis: the shopping centre, in which there is 1952 
a statue of the ideal of Plenty; the music room; and some loose marks of spaces of art. I 1953 
also address the organisation of the production and exhibition of artworks and literary 1954 
works. 1955 
In the first instance, the space of art appears as a marker. Arriving at the shopping 1956 
centre, West notices a statue ‘above the portal, standing out of the front of the building, a 1957 
majestic life-size group of statuary, the central figure of which was a female ideal of 1958 
Plenty, with her cornucopia’ (Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 52). In this space, the artwork 1959 
assumes the position of a monument, functioning as a sign for the space it is in. The 1960 
description of the work as representative of the ideal of Plenty, in conjunction with its 1961 
 
99 Mullin is here referring to the Roman Castrum, whose definition is, according to Britannica, as follows: 
‘The Romans’ castra, or military garrison towns, were protected by ramparts and ditches and interconnected 
by straight military roads along which their legions could speedily march’ (Britannica). 
100 Bellamy’s own biography may corroborate the military predisposition. Cecilia Tichi says: ‘The young 
Bellamy’s dream of a military career ended in 1867, when he failed to pass the physical examination for 
West Point’ (Tichi, 1986, pp. 10-11), ambition and vision he carries through in LB, as made clear by the 
military-like organization of the Industrial Army. 
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placement in a shopping centre, confirms and stabilises the space. It is open and social in 1962 
the sense that it is made available, but its meanings and practices are bounded: The statue, 1963 
similar to the modern museum, is meant as an ideological piece, serving almost as a 1964 
decorative mouthpiece rather than as an artistic object in itself. Mental space is 1965 
disregarded, as well as spatial praxis: the artwork is institutionalised via the view of the 1966 
perfected vision of utopia, in which practices and perspectives are pre-ordained. These 1967 
practices and perspectives are disregarded under the ordered, univocal view of the city 1968 
planner (in this case, Bellamy), who provides a preferable standpoint and interpretation 1969 
of the statue and its spatial meanings. 1970 
The statue of Plenty exemplifies what Kwon means when she states that not all 1971 
land art or site-specific art engages in critical spatial practice.101 Instead, although art is 1972 
placed in a public space, it still preserves the modern form, as well as the form of the 1973 
modern art space. Art is unable to create its own art space and rather assumes the tensions 1974 
between the mental and material spatial dichotomies of the modern artwork. The statue 1975 
of Plenty is a continuation of the building in front of which it stands. It represents a mute 1976 
continuation of Bellamy’s utopian vision102 – it is institutional in this sense, as it confirms 1977 
the status quo and the place it is in. Unlike, for example, Duchamp’s and Warhol’s 1978 
installations analysed in the previous chapter, which took place in physically bounded 1979 
places but subverted them, the statue of Plenty refuses to be seen as distinct from the 1980 
scenery of the shopping centre; its physical unboundedness obscures its mental or 1981 
relational boundedness. As Massey argues, being bounded does not mean that a place is 1982 
reactionary, nor is being unbounded an automatic signifier of progressiveness. 1983 
Although the entry of the shopping centre is an art space in the ontological sense, 1984 
by negating the artwork’s critical capability, the art space as an ontological entity 1985 
establishes no dialogue and no relation, except one of subordination to the space of the 1986 
shopping centre, which requires the space of art not to host truly social art – as no one 1987 
participates with it – but of functional art. In this matter, although devoid of any apparent 1988 
actual aesthetic virtues, the function exercised by this statue cannot be understood in 1989 
negative terms as it acts as a perfect relaxant, confirming the good life and the aesthetic 1990 
 
101 The statue and the space it is forced to occupy – as the artwork does not produce a space of its own – 
stands as virulent anti-thesis for installations such as Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc, whose happen-stance was 
inextricably compromised with spatial critical practice – even if a disruptive one. 
102 It is precisely from this standpoint of confirmation that Manheim traces the distinction between ideology 
and utopia in Ideology and Utopia. 
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taste of Bellamy’s utopia. Its aesthetic function is maintained so as to confirm the beauty 1991 
of LB’s perfectly ordered city. 1992 
In ‘The Utopian Vision of Edward Bellamy and Thorstein Veblen’, Rick Tilman 1993 
traces the similarities between the two authors’ utopian visions. This work compares 1994 
Veblen’s functionalist aesthetic to Bellamy’s in LB. Comparable to Bellamy, Veblen’s 1995 
functionalist aesthetic follows his considerations of the relationship between culture and 1996 
both wasteful consumption and unproductive employment. Based on this, Adorno 1997 
critiques Veblen’s analysis of culture as one-sided in his search to explain it in terms of 1998 
‘a display of booty, power, and appropriated surplus value’ (Tilman, 1985, p. 889) that 1999 
neglects other aspects of cultural phenomena and hence treats all cultural products as 2000 
commodity culture. Comparatively, in LB artistic practice is allowed only with 2001 
permission from the Industrial Army, on the condition that people – whose education 2002 
homogenises artistic consumption and neutralises difference – find the artist’s work 2003 
valuable. Artistic production is thus articulated in terms of value, and although Tilman 2004 
abstains from drawing further comparisons between Veblen’s and Bellamy’s stances on 2005 
art – given the latter’s reluctance to include more of it in his utopia – I argue that 2006 
Bellamy’s aestheticism is largely similar to Veblen’s functional aestheticism and is often 2007 
articulated as a sign. As Tilman states, ‘Veblen’s parsimonious aesthetic (when pushed 2008 
to its logical extreme) would indict as mere manifestations of ceremonialism the paintings 2009 
of Rembrandt and Hals, the poetry of Shelley, and the sculpture of Rodin’ (Tilman, 1985, 2010 
p. 889). Similarly, I argue that Bellamy’s aesthetic preoccupations and placement of art 2011 
reveal his own view of the artwork’s ceremonial character, opposing a logic of sign value 2012 
that fails to escape the institutionalisation or museification of the artwork. His 2013 
overemphasis on the private consumption of art, demonstrated by the music room and 2014 
private library (the only one he mentions throughout the novel), although accessible to 2015 
everyone, serves as function in the text. 2016 
The music room is described as ‘an apartment finished, without hangings, in 2017 
wood, with a floor of polished wood’ (Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 98) and, frustrating 2018 
West’s expectations, has no musical instruments. Instead, there is a card that ‘b[ears] the 2019 
date “September 12, 2000” and contain[s] the longest program I ha[ve] ever seen’ 2020 
(Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 98). One can select the desired instrument and type of music, 2021 
and the music is played live, according to a 24-hour programme, which is divided into 2022 
hours. Sitting comfortably in the music room, Julian West sees that, ‘at once the room 2023 
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was filled with the music of a grand organ anthem; filled, not flooded, for, by some means, 2024 
the volume of melody had been perfectly graduated to the size of the apartment’ 2025 
(Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 98). The music, Edith Leete explains, is provided from music 2026 
halls scattered throughout the city and connected via telephone to ‘all the houses in the 2027 
city whose people care to pay a small fee, and there are none, you may be sure, who do 2028 
not’ (Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 99). Furthermore, different programmes are 2029 
‘simultaneously performed’ and can be reproduced in any house at any point of the day. 2030 
A striking characteristic of this organisation is that musical production is organised much 2031 
like the Industrial Army, and artistic practice is mostly disregarded as functional labour 2032 
rather than as art in itself. The relation to the music piece seems to be cultivated as a 2033 
detached one in which the artist is reduced to the performer of a perfectly organised 2034 
musical production. The spectator, once more, is abstracted as a homogeneous consumer 2035 
whose mood may vary, but not his or her taste or practices towards the art object. After 2036 
these first remarks, however, let us pay attention to the space, the music room as art space 2037 
in itself. 2038 
Bellamy is critical of religious institutions for being used ‘by the dominant class 2039 
in self-serving ways’ and enriching the clergy, but he fails to see how spatial 2040 
institutionalisation itself enacts ideologies and power through the control of their spatial 2041 
conditions. Thus, although he removes religion from churches and art from the modern 2042 
museum (although apparently public galleries still exist), seeking to make religion and 2043 
art available to everyone instead of privatised according to personal interest, these spaces’ 2044 
apparent openness and publicness only enact the modern art space outside the modern 2045 
museum. 2046 
The bareness of the room – which is not a white cube but a wooden cube – and 2047 
the emphasis on the private fruition of art – also made explicit in the private library of 2048 
every citizen – seem to follow the modern tendency to regard the artwork as an ideal 2049 
category. As the statue represents the ideal of the harmonious and plentiful utopia of 2050 
Bellamy’s vision, music is regarded as an ideal object, whose artistic practice and 2051 
production assume an ethereal character. The artwork requires a vacant, empty space in 2052 
which art as detached ideal can be consumed, once more museifing it, reducing it to mere 2053 
object rather than a praxis – social or otherwise. The fact that music is available to 2054 
everyone does not mean that it transgresses the space of the modern museum, but that it 2055 
reproduces that space for everyone. Art is not to be lived with, in the sense that it does 2056 
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not dialogue with its space, history or social relations. Although part of everyday life, art 2057 
is not relational, processual or dynamic; its form is fixed under an ideal, its discourses are 2058 
muted in communication with other structures of society, and their boundaries are 2059 
impermeable to process. Art is not creatively produced but follows formal and pre- 2060 
established rules of what art is. 2061 
Just as the statue of Plenty confirms the wealth and harmony of the utopian 2062 
Boston, so do music rooms and private libraries merely serve as plot devices that attempt 2063 
to tackle the issue of art via its publicness. Despite art being made for the people, this 2064 
shift in art consumption disregards the subject and the community as a heterogeneous 2065 
source of meanings, constituted of atoms whose livelihood and taste escape those of the 2066 
imposed superstructure, while the role of the individual as an artist whose motivations 2067 
may vary is wholly absent. In Bellamy’s utopia, artistic practice, consumption and 2068 
exhibition have a conservative function, assisting in the perpetuation of the new order of 2069 
utopia just as the modern form of artwork and art space preserve the older Boston. 2070 
Education,103 said to be the vehicle through which art was popularly ‘elected’ – when 2071 
governments were not – follows the same blueprint: it teaches people to judge and 2072 
appreciate art and their environment according to a superimposed notion of good taste 2073 
that is at once universal (as Dr. Leete says, it is a natural aptitude of every human) and 2074 
acquired (as it requires education on artistic sensibility). Thus, education – on art and 2075 
other subjects – does not endorse critical or alternative attitudes that would create 2076 
alternative creative practices. Bellamy’s concerns with art and culture exhaust themselves 2077 
in the public availability that confirms that his utopian society is indeed egalitarian. Once 2078 
education was made available to everyone, citizens could choose, by ‘vote’ or 2079 
consumption, based on the formation the educational system provided them (a system 2080 
that was conservative and homogenising by itself), what type of art could be produced. 2081 
‘The opportunity for formal education’, as with access to art, ‘would be qualitatively 2082 
increased so that all citizens would share equally among them’ (Gutek, 1964, p. 252) so 2083 
that the status quo’s perceived perfect blueprint would be maintained and artistic practices 2084 
frozen in time.  2085 
Moreover, true subjective mental representations of space are disregarded under 2086 
the critique of individualism, instead of employed critically in Bellamy’s utopia. Equality 2087 
 
103 See Gerald Gutek’s ‘An Analysis of Formal Education in Edward Bellamy's Looking Backward’. 
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is achieved on the condition that the public is converted into a homogeneous entity104 2088 
whose spatial or identitary transgression is considered antisocial or individualistic: 2089 
‘utopian Boston is a caring, homogeneous community where equality, grace, dignity, and 2090 
innocence are manifest – provided one agrees with the goals of the state’ (Mullin and 2091 
Payne, 1997, n.p.). The fact that ‘people of the new age have no difficulties in recognising 2092 
this urbane middle class gentleman [West], so similar to themselves’ (Geoghegan, 1992, 2093 
p. 76) speaks to the homogenising and identitary fixity that Bellamy ascribes to the entire 2094 
population of the new Boston.  2095 
The connections he establishes between history and space are also problematic in 2096 
this respect, as, similar to what happened to the modern museum, art is severed from 2097 
public life and social relations as process. For Mullin, ‘Bellamy’s New Boston is built on 2098 
the old one’ (Mullin, 2000, p. 53). Bellamy’s walk and pinpointing of old locations is 2099 
meant to highlight history and the continuity between the old and the new Boston in terms 2100 
of institutional space that has finally been cleaned and ordered. Moreover, Mullin states, 2101 
‘Bellamy’s fusion of past and future allows the reader to be aware of this “process” of the 2102 
creation of a utopia’ (Mullin, 2000, p. 53) in which the old structures are not only 2103 
dismantled into new structures but also re-ordered according to his vision. Rather than 2104 
replacing the city of his time, Bellamy orders, cleans and embellishes it. He thus opens 2105 
the streets of his own time to fight the crowdedness, flanking them with similar buildings 2106 
but in an organised, well-ordered form and making space ‘stretch towards infinity’ 2107 
(Mullin & Payne, 1997, n.p.). However, although a linkage to the past is established via 2108 
the spatial orientation and natural disposition of 1887 Boston, Vincent Geoghegan 2109 
conclusively argues in his comparative study of historical attitudes in Bellamy’s LB and 2110 
Morris’s NFN that ‘this notion of the seed of the new in the old exemplifies the deeper 2111 
level of continuity underlying the supposed discontinuity between past and present. The 2112 
move from old to new is portrayed as a smooth, seamless transition. In this conception, 2113 
the past is in no way stimulating, shocking or threatening to the new society’ (Geoghegan, 2114 
1992, p. 76), rather, the past is a sealed off entity whose interest constitutes mere scholarly 2115 
curiosity. Not only the past but also the future is sealed off, with being in the present the 2116 
only state of permanence left for the theorisation of time. The past is neutralised, and the 2117 
 
104 Much criticism has focused on how all the inhabitants of Boston of 2000 belong to the same race, religion 
or class. Equality has been achieved on the condition Otherness is annulated. For an account on these issues, 
especially devoted to its implications on Bellamy’s view of globalisation and race, see Robin Balthrope’s 
‘Bellamy’s Looking Backward 2000–1887, Globalism, and Race’. 
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present made eternal. Bellamy’s LB denotes the modern emphasis on temporal form, but 2118 
in a way that points to an identitary categorisation: The future is recognised as, on the one 2119 
hand, the end product of scientific evolution and, on the other hand, an eternal monad in 2120 
which evolution has finally assumed its proper form.105 The crossing between space and 2121 
history is, thus, one in which both are abstracted into pure form, and not dialectical criss- 2122 
crossed with social and cultural forms. Utopian space is the product of linear historical 2123 
progression and is only considered in the form of abstract (or first) space, as reflected by 2124 
Bellamy’s take on the modern art form. 2125 
The space of art in LB is of two types and is univocal and unidimensional in all 2126 
instances: first, functionally aesthetic and abstract spaces, in which institutionalisation is 2127 
achieved in the form of monument (e.g., the statue of Plenty); and second, aesthetic and 2128 
mental spaces, in which institutionalisation is achieved by the private reproduction of the 2129 
modern museum as music room or private library and in which aesthetic form confirms 2130 
the pleasurable utopia’s function. These two forms of static representation of art and 2131 
spaces of art deem it asocial (as its meanings are sealed off from social relations), bounded 2132 
(as it refuses dialogue with other spaces), static (as it is immutable), horizontal (as it 2133 
fosters a historicist logic of eternalisation of the artwork form), unarticulated with space 2134 
and society, and homogeneous (as it refuses difference in both its representations and 2135 
social praxis as well in their distinction from other art spaces). 2136 
Its function is derivative of this modern spatialisation and aestheticism that serve 2137 
as a continuation of the perceived perfect form of this utopia – a positive one – and as 2138 
testimony to a vision of utopia that has already been achieved, refusing alterity and 2139 
dialogue. 2140 
Throughout the book, remarks about statues, architecture, literature and art 2141 
publishing, and exhibition point to an institutionalised, sometimes even mercantile logic 2142 
of the status of the artwork in the Boston of 2000. Artists are only excused from their jobs 2143 
to dedicate themselves to their art if people find the work valuable to society or buy the 2144 
work; artworks only become integrated in public space after the vote of the people; artist 2145 
and art critic are not considered valuable jobs per se, but only on the condition that they 2146 
are useful. This perspective means that artworks that are not a continuation of utopia and 2147 
that are instead critical, differential or processual of the established order can never be 2148 
 
105 The modern obsession with time assumes, in Bellamy, the role of historicism rather than of historicity 
if we accept the Geoghegan’s conclusions. 
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made public.106 The publishing system, which is considered to ‘encourage literary 2149 
vocation’ and ‘discourage mere scribblers’ (Bellamy, 1986 (1888), p. 103), not only 2150 
homogenises artistic production but rests on the presumption that there is a privileged 2151 
format for art, just as there is a privileged way in which it should be displayed – mass 2152 
spatial-public testimonies or private static monads. This presumption is grounded on 2153 
polarisations of good versus bad, useful versus useless, and tasteful versus distasteful, 2154 
according to homogeneous standards. Art is reduced to an evident, readymade consumer 2155 
good, whose spatial disposition must confirm its (positive) utopian function. 2156 
Although critical of late nineteen century Boston, Bellamy recreates the same 2157 
modern spaces he encountered in his own period as abstractions. He adopts, for example, 2158 
‘a set of nineteenth-century conventions concerning the relative attractiveness of pre- 2159 
industrial towns as against industrial cities’ (Wilson, 1977, p. 49). He institutionalises 2160 
space, stratifies social relations and homogenises spatial practices under his ideological 2161 
view of utopia. The institutionalisation of art, discussed in the previous chapter, is 2162 
mimicked by Bellamy, whose futuristic urban Boston, although radically different in 2163 
aspect, remains the same, as modernism would have it; it obeys the same spatial logic that 2164 
eternalises the modern form of art – and history. While elites have been eradicated, art 2165 
production and exhibition remain regulated under an appointed mass, whose wishes 2166 
cohesively reproduce those of the city planner. 2167 
One could argue that the space of art is simply not an important issue given the 2168 
sparseness of the examples107 provided by Bellamy. I suggest, alternatively, that if we 2169 
take on this quantitative approach, the connections between the few accounts of art – and, 2170 
hence, spaces of art – and the traditional utopia are even more striking. Despite numerous 2171 
descriptions of space and economic, labour or education relations, other details lack 2172 
imaginative transformation. How people live, dress and express themselves; how art is 2173 
made; and how people go about their daily lives all lack depth or are maintained intact.108 2174 
 
106 Of course, this issue has, again, to do with the homogeneity with which Bellamy invests both the utopian 
population and education. 
107 Henry Holiday writes, some years after the publication of LB in 1888, an article on the artistic aspects 
of LB, ‘The Artistic Aspects of Bellamy’s ‘Looking Backward’’, in part in the defence of it from some of 
the criticism done in the aftermath of the publication, in part as recognition that these aspects could have 
been made more explicit in the novel. 
108 As Mullin so aptly summarises, the new Boston of 2000 is: ‘ordered, regularized and standardized. It is 
a place where the fundamental needs of all citizens are met and where there is extensive choice for the 
citizens – provided they accept society’s cultural norms . . .. It is an efficient, controlled place where the 
mob, the crowd and the different are dispersed. There is little sense of joy, anger, whimsy and serendipity’ 
(Mullin, 2000, p. 56). 
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When the analysis of the city is confronted with that of the spaces of art, the spatial 2175 
character of Bellamy’s utopia and its function as utopian text become clear. In LB, the 2176 
city space is abstracted upon the ordered gaze of the planner: it is uninhabited and 2177 
homogeneous, and although apparently inclusive, the regulating process imposed on both 2178 
the population itself (via the nullification of differences between them) and their practices 2179 
(via the stipulation of ordered functionality) testifies to the exclusiveness of the spaces 2180 
depicted. These spaces are not prepared for difference, but for standardisation, pattern 2181 
and industry. The spaces do not contribute to Bellamy’s goal of making a fair society in 2182 
which art is accessible to everyone, but turn everyone into an acceptable spectator, whose 2183 
learning must be orientated to belong to the ideal class, which Bellamy perceives as the 2184 
educated middle class to which he himself belongs.  2185 
Bellamy’s utopia is one in which the modern holistic spatiality of the artwork has 2186 
been fully integrated and in which such discourse maintains the ideological, univocal 2187 
perspective of modernism, despite Bellamy’s criticism. This form of spatial configuration 2188 
reveals the positive function of art, confirming the emphasis on the uniformity, harmony 2189 
and perfect form of the traditional utopia. LB’s modern spatiality, whose fixed 2190 
spatialisation is almost military, reveals a ‘sense of control [that] did not allow for the 2191 
avant-garde, the counter-culture or the unique’ (Mullin, 2000, p. 62). Art production in 2192 
LB lacks heterogeneity, criticality and a ‘thirdring-as-Othering’ altogether. After all, 2193 
Glenn Altschuler reminds us that ‘a perfect society . . . has no need for conflict, change, 2194 
or a dialectic between individuals and the environment’ (Altschuler, 1989, p. 952). As the 2195 
analysis of the modern art space confirms LB as a traditional utopia, so does the 2196 
traditional utopia confirm the modern art space and the artwork in their positive function. 2197 
Morris wrote NFN largely as a direct response to LB. The antagonism between 2198 
Morris’s aspirations and those of what he considered ‘the unmixed modern’ attitude of 2199 
Bellamy became the main motive for his work, blatantly contrasting the two in terms of 2200 
labour conditions, building design,109 spatial layout and artistic creation. His critique of 2201 
Bellamy110 is hence based on his considerations (or lack thereof) of art and urban 2202 
 
109 Morris had firstly thought on pursuing an education in architecture and, because of that, worked in 
George Edmund Street’s office for over a year, this experience influencing his perspectives on architecture 
– as well as his sensibility toward the topic in the construction of his utopian vision. For a further analysis 
on the relation of Morris with utopia see Ana Margarida Barata’s Master Dissertation Arquitectura e Design 
na Ensaística de William Morris e Walter Gropius. 
110 Bellamy’s utopia society would be, accordingly, ‘even more meaningless than a capitalist one, ruled by 
impersonal diktat and the laws of supply and demand, with no true community, no nature, no sense of the 
past and nothing to hope for but freedom from work’ (Wilmer, 2004, p. XXXIV). 
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spatiality, which are perceived to disrupt labour as creative work by mechanising it and 2203 
uprooting community- and identitary-based spatiality. As a response to Bellamy’s well- 2204 
ordered, symmetric, planned utopia, Morris wrote NFN in an organicist way. Morris’s 2205 
utopia’s spatial, social and historical configurations and descriptions are usually 2206 
phenomenological, presenting a general lack of institutions and an abstract overview of 2207 
this utopian society, except through what Ruth Levitas calls the ‘archive of the feet’. This 2208 
archive of the feet presupposes that space is mostly felt, rather than perceived. It 2209 
constitutes an abstract entity and is invested with a deep sense of memory and historical 2210 
embeddedness. Levitas describes this phenomenon, applying the term invented by Simon 2211 
Schama, as a kind of bodily memory of sense of space.111 Of course, the archive of the 2212 
feet possesses much of the flaneur’s and the second space’s subjective quality of space 2213 
perception, which fits perfectly with the type of spatial affirmations Morris makes 2214 
throughout the text and that serves as nostalgic experience in contrast to Guest’s (and 2215 
Morris’s) social background. 2216 
In the book, the new London is revealed through Guest’s mapping in his own 2217 
London. At each step, his childhood, recreated as representing a pre-industrial society, is 2218 
recuperated.112 The text thus acts as an ‘appeal to individual memory both in its 2219 
construction and initial reception, most clearly a memory that is embedded in a specific 2220 
place’ (Levitas, 2007, pp. 29-30). The loss felt, however, opens the way for the creation 2221 
of utopian possibilities, here an attempt to recuperate a sense of place that is more attuned 2222 
to the natural landscape and communal life of Morris’s childhood and less attuned to its 2223 
destruction for the production of capital.113 2224 
Levitas recognises that it is precisely the intersection of space and history in the 2225 
recuperation of space of a medieval past in the construction of the future utopia social 2226 
space that constitutes Morris’s IROS (Levitas, 2007, p. 47). Morris’s utopian vision thus 2227 
provides a ‘base outside’, which, when used as an archaeological tool, may unveil 2228 
 
111 Levitas explains ‘the archive of the feet’ in the following terms: ‘our embodied sense of physical place, 
the way in which our body knows where to go, which way to turn, is laid down very early. When street 
layouts, rather than specific buildings, change, what is generated is a dream-like sense of dislocation and 
an embodied sense that something is wrong. . . . William Morris said, in NFN: ‘I thought I knew the 
Broadway from the lie of the roads that still met there’. Physical obliteration also represses, or at least 
compounds, the forgetting of the social performances previously enacted in them. It creates an absence in 
what Schama calls ‘the archive of the feet’ (Levitas, 2007, p. 25). 
112 Levitas points to the fact that utopia is a reaction against the ‘loss of rural Hammersmith’ and the ‘recent 
changes’ in the landscape that his contemporary audience would have recognized. 
113 The sentiment of recuperation is a recurring one in NFN – oftentimes granting it the (misplaced, in my 
opinion) coinage of pastoral utopia. See Roger C. Lewis’ ‘News from Nowhere: Arcadia or Utopia?’. 
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‘significant silences in place of Morris’s holism’ (Levitas, 2007, p. 66), namely, the 2229 
underlaying narrative of place and its relations to the individual, society and history. 2230 
Hammersmith as a good place and yet-to-be-good-place stresses the dialectics between 2231 
utopianism as concept and physical infrastructures. 2232 
The encroachment on real space as a catalyst for utopian longing is, in turn, 2233 
inseparable from artistic interest and practice, which must consequently become manifest 2234 
in people’s actions and, perhaps more importantly, in the environment (i.e., utopian 2235 
space). Departing from the same despairing ‘nightmare of commercial ugliness’ (as cited 2236 
in Dowling, 1996, p. IX) of Bellamy, Morris’s aestheticism is, by contrast, ‘able to 2237 
imagine art in such a situation [that] might possess a great power of redemption’ 2238 
(Dowling, 1996, p. IX). Aestheticism consequently informs both his political stance and 2239 
his utopian vision. His aim is the ‘democratization of beauty’ (Dowling, 1996, p. X) or 2240 
the establishment of an ‘aesthetic democracy’ (Dowling, 1996, p. XII), as Linda Dowling 2241 
terms it. 2242 
Society, art and space are co-extensive concepts among themselves,114 being the 2243 
source of human experience. This ambition ‘impelled him [Morris] to seek not simply a 2244 
set of decorative arrangements or artistic relations but the social political ideal’, an 2245 
aesthetic utopian democratic transformation ‘by which the unanimous yet uncoerced 2246 
bond between the citizens and their polity approximated the relations between aesthetic 2247 
perceivers and the beautiful’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 50). He thus sought participation, with 2248 
all citizens sharing in beauty and artistic practice to bring about happiness and social 2249 
betterment. Hence, Morris ‘strove continuously so ‘that the Arts might be re-created and 2250 
knit together into one vital organic Art, feeling the whole of life. And he strove that the 2251 
people be re-created and knit together into one vital organic commonwealth’ (Dowling, 2252 
1996, p. 50).  2253 
Following Ruskin, Morris structures is thought around the belief that the only path 2254 
for human happiness and social equality is ‘creative freedom’ (Wilmer, 2004, p. XII). 2255 
Furthermore, Morris upholds that beauty and taste are part of humans’ natural faculties 2256 
and that only by the exercise of these intrinsic desires for the aesthetic can happiness thus 2257 
be achieved. For Morris, this view means that art is not only a necessity of life, but also 2258 
 
114 Morris’s definition of art as ‘the complete work of applied art, the true unit of the art, is building with 
all its due ornament and furniture’ (as cited in Vieria 2006, p. 463) is co-implicative with his notion of 
society – and of social space – serving as its truth referent (Cf. Vieira 2006, 463). 
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a precondition for the dignity of labour. This instinct had been thwarted by industrial 2259 
modernism but redeemed through utopian aesthetic commitment. The emphasis on 2260 
medievalism and its architectural correspondent, the Gothic, follows these convictions, 2261 
as the return to such artistic conditions would also mean the return to freedom; free 2262 
labour; artistic creation; and a rooted relation to space, nature and the community, whose 2263 
reality is unmistakably dissonant with Morris’s own reality. Thus, against the aristocratic 2264 
– and capitalist – tendency to seclude art from everyday life and the separation between 2265 
arts and crafts, the revival of medieval craftsmanship115 would recuperate this lost 2266 
practice that seeks art not for art’s sake but for the sake of the community. The division 2267 
between arts and crafts is the result of the dehumanisation of (creative) labour, which is 2268 
coincident with the abandonment of workshops, the industrialisation of craft-making and 2269 
the consequent displacement of ‘the lesser arts’ to factories and of ‘high art’ for 2270 
commercial use. The opposite of this situation is the intertwining of art with 2271 
craftsmanship,116 which would lead to a free society lacking elitist distinctions. Moreover, 2272 
with labour being the reflection of artistic expression, everyone could enjoy their work 2273 
and rejoice in their status of free creators. The cultivation of the creative everyman and 2274 
the return to craftsmanship in labour are hence foundational for utopia’s realisation. This 2275 
artistic cultivation is in turn reflected in the paradigm of artistic creation as ‘the medieval 2276 
guild’; Morris particularly admires ‘the paternalistic moral force that the guild ideally 2277 
exercised over its members’ (Davis, 2009, p. 228), encouraging them to work 2278 
cooperatively and for the community. What is more, this artistic cultivation is also 2279 
reflected in how people perceive and experience space117, an idea that is carried in the 2280 
architecture of Nowhere. Accordingly, in NFN, there is barely a distinction between 2281 
decorative and fine art, as the preference for the latter over the former is identified as the 2282 
cause of the loss of qualities and possibilities in both.  2283 
 
115 Medieval craft labour, he believed, knew ‘no distinction between brain and hand, art and manufacture, 
pleasure and work’ (Geoghegan 83). 
116 The Arts and Crafts movement, of which Ruskin and Morris are its most relevant figures, was an 
international trend in the field of design that sought to recuperate it as a valuable form of art and labour. 
Morris’s representation of art also follows his own artistic endeavours as founder figure of the Arts and 
Crafts movement and pattern designer himself. 
117 While in nineteenth-century London, living space is being replaced by space for industry and machinery 
– and living conditions more and more unequal and pleasurable –, in the decentralised towns of Nowhere 
‘both shores had a line of pretty houses, low and not large, standing back a little away from the river; they 
were mostly built of real brick and roofed with tiles, and looked, above all, comfortable and as if they were, 
so to say, alive and sympathetic with the life of the dwellers in them’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 48). 
 80 
 
Gothic architecture is central to Morris’s utopian imaginary, as it is a perfect 2284 
paradigm of the reconciliation between art and human life, and between these and nature. 2285 
Gothic buildings are perceived as natural, while the neoclassic buildings of his own time 2286 
struck Morris as ‘cold, impractical and snobbish’, the style’s revivalism the mark of an 2287 
elite who accepted a ‘cultural hierarchy’, conveying ‘a particular social message’ 2288 
(Wilmer, 2004, p. XXIV).118 The erection of these buildings was then not a matter of taste 2289 
or coincidence, but of the preservation of a specific ideological and psychological attitude 2290 
that sought to maintain (and even reinforce) the status quo. The Gothic was, in turn, 2291 
identified as an architectural style in which ‘freedom of expression’; ‘feeling for natural 2292 
beauty’ (Wilmer, 2004, p. XXV); and the conjunction between arts and crafts and art and 2293 
labour could be fully expressed.  2294 
Uncoincidentally, the first art space is a Gothic building. The Guest House of 2295 
Nowhere is described as ‘handsomely built of redbrick with a lead roof, and high above 2296 
the windows there ran a frieze of figure subjects in baked clay, very well executed, and 2297 
designed with a force and directedness which I had never noticed in modern work before’ 2298 
(Morris, 2004c, p. 53). This frieze is an example of the detail and craftsmanship employed 2299 
in all spaces, and especially the new buildings replacing the old ones. The Guest House’s 2300 
Gothic style is representative of the architecture and space of utopia, being repeated in 2301 
every major building prior to the revolution. Furthermore, most of the buildings that were 2302 
not torn down119 conform to the Gothic style or were constructed during the Gothic 2303 
revival, such as Westminster Abbey and Westminster Palace, respectively. 2304 
What Morris intends with this approach is to overcome the unartistic visions of 2305 
the social order of his own time, as well as the separation between aesthetic fruition and 2306 
everyday life. Combined, however, with the lack of creative, reflective art forms, these 2307 
descriptions of art space have two main consequences: first, that art’s function is solely 2308 
aesthetic and thus testifies to Morris’s utopian ideal; and, second, that there is a proper 2309 
 
118 As Morris himself suggests in his lecture ‘Gothic Architecture’: ‘the narrow superstition of the form of 
the Greek temple was not a matter of accident, but was the due expression of the exclusiveness and 
aristocratic arrogance of the ancient Greek mind, a natural result of which was a demand for pedantic 
perfection in all the parts and details of a building; so that the inferior parts of the ornament are so slavishly 
subordinated to the superior, that no invention or individuality is possible in them’ (Morris, 2004a, pp. 334-
335). 
119 In a broad mode, every building that did not conform with the Gothic style and deemed ‘worthless, and 
public nuisances’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 69) was tore down and built anew as they were considered unpleasant 
and ugly. 
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form for art and its space that is univocal, respecting the aesthetic rule of the Gothic.120 2310 
Art is not articulated in the form of concept or spatiality, but as a general aesthetic 2311 
abstraction. Moreover, although we are offered various descriptions of buildings and 2312 
utopia’s architecture, these are artworks solely based on their aesthetic qualities, being 2313 
described in abstract form and respecting the utilitarian prescriptive form of space and 2314 
utopia, whose object-ness is mediated rather than having intrinsic value. Hence, although 2315 
replacing Victorian art forms and space, Morris appears to maintain the ideal, aesthetic 2316 
and univocal character of the modern art space. What persists is the sense that Morris, 2317 
despite his efforts, ‘remained an unwitting prisoner of precisely the aristocratic 2318 
assumptions he had overtly rejected’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 56).121 2319 
Interior spaces of art, however, are slightly different in terms of narrative exposure 2320 
and spatial perception, although maintaining the same function. The artworks of these 2321 
spaces conform to the same artistic form – medieval-inspired pattern design, ludic murals, 2322 
tapestry art, decorated arcs and others. Regarding the descriptions of these interior spaces, 2323 
phenomenological perception is the main operative mode of narration. As we enter the 2324 
Guest House – a communal space, as most of Nowhere’s art spaces are – we find a hall 2325 
exhibiting ‘a floor of marble mosaic and an open timber roof’, with ‘no windows’. On the 2326 
side opposite to the river are arched entrances leading to chambers, ‘one of which showed 2327 
a glimpse of a garden beyond, and above them a long space of wall gaily painted (in 2328 
fresco, I thought) with similar objects to those of the frieze outside’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 2329 
53). This space is said to generate ‘that exhilarating sense of space and freedom which 2330 
satisfactory architecture always gives to an anxious man who is in the habit of using his 2331 
eyes’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 53). The space is finely decorated with paintings, murals, little 2332 
statues and patterned tapestries, whose functions are mainly ornamental or of pleasurable 2333 
extension. The images depicted on such murals refer to fairy tales and myths; statues act 2334 
as continuations of space, and literature is said to be escapist or fantastic, according to 2335 
Clara. Pinkney elaborates on this, adding that, ‘the complex psychologism of the realist 2336 
novel is rejected by Ellen’s great commination on the genre, and it has been replaced in 2337 
 
120 Morris upholds in his lecture on Gothic Nature that ‘there is only one style of Architecture on which it 
is possible to found a true living art, which is free to adapt itself to the varying conditions of social life, 
climate, and so forth, and that that style is Gothic architecture’ (Morris, 2004f, p. 292). 
121 Although critical of the revivalist style of neoclassicism for recuperating Greek aestheticism and 
architecture, which were the mutual by-product of the unjust and aristocratic character of its society, Morris, 
nevertheless, revived himself the medieval art forms and architecture as displays of that time value of 
craftsmanship, disregarding, however, the injustices and miseries lived by the people who were deprived 
of education, health or living conditions. 
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the new culture by the one-dimensionality of Grimm’s fairy stories or of historical friezes 2338 
that decorates the walls of the Hammersmith Guest House’ (Pinkney, 2008, n.p.). Hence, 2339 
despite these spaces being functional as well as aesthetic, (fulfilling the function of dining 2340 
rooms, meeting-places, guest houses or others), as spaces of art, they most often lack 2341 
negative or critical functions, but are pleasurable continuations of the ideals represented 2342 
in the works of art themselves. As such, they acquire purely aesthetic and positive societal 2343 
functions. They are lived spaces but lack assorted spatial practices; hence, we cannot say 2344 
that they involve ‘thirdring-as-Othering’, as they serve a holistic narrative in which 2345 
difference is absorbed or negated. 2346 
In addition to those spaces that are properly utopian – as they were created by 2347 
Nowhere’s citizens post-revolution – some old buildings of Guest’s own London remain, 2348 
despite their original function having been subverted, as a memoire, contrast122 or useful 2349 
site. However, even those buildings constructed in the same style as utopia’s other 2350 
buildings, such as some Houses of Parliament – Westminster Palace among them – are 2351 
repurposed and ‘used for a sort of subsidiary market, and a storage place for manure’ 2352 
(Morris, 2004c, p. 80).  2353 
Nevertheless, the key cases of maintenance (and subversion) of spaces in 2354 
Nowhere that can be perceived as spaces of art in more than an ontological sense are the 2355 
old factories, modern museums (e.g., the British Museum and National Gallery) and the 2356 
slums.123 Regarding the modern museums, although their original function is maintained 2357 
as a shelter for art (and other artefacts and memorabilia), their practices and the 2358 
ideological, elitist overtones they formerly maintained are disrupted.  2359 
In fact, the very term ‘museum’ has been lost. All museums are now called 2360 
‘national galleries’ after the National Gallery of London. For the Nowherians, the 2361 
museum has become ‘a place where pictures are kept as curiosities’, with ‘a good amount 2362 
of them up and down the country’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 80). The National Gallery in 2363 
 
122 Dick tells us that these ‘silly old buildings serve as a kind of foil to the beautiful ones we build now’ 
(Morris, 2004c, p. 80). 
123 In London Rookeries and Colliers' Slums, Robert Williams describes the slums in the following terms: 
‘It may be one house but it generally is a cluster of houses, or of blocks of dwellings, not necessarily 
dilapidated, or badly drained, or old, but usually all this and small-roomed, and, further, so hemmed in by 
other houses, so wanting in light and air, and therefore cleanliness, as to be wholly unfit for human 
habitation’ (Williams, 1985 (1893), p. 13). In Exploring the urban past: Essays in urban history by H. J. 
DYOS the point is made that there is a connection between the proliferation of slums with the rapid growth 
of the urban form and the suburbs, reason why, perhaps, Morris refers to the urban form as origin of many 
social evils, dissolving it – as well as the idea of suburbs – in NFN. 
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particular is described as ‘an old building before the middle of the twentieth century’ in 2364 
‘a queer fantastic style not over beautiful; but there are some fine things inside it, too, 2365 
mostly pictures’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 53). The paintings and the space itself nevertheless 2366 
have a merely historical function, as their meanings are apparently closed: few people 2367 
seem to go there, and there is an overall lack of interest in artworks that are not produced 2368 
according to the presently accepted style. Previous pieces primarily function as historical 2369 
relics or artefacts, rather than as actual artworks with meanings of their own. However, 2370 
museums’ preservation as spaces of art reveals not only a dialogue between history and 2371 
space, horizontality and verticality, but also their function as disruptive, negative forces; 2372 
they are radically different from the surrounding utopian environment, and their 2373 
descriptions as mental and lived spaces disrupt the original aura of sanctity or permanence 2374 
they once had. People disrupt abstract spaces and instead live in them, flirt in them and 2375 
dwell in them in ways other than what the spatial geometry had envisioned, reflecting the 2376 
negative function with which Morris imbues these buildings. The descriptions of and 2377 
interactions in the British Museum are proof: the instant the British Museum is described 2378 
– with a sense of nostalgia on the part of Guest – Dick states how this ‘familiar’ space is 2379 
where his ‘great-grandfather mostly lives’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 85).  2380 
The museum, presented to us in a diachronic manner reflecting Guest’s own 2381 
representations and sense of space,124 above and beyond housing a ‘wonderful collection 2382 
. . . of all type of antiquities’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 86), is the accommodation home of Old 2383 
Hammond, Dick and Clara’s flirting. The space of the museum no longer imposes a set 2384 
of fixed spatial practices and protects its objects as quasi-religious entities but is dynamic 2385 
and open to new explorations and meanings. Of course, artworks are maintained, as Dick 2386 
puts it, as ‘curiosities’ or ‘records’; still, their openness to a negative discourse highlights 2387 
Morris’s attunement to the problem of spatiality and artistic museification – which he 2388 
considers a necessary evil no longer needed in his utopia. 2389 
The factory, a major industrial and capitalist indicator of the Victorian period, is 2390 
another building whose maintenance we may find unexpected. Factories are maintained 2391 
not for their original purposes, but are recycled into ‘banded-workshops’ where ‘people 2392 
collect who want to work together’ when ‘convenient’ or ‘necessary’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 2393 
 
124 Morris writes: ‘we walked straight into the forecourt of the Museum, where, except that the railings 
were gone, the whispering boughs of the trees were all about, nothing seemed changed; the very pigeons 
were wheeling about the building and clinging to the ornaments . . . as I had seen them of old’ (Morris, 
2004c, pp. 85-86). 
 84 
 
81) – a habit regarded as ‘pleasant’.125 Thus, not only are usual spatial practices 2394 
transgressed, but the metaphor of social and spatial transformation also completes itself: 2395 
in the same way the factory is transformed into a workshop, ‘useless toil’126 is 2396 
transformed into a communal creative practice. 2397 
Finally, the slums, despite having been dismantled altogether, the ‘memory of 2398 
[them] abides’ since the location upon which they once stood has been repurposed:  2399 
Once a year, on May-day, we hold a solemn feast in those easterly communes of London to 2400 
commemorate The Clearing of Misery . . .. On that day we have music and dancing, and merry 2401 
games and happy feasting on the site of some of the worst of the old slums, the traditional memory 2402 
of which we have kept. On that occasion the custom is for the prettiest girls to sing some of the 2403 
old revolutionary songs, and those which were the groans of the discontent, once so hopeless, on 2404 
the very spots where those terrible crimes of class-murder were committed . . .. It is a curious and 2405 
touching sight to see some beautiful girl, daintily clad, and crowned with flowers from the 2406 
neighbouring meadows, standing amongst the happy people, on some mound where of old time 2407 
stood the wretched apology for a house, a den in which men and women lived packed amongst the 2408 
filth like pilchards in a cask; . . . to hear the terrible words of threatening and lamentation coming 2409 
from her sweet and beautiful lips, and she unconscious of their real meaning: to hear her, for 2410 
instance, singing Hood's Song of the Shirt127, and to think that all the time she does not understand 2411 
what it is all about--a tragedy grown inconceivable to her and her listeners. (Morris, 2004c, p. 104) 2412 
 2413 
By preserving memory as location through the act of festival, which here implies the act 2414 
of artistic practice as festival,128 the nineteenth-century spatial creation of the slums is 2415 
negatively comprehended. Artistic celebration becomes an act of spatial transgression 2416 
with conceptual functions, but most importantly, it acts as a social fact, not for the 2417 
utopians, but for the reader. The ‘utopian slums’ function as real-and-imagined spaces 2418 
once we stand outside the text itself, given that for the citizens, most of the spatial 2419 
meaning of the artistic celebration of the tragedy of the slums has been lost. For them, the 2420 
festival is an act of pure aesthetic fruition. However, the conflict it presents to the reader 2421 
as imagined space unveils the very contradiction of the real space. The space of art is 2422 
univocal in its stance, representing – as mental space – the very ideology underlying the 2423 
making of Nowhere in particular. It is relational only as far as it relates to the space 2424 
outside of the text, since its space is rather static; artistic practice is merely reproduced, 2425 
and its spatial meanings are closed off for its practitioners. These arts spaces lack 2426 
 
125In there, Dick explains, they may ‘make pottery and glass’, for example, as they are equipped for the 
needs of such craftsmanship, being replicated all across country as artistry is made available for everyone, 
especially given the fact that everyone receives formation on the arts and crafts from very young age. 
Moreover, they are ‘nice place[s] inside, though as plain as you see outside’, besides ‘throwing the clay . . 
. be[ing] a jolly work’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 81). 
126 See Morris’s lecture ‘Useful Work versus Useless Toil’. 
127 The reference is to a popular ballad of 1843, a protest poem against labour conditions. 
128 See Julia Ramírez Blanco’s Artistic Utopias of Revolt: Claremont Road, Reclaim the Streets, the City of 
Sol. 
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articulation and, most importantly, dialogue. By emphasising a sort of iconoclastic 2427 
reading of the beautified landscape that has replaced the slums and been transformed into 2428 
space of art, Morris inadvertently supports the very system he aims to criticise and 2429 
replace. Indeed, as Nathanael Gilbert warns, ‘a number of critics have argued that the 2430 
creation of a national, English countryside through landscape art in the eighteenth and 2431 
nineteenth centuries merely served to reinforce and validate the unequal, oppressive 2432 
social systems that were already in place’ (Gilbert, 2005, p. 22), a position argued in the 2433 
first chapter. What the landscape129 overview implies is that space and art can be and must 2434 
be perceived from a single perspective – historical meaning and otherness remain outside.  2435 
Admittedly, there is no formal censorship of ‘aesthetic expression such as may be 2436 
found in Plato’s Republic’ (Davis, 2009, p. 227) or in the form of popular democracy in 2437 
Bellamy’s LB. Nevertheless, ‘introspective, visionary, avant-garde, or critical aesthetes 2438 
and intellectuals are a rarity in Morris’s craft utopia, a breed apart tolerated rather than 2439 
encouraged in a thoroughly socialised world in which artistic activity is judged primarily 2440 
by the gender-coded ‘manly’ criterion of social usefulness’ (Davis, 2009, p. 227). What 2441 
is more strikingly modern in these spaces of art, however, is that artistic spatial form 2442 
comes into being only as aesthetic objects and that the artist is homogenised into the 2443 
very utopia in which he or she lives. Thus, although they possess both positive and 2444 
negative functions, it is always in confrontation with the real space of the reader and 2445 
never to the artist-citizen of utopia that a negative or critical function implying the notion 2446 
of conflict emerges, which is absent from the traditional utopia.130 Furthermore, artistic 2447 
practices themselves, as social relations, are not depicted in their ‘exact conditions’, but 2448 
serve as general, ‘timeless’ or symbolic abstractions of what human and artistic 2449 
experience should be like under the ideal conditions Morris envisions for them. While 2450 
Morris may offer accounts of space as lived space, since these descriptions not only 2451 
 
129 Space of art thus oftentimes acquires abstract character not of the city planner but of the landscape 
designer, even when space is presented to us as second (and less commonly, third) space, in which the 
beautiful pieces are part of the beautified landscape-society portraited. To be sure, the iconoclastic character 
the space of art does not always limit itself to mere numeration of objects establishing ‘relationships 
between those things’ (Gilbert, 2005, p. 23). 
130 Nowhere, unlike many of its traditional peers, does not completely deny conflict: Dick and old 
Hammond confirm that violence still occurs although sporadically, Ellen’s grandfather shows discontent 
over the lack of literary and artistic interests of the people of Nowhere and Ellen herself critics the lack of 
historical consciousness. However, Nathanael Gilbert counterposes, ‘the social landscape of Nowhere is 
such that while it does not conceal these acts, it in some sense absorbs are heals the consequences, not with 
any form of official punishment [as there is none] but through the sheer power of its aesthetic wholeness’ 
(Gilbert, 2005, p. 33). 
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involve geometrical or phenomenological accounts, but also are defined by the social 2452 
relations enacted in them, this lived space cannot be enunciated in the way Soja 2453 
articulates Thirdspace. Social relations are not conceived heterogeneously, and second 2454 
space is uniformised under a single perspective. Moreover, Nowherians’ spatial 2455 
practices do not construct real-and-imagined space, since their practices do not involve 2456 
stepping out of the self and opposition is removed. The inhabitants of utopia are unable 2457 
to reclaim the utopian vision created for them, appearing ‘at times to constitute on the 2458 
level of human activity what Morris’s “force of badges” and “banded-workshops” 2459 
represent in the sphere of mechanical operations: entities indispensable to the smooth 2460 
ideological functioning of his novel’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 72). Nowhere’s citizens, art and 2461 
spaces are homogenised, but only on closer inspection. Although apparently diverse, 2462 
structural differences among citizens are erased, and they are unable to perform acts of 2463 
spatial resistance. Although apparently the product of free will and desire, art possesses 2464 
a positive aesthetic function and obeys what Morris considers the ideal form of art. 2465 
Finally, although apparently granting free mobility, spaces possess forcefields of the 2466 
practices and representations that are allowed within them. Geoghegan asserts that in 2467 
this respect, ‘Morris depicts a society in which sensitivity to personal memories is 2468 
matched by a sensitivity to aspects of the past. This sensitivity has its blind spots, 2469 
however. Morris builds into his fantasy his own selective appreciation of the past, and 2470 
universalizes his strong likes and dislikes’ (Geoghegan, 1992, p. 87). Thus, Geoghegan 2471 
states, ‘Morris is clearly appreciative of the past, but it is his past!’ (Geoghegan, 1992, 2472 
p. 87). There is no space but his space, no art but his art. The intersection of space, 2473 
history and society in Morris’s rendering of utopian art is a regressionist, identitary one 2474 
in which, much like Jameson’s cognitive mapping, the subject reclaims his or her own 2475 
subjective vision of an idealised form of aesthetic sensibility and spatiality that 2476 
corroborates his or her own vision of the world. The aesthetic function of art and art in 2477 
space is one that seeks to integrate Guest – and Morris – back into what Morris perceives 2478 
to be a lost holistic narrative. Recalling the discussion on recuperation achieved by the 2479 
reclaiming of an ‘archive of the feet’ at the beginning of this section, Morris’s emphasis 2480 
on medieval art forms and derivative spaces of art can be articulated in terms of a modern 2481 
spatial narrative that dispenses with history, although apparently embedded in historical 2482 
medievalism. Art, its space and the space of utopia are eternalised and organised 2483 
according to a single perspective that orders history according to memory.  2484 
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The last examples of the museums, factories and slums point nevertheless to a 2485 
different direction than LB did: they are not presented as abstract space, as a 2486 
phenomenological sense of place is regularly favoured. Social relations are presented 2487 
vertically rather than horizontally, and some spaces of art are presented as lived spaces 2488 
with malleable borders and, sometimes, as even unbounded. However, these qualities lack 2489 
a dynamic articulation and reveal the very incongruities of Morris’s own views on the 2490 
utopian function of art and his actual employment of those principles. Dowling speaks of 2491 
a ‘paradox of aesthetic democracy’ (Dowling, 1996, p. XII).131 Partly elaborating on and 2492 
partly disagreeing with Dowling, I argue that this ‘paradox’ is not due to Morris’s 2493 
preservation of institutions that separate art from life, but that art, to be democratic, must 2494 
necessarily resist univocal, homogeneous or one-dimensional discourses that try to fix art 2495 
under a given form. 2496 
Spaces of art in NFN, we may conclude, serve two main functions: negative and 2497 
positive. The preservation of pre-existing spaces such as the British Museum (and other 2498 
unnamed museums) or the slums in which artistic practices take place – as a festival – 2499 
serve as hermeneutic exercises in which the connection between real and imagined spaces 2500 
is made. Although immutable by themselves, as abstract entities, they nevertheless do not 2501 
obey the abstract function for which they were originally created: they are alive, social 2502 
and relational, and not just in stark contrast to the rest of the spaces, but in their historical 2503 
articulation. The spaces that are properly those of utopia – being built as a result of 2504 
utopia’s establishment – have only a positive aesthetic function, similar to the case in LB. 2505 
Morris’s utopia favours prescriptive, moralist art whose form is not always evolving but 2506 
recreates the space of art in medieval times as an eternal monad. Art in NFN thus acquires 2507 
a static character whose idealisation, despite being discordant with Victorian taste, is 2508 
reduced to an ideological representation of a prescriptive aestheticism. 2509 
When framed within the modern/postmodern spatiality debate, the first are more 2510 
properly postmodern (although not yet fully integrating its critical heterogenous 2511 
character), and the second are modern spaces since, although radically different from the 2512 
form of Morris’s own real space, they preserve their function and ideological 2513 
implications. The conclusion I derive from this exercise is that NFN, while still inserted 2514 
 
131 As, Dowling argues, ‘every gesture in the direction of social redemption is immediately undermined by 
an urgent awareness that art, if it is to survive in the modern age, must be isolated or protected from the 
hideousness of mass society’ (Dowling, 1996, p. XII). 
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in a modern discourse, cannot be fully articulated in the tradition of utopia as such. 2515 
Authors such as Miguel Abensour and Tony Pinkney also argue for a similar perspective, 2516 
favouring a reading of NFN beyond a utopian blueprint and as centrally concerned with 2517 
what Abensour names ‘the education of desire’ – what I call the negative function of art. 2518 
Regarding heuristic function, Laurence Davis refers to the openness to real space in the 2519 
construction of a community-based utopia and art. These authors highlight the heuristic, 2520 
anti-perfectionist character of Morris’s utopia; others, however, point to how his notions 2521 
of space are regressionist and even reactionary. The same applies to his considerations on 2522 
the role and form of art, that may be considered coercive also in the over-valorisation of 2523 
medieval forms over all others. In the prescriptive reading of NFN, we can point to the 2524 
perspectives of Dowling, who highlights that Morris’s attempt to denounce the Cockney- 2525 
like character of Bellamy’s utopia results in the production of a ‘Cockney paradise of his 2526 
own’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 72). She refers to the ‘disappearance of fine or intellectual art 2527 
within the blandly static experience of Nowhere’ and claims that the merging of artistic 2528 
creation with ‘the uniform sensuous experience’ effaces ‘the crucial principles of 2529 
resistance and cognition necessary to both art and human development as they are 2530 
constituted even in utopia’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 71). By putting this lack into evidence, 2531 
Dowling argues that aesthetic homogenisation results in ‘precisely the fulfilment of the 2532 
radical Enlightenment sensualism that Blackwood’s Magazine had long ago identified 2533 
and denounced in the “Cockney school”’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 72). 2534 
My own view synthesises the previous two. Based on the close reading done so 2535 
far on the role of art and its spaces, NFN is prescriptive and positive regarding the 2536 
placement of art in utopia, but heuristic and negative as a utopian text in itself. Morris’s 2537 
work reveals the diverse aesthetic discourses that shape his account of art and its 2538 
spatialisation: first, art is not wholly autonomous but is embedded in a discourse seeking 2539 
to preserve art as a cultural relic that still perceives it as merely aesthetic object, whose 2540 
meanings, despite being articulated as product of an ideological stance, are lost once a 2541 
preferable aesthetic form is expressed. Second, art is a social fact, but only as far as it 2542 
functions as a signifier of communal work – having a positive function in utopia – or as 2543 
a negative reflection of the conditions of life under industrialism.  2544 
The juxtaposition of Victorian art and spaces produces important aesthetic 2545 
meanings for the text itself as work of art. Guest, awaking from his dream of utopia, 2546 
reflects that ‘if others can see it as I have seen it, then it may be called a vision rather than 2547 
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a dream’ (Morris, 2004c, p. 228). With this sentence, Morris extends – explicitly this time 2548 
– the text to the real world and real space, hoping that the interplay between imaginary 2549 
and real space acts as an emancipatory, transformative utopian desire that destabilises the 2550 
status quo. The articulation implies a negative function in the text itself. ‘Clearly, for 2551 
Morris, the utopian dream can be politically effective through being re-told in the form 2552 
of a fable’ (Lee, 1995, p. 73), permitting both Guest and the reader real political action. 2553 
Bellamy’s text, by contrast, although seeking to inspire people to embrace equality and 2554 
solidarity, excludes negative function from the text by, among other things, not allowing 2555 
West out of the utopian society, which serves as relief, thus ‘breaking any symbolic 2556 
suggestion that this vision of an alternative order can be brought back to transform the 2557 
visitor’s own society’ (Lee, 1995, p. 73). 2558 
Vincent Geoghegan, comparing Bellamy and Morris, convincingly argues that 2559 
Bellamy’s utopian text is ‘much more typical of late nineteenth-century socialism’ 2560 
(Geoghegan, 1992, p. 87), and, I argue, of modernism altogether. While Geoghegan 2561 
attributes this difference to the authors’ distinct attitudes on history and memory, I would 2562 
argue that this distinction is largely dependent on their attitudes and depiction of artistic 2563 
practice and spatiality. Bearing this in mind, although still deeply embedded in modern 2564 
aesthetics and spatiality revealing the reactionary, identitary and nostalgic counterpart of 2565 
modernism, whose emphasis is idealist and phenomenological, rather than material or 2566 
geometrical (in comparison to LB), Morris utopia surpasses some of the shortcomings of 2567 
Bellamy’s depiction as it establishes an articulation between modern and postmodern 2568 
perspectives, on the one hand, and between traditional and critical utopia, on the other 2569 
hand. 2570 
 2571 
 2572 
 2573 
 2574 
 2575 
 2576 
 2577 
 2578 
 2579 
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2.2. From Anarres to Triton and Back again: The Utopia as (Space) Ship in the 2580 
Critical Utopias of Ursula K. Le Guin and Samuel R. Delany 2581 
the boat is a floating piece of space, a place without a place, that exists by itself, that is closed in 2582 
on itself and at the same time is given over to the infinity of the sea and that, from port to port, 2583 
from tack to tack, from brothel to brothel, it goes as far as the colonies in search of the most 2584 
precious treasures they conceal in their gardens, you will understand why the boat has not only 2585 
been for our civilization, from the sixteenth century until the present, the great instrument of 2586 
economic development (I have not been speaking of that today), but has been simultaneously the 2587 
greatest reserve of the imagination. The ship is the heterotopia par excellence. In civilizations 2588 
without boats, dreams dry up, espionage takes the place of adventure, and the police take the place 2589 
of pirates. (Foucault, 1986, p. 336) 2590 
 2591 
We are first introduced to the utopian society of Anarres in TD, and we are confronted 2592 
with a wall. Drastically different from the apparently perfect pictures portrayed by Morris 2593 
and Bellamy of a seemingly beautiful, open, unbounded and free utopia, the first space- 2594 
idea we encounter is bounded, representing a limit and closure that serves as both a 2595 
physical and mental trope. The wall132 symbolises spatial fixity, a binary between inside 2596 
and outside, within and without, Same and Other. 2597 
There was a wall. It did not look important. It was built of uncut rocks roughly mortared. An adult 2598 
could look right over it, and even a child could climb it. Where it crossed the roadway, instead of 2599 
having a gate it degenerated into mere geometry, a line, an idea of boundary. But the idea was real. 2600 
It was important. For seven generations there had been nothing in the world more important than 2601 
that wall. 2602 
Like all walls it was ambiguous, two-faced. What was inside it and what was outside it depended 2603 
upon which side of it you were on. (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 1) 2604 
 2605 
While Le Guin warns the reader in the book’s subtitle that this is an ‘ambiguous utopia’, 2606 
the imposition of the wall still represents a remarkably dissonant place from the common- 2607 
sense space of the traditional utopia. What the space of the wall does – especially as it 2608 
becomes a main spatial and imaginary motif throughout the entirety of the text – is 2609 
prepare us for a utopia in which not everything is perfect and not everything is sameness. 2610 
In TD, although the wall separates and establishes a limit, it also opens the possibilities 2611 
of difference and relationality. As Massey articulates through her concept of ‘progressive 2612 
sense of space’, space that is sameness must necessarily be articulated in opposition to 2613 
something that is not space or that is another space (i.e., Otherness). The recognition of 2614 
binaries permits interaction between them and a border that can be transgressed and 2615 
through which different perspectives can relate to each other. Comparably,  viewed from 2616 
 
132 In ‘The Gap in the Wall: Partnership, Physics, and Politics in The Dispossessed’ Everett L. Hamner 
argues for the symbology of the wall contending that whereas some of the wall are immutable, some others 
act as facilitators of a dialectic between opposites meant to be deconstructed and unified. 
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inside, Anarres’ wall ‘enclosed the universe, leaving Anarres outside, free’ (Le Guin, 2617 
2011 (1974), p. 2); however, ‘looked at from the other side, the wall enclosed Anarres. 2618 
The whole planet was inside it, a great prison camp, cut off from other worlds and other 2619 
men, in quarantine’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 2). 2620 
The idea of transgression as revolution is thus fundamental for the comprehension 2621 
of Le Guin’s critical utopia. The recognition of binaries involves, simultaneously, their 2622 
articulation for utopian realisation – revolution and the constant pursuit of freedom being 2623 
the main organising principle of Anarres, a society ‘developed by a million followers of 2624 
the revolutionary Odo, a woman whose writings form the theoretical basis for the 2625 
movement and the society . . .. Odo's theory is a variety of anarchism: the principle of 2626 
individual freedom and initiative is its essence’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 239). 2627 
The principles of transformative revolution via the personal expression of 2628 
freedom, despite being the foundation of Anarres, become of paramount importance when 2629 
applied to the citizens of utopia, who are to enact this principle as praxis rather than as 2630 
institution – the very striving for utopia being what is utopian about the Anarres society. 2631 
As Moylan explains in ‘Beyond Negation: The Critical Utopias of Ursula K. Le Guin and 2632 
Samuel R. Delany’: 2633 
As Le Guin presents the superstructure of Anarresti society - its moral, legal, cultural systems - 2634 
she ties them to the economy; but, given her idealist approach, she bases the social conscience and 2635 
social system much more on the concept of individual initiative and freedom than on the economic- 2636 
material system (Moylan, 1980, p. 240) 2637 
 2638 
While traditional utopia degenerates into dogma – as happens in Anarres once it permits 2639 
the Odonian revolution to be reduced to a mere ideologeme or mouthpiece, a phenomenon 2640 
that fuels the narrative – the recognition of articulation through transgression is perceived 2641 
as the only possible way to grant true utopian human freedom, which is necessarily co- 2642 
implicative with the recognition of difference. This recognition is pervasive throughout 2643 
the entire novel, which depicts the journey of Shevek from Anarres to Urras (the 2644 
dystopian counterpart of Anarres), from obedience to rebellion, from sameness to 2645 
otherness. The destructive/reconstructive mode is recognised as fundamental for a utopia 2646 
that does not homogenise but that is critical of itself. 2647 
Moylan distinguishes three levels in the utopian narrative that shift from the 2648 
traditional to the critical utopia: the iconic, the discrete and the generic. The iconic is ‘the 2649 
way in which the alternative society is presented’, the discrete is ‘the way in which the 2650 
protagonist is presented’, and the generic is ‘the way the text becomes self-aware and 2651 
 92 
 
self-critical’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 43). The symbolism of the wall is remarkable in 2652 
pinpointing these changes as it polarises rather than uniformises, opening possibilities for 2653 
radical subjectivity and reflecting on the very ideologeme of the utopian text that, as wall 2654 
in itself, seeks to transgress its traditional formality. The wall asks for its own recognition 2655 
and, in the eyes of Shevek, its destruction – ‘not a simple handshake over a mended fence 2656 
but the smashing of boundaries that divide and isolate’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 88) – as part of 2657 
the utopian reconstruction demanded of its citizens. The question of homogenisation is 2658 
thus overcome from the beginning, as the hero – or anti-hero – becomes the means 2659 
through which difference is enacted and ideals contested. The traditional role of the visitor 2660 
is reversed, and our ‘eyes’ through utopia, become agent and citizen of the utopia being 2661 
presented. Contrary to the traditional shift from an original society to a utopian society, 2662 
‘the visitor in some of the novels – The Dispossessed: An Ambiguous Utopia especially 2663 
– reverses directions and goes from utopia to explore and learn from the original society; 2664 
or in the case of Triton the visitor is a non-utopian misfit trying to live in utopia’ (Moylan, 2665 
2014, p. 44). In TD, through Shevek, a citizen of utopia, we discover utopia’s flaws, as it 2666 
degenerates into dogma, a ‘compromise and ossification of revolution’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 2667 
91), revolution that constituted the original promise of utopia as a permanent and critical 2668 
practice of itself. 2669 
This radical subjectivity is thus not only informer of the text, but of society 2670 
altogether, as ‘the liberty of the individual is joined in dialectical tension with the needs 2671 
of the society: a non-antagonistic contradiction that provides Anarres with its 2672 
fundamental human energy’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 240). Although perceived through the 2673 
perspective of Shevek, Le Guin’s critical utopia is plural in its subjectivity: Space is not 2674 
perceived from a purely abstract or mental standpoint, but is thought about and interacted 2675 
with, being constituted by the many discourses and practices of the utopian citizenry, 2676 
including Shevek. The assumed subjectivity of the text, rather than enclosing the text and 2677 
its spaces in the univocal experiences and judgements of its perceiver, articulates these 2678 
spaces in terms of openness to multiple perspectives that constitute the iconic form of 2679 
utopia. In its refusal of a static compromise, through artistic affiliation or form, the literary 2680 
practice of the utopian text is radicalised in its negation of the present – for both Shevek’s 2681 
original society133 (Anarres) and Le Guin’s. The power of Le Guin’s utopian vision thus 2682 
 
133 Davis says on the use of contrast between Urras and Anarres employed by Le Guin: ‘In this creative 
dialectic of utopia and existing reality, the Anarresti utopia provides the hope that is the catalyst for 
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resides not only in the systematic exposition of how an anarchist society would organise 2683 
itself on the iconic level, but also in the embodiment of Odonian principles through the 2684 
(critical) spatial practices of social relations and everyday life – especially when we 2685 
consider the role of art as emancipatory revolutionary praxis. By focusing on the ‘personal 2686 
journey from passivity to agency’ (Moylan, 2014, p. XV) as social practice, and by 2687 
mediating between individual awareness and agency, on the one hand, and the political 2688 
process ‘needed to take radical change forward’ (Moylan, 2014, p. XV), on the other 2689 
hand, Le Guin – like other authors134 within the subgenre of the critical utopia – exposes 2690 
subjectivity as a revolutionary form of alterity. This factor is in turn reflected in the 2691 
function of art and the construction of spaces of art – which are part of the iconic register 2692 
of the novel. Peter Fitting in particular, Moylan points out, comprehends the critical 2693 
utopia’s focus on the relationship between the politics of everyday life and revolutionary 2694 
transformation, contending that the critical utopia offers the reader ‘the look and feel and 2695 
shape and experiences of what an alternative might and could actually be, a thought 2696 
experiment or form of “social dreaming”’ (Fitting, cited in Moylan, 2014, p. XVI). Spaces 2697 
of art appear recurrently as markers or as settings, and they enact the dynamic energies 2698 
between the subject and society, from bottom-up critical action to social transformation. 2699 
Indeed, according to Moylan, the social system of the critical utopia is not imposed but 2700 
produced, so much so that the ‘literary form of utopia as method – a thought experiment, 2701 
if you will, of how utopianism can work – [is] one which has . . . archaeological, 2702 
architectural, and ontological elements’ (Moylan, 2014, p. XIX). 2703 
Comparing Le Guin’s utopia with that of Morris – and of Oscar Wilde – Davis 2704 
notes that ‘unlike Morris, Le Guin acknowledges a prominent and enduring place in her 2705 
utopian vision for a socially disruptive form of individual assertiveness’ (Davis, 2009, p. 2706 
237). This subversive form of individual freedom is at the core of the dynamic, critical 2707 
character of Le Guin’s own utopian vision, constituting the means for artistic production 2708 
as truly free critical expression to flourish and constitute itself dialectically, critically and 2709 
spatially.  2710 
 
revolution on Urras, while the continuing reality of oppression and injustice on Urras reminds the Anarresti 
of why they must be eternally vigilant in testing, protecting, and renewing their anarchism. Each, in other 
words, gives the other what it lacks in isolation: the reason to go on changing’ (Davis, The Dynamic and 
Revolutionary Utopia of Ursula K. Le Guin, 2005, p. 9). 
134 In Female Man, for example, Joanna Russ depicts not ‘the utopian plan’ but ‘the ambience’ (Moylan, 
2014, p. 54) of utopia, being the importance shifted from iconic to the discrete. Whileaway, the utopian 
society portrayed, ‘is not the answer, but rather the vision that provokes change’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 54). 
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This dynamic is supported by the role art plays as a trigger for critical thinking for 2711 
Shevek, who, through the influence of his friends Bedap, Salas and Tirin – the last two 2712 
being, respectively, a music composer and a playwright – initiates his own revolutionary 2713 
journey. Anarres abounds in artistic education, workshops, concert halls and other less 2714 
systematised spaces of art – ‘the arts are practiced by everyone and integrated into the 2715 
everyday life of the people: the popular forms are poetry, storytelling, dance, song, 2716 
pottery, weaving, and sculpture. Musical concerts and theater are the highest arts and 2717 
attract large audiences whenever performed’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 241). However, utopian 2718 
stagnation imposes a constraint on critical artistic practices. Such constraints apply 2719 
whether these practices are enacted in rebellion or as differential acts – or even acts of 2720 
resistance, as in the case of Tirin. However, let us first consider those spaces of art that 2721 
are part of the superstructure proper. 2722 
In the descriptions of both Northsetting and Abbenay, the question of centralisation and 2723 
decentralisation motivates how power organises itself – Mitis, Shevek’s mentor, warns 2724 
Shevek before the latter’s departure to Abbenay (Anarres’ capital) that ‘power inheres in 2725 
a center’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 74) – although the configuration of towns remains 2726 
more or less the same, except for scale. Hence, there is no proper organisation of the arts, 2727 
despite the existence of Music and Theatre Syndicates, but even those are essentially 2728 
decentralised, and the arts are mainly part of everyday life. Similar to NFN, people ‘make, 2729 
give and wear jewelry; pottery, sculpture, weaving, and other crafts are part of daily use; 2730 
poetry, dance, song and storytelling are popular cultural forms participated in by all; the 2731 
musical concert and drama are the most highly regarded of the arts’ (Moylan, 2014, pp. 2732 
94-95). Comparable to Nowhere, in Anarres, ‘work is no longer a curse but, instead, a 2733 
form of play integrally associated with sociability, festivity, and joyful artistic creation’ 2734 
(Davis, 2009, p. 264). Furthermore, craftsmanship is expressed with joy and pride, 2735 
although plainly (as scarcity and refusal of ‘properetarian’ thinking result in a plain 2736 
landscape and architecture) through the decorative. In his own analysis of the text, Davis 2737 
notes that: 2738 
In the textile district briefly described in chapter four, for example, the centre of each square is 2739 
planted with poles strung from top to bottom with banners and pennants ‘proudly proclaiming’ the 2740 
local dyers art in all its varied colours. Further on, Shevek notices a wiremaker s shopfront 2741 
‘cheerfully and ornately’ decorated with pat terns of vines worked in painted wire (Davis, 2009, 2742 
p. 236) 2743 
 2744 
As evidenced by Shevek, Anarresti pride and pleasure in the production of arts and crafts 2745 
are the result of an education that, based on the principles of revolution as continuous 2746 
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creation, provides everyone with rich artistic schooling – whether in music, painting, 2747 
theatre or other domains. Shevek remarks, after recognising the pleasures of attending 2748 
music concerts, that he had always ‘thought of music as something you do rather than 2749 
something you hear’. Indeed, we are told ‘as a child he had always sung, or played one 2750 
instrument or another, in local choirs and ensembles; he had enjoyed it very much, but 2751 
had not had much talent’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 205). Nevertheless, learning centres 2752 
were: 2753 
prepared for the practice of art: training in singing, metrics, dance, the use of brush, chisel, knife, 2754 
lathe, and so on. It was all pragmatic: the children learned to see, speak, hear, move, handle. No 2755 
distinction was drawn between the arts and the crafts; art was not considered as having a place in 2756 
life, but as being a basic technique of life, like speech. Thus architecture had developed, early and 2757 
freely, a consistent style, pure and plain, subtle in proportion. Painting and sculpture served largely 2758 
as elements of architecture and town planning. As for the arts of words, poetry and storytelling 2759 
tended to be ephemeral, to be linked with song and dancing; only the theater stood wholly alone, 2760 
and only the theater was ever called “the Art”—a thing complete in itself. There were many 2761 
regional and traveling troupes of actors and dancers, repertory companies, very often with 2762 
playwright attached. (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), pp. 205-206) 2763 
 2764 
Contrary to NFN,135 aesthetic incorporation into everyday life and critiques of consumer 2765 
capitalist society are not achieved by stark negative reflection, but dialectically, through 2766 
the association of positions. According to Douglas Spencer, ‘challenging this binary 2767 
logic, some of the novel’s characters relate intimately to objects without succumbing to 2768 
their powers of alienation; on the contrary, their subjectivity engages with the social 2769 
through the world of objects as an extension of their individual agency’ (Spencer, 2005, 2770 
p. 106). By opening to the construction of the mediation and kinetic articulation of space, 2771 
which enables mobility between positions (e.g., spatial, social, historical, identitary, or 2772 
cultural), the space created by Le Guin becomes assumedly postmodern. 2773 
Thus, similar to the functions of ancient Greek theatre – whose allegorical or 2774 
metaphorical representations are thought to have allowed for the critical articulation of 2775 
concepts and application to political and social life – the arts in Anarres, especially music 2776 
 
135 In ‘The Alien Comes Home: Getting Past the Twin Planets of Possession and Austerity in Le Guin’s 
The Dispossessed’, David Spencer articulates the critique of consumer capitalism expressed in The 
Dispossessed enacted by the contrast between Anarres and Urras with the ones expressed by the project 
Utopic and Superstudio: ‘Whereas Utopie and Superstudio responded to the excesses of consumer 
capitalism by equating renunciation with salvation and freedom, Le Guin (like William Morris before her) 
recognizes the related limitations of both austerity and opulence. She also gestures to a possibility that 
Reynolds claims Marcuse overlooks, namely that art might provide a context for the rehabilitation of the 
object, liberating it from its commodified form.’ (Davis, 2005, p. XIII) so much so, thus, possess liberating 
effects both as to the original society of the author and of the protagonist. 
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and theatre,136 have an important didactic function, Simon Strow argues. They offer ‘not 2777 
the limited opportunities of a specific critique or thought experiment, but something much 2778 
more valuable: the experience and the demonstration of applicable critical method’ 2779 
(Strow, 2005, pp. 37-38).  2780 
In parallel, Le Guin articulates artistic practice with the critique of traditional 2781 
utopias’ ‘tyranny of the majority’.137 Bedap critically exposes this aspect, despite having 2782 
‘no government, no laws, all right . . . ideas were never controlled by laws and 2783 
governments, even on Urras’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 215). Thus, even in dystopian 2784 
societies, ‘you can’t crush ideas by suppressing them. You can only crush them by 2785 
ignoring them. By refusing to think – refusing to change’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 216). 2786 
The tyranny and peril of a perfect utopian blueprint are those of ‘public opinion! That’s 2787 
the power structure he is part of and knows how to use. The unadmitted, inadmissible 2788 
government that rules the Odonian society by stifling the individual mind’ (Le Guin, 2011 2789 
(1974), p. 216). Although not having a minority government, Anarres has ‘government 2790 
by the majority’, who have allowed ‘cooperation [to] become obedience’ and individual 2791 
and social consciousness to be ‘controlled by bureaucrats’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 218). 2792 
Le Guin, however, safeguards her utopian vision by being self-reflexive on the 2793 
conditions of artistic practice as social function and social fact. The anarchist balance 2794 
between the individual and society, Davis argues, is thus maintained such that it 2795 
‘simultaneously protects the autonomy of art and firmly rejects the assumption that it 2796 
must be something precious and elitist’ (Davis, 2009, p. 232). This balance recognises 2797 
how the production and consumption of art may be assumed to represent a social and 2798 
spatial fact, one to be lived with and not to hide from, while still defending it from co- 2799 
option. This balance is maintained once art is not merely perceived as an aesthetic object 2800 
that requires a specific pleasurable, aesthetic form – and response – but also constituted 2801 
critically.  2802 
In Chapter 2, we learn about Shevek’s childhood and education as he returns to 2803 
Northsetting. Tirin writes and performs a play during a party for Shevek at the 2804 
‘Northsetting Regional Institute of the Noble and Material Sciences’. The play is about 2805 
 
136 In the book, theatre is said to stand ‘wholly alone, and only the theater was ever called ‘the Art’—a thing 
complete in itself.’ (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 205) 
137 In On Liberty, John Stuart Mill argues that power is not only exercised top-down, by the institutions, 
governments and monarchs, but from the rule of the majority that constraints individual freedom. Thus, 
this constraint may take the form of ‘compulsion and control, whether the means used be physical force in 
the form of legal penalties, or the moral coercion of public opinion’ (Mill, 1999, p. 51). 
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an Urrasti (the original society, in contrast to which Anarres establishes itself as a utopian 2806 
possibility) mendicant, who values all his experience in terms of his possessions: 2807 
There were skits and entertainments, rehearsed and impromptu. Tirin got himself up in a collection 2808 
of rags from the recycle bin and wandered among them as the Poor Urrasti, the Beggarman—one 2809 
of the Iotic words everybody had learned in history. “Give me money,” he whined, shaking his 2810 
hand under their noses. “Money! Money! Why don’t you give me any money? You haven’t got 2811 
any? Liars! Filthy properetarians! Profiteers! Look at all that food, how did you get it if you haven’t 2812 
any money?” He then offered himself for sale. “Bay me, bay me, for just a little money,” he 2813 
wheedled.  2814 
“It isn’t bay, it’s buy,” Rovab corrected him.  2815 
“Bay me, buy me, who cares, look, what a beautiful body, don’t you want it?” Tirin crooned, 2816 
wagging his slender hips and batting his eyes. He was at last publicly executed with a fish knife 2817 
and reappeared in normal clothing. There were skillful harp players and singers among them, and 2818 
there was plenty of music and dancing, but more talk. (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), p. 76) 2819 
 2820 
The space created by the play is somewhat ambiguous, although we know that its abstract 2821 
location is the Institute, the home of these characters, who have always lived within a 2822 
larger community of people, rather than within a family. Despite taking place at the 2823 
Institute, the space produced by the work of art cannot be said to be an institution, as it is 2824 
not part of the ideological apparatus of the larger society. Rather, the space of art is 2825 
created through the spatial performance of both Tirin and the spectator, who is asked to 2826 
participate in the establishment of such a space. The space of art reveals itself as a fluid, 2827 
unbounded entity, as it lacks a barrier between itself and other spaces or people, who 2828 
become part of the space where practice happens. It is a proper postmodern space because 2829 
it lacks boundaries; engages in a practice of ‘thirdring-as-Othering’; is heterogenous; and 2830 
calls social relations and spatial practices to be part of its multiple, plural discourse. 2831 
Following Shevek’s departure, Tirin writes another play, which raises questions 2832 
about the simplistic dichotomies between life on Urras and life on Anarres. Years later, 2833 
Shevek learns through Bedap and then Tirin himself that after this episode, Tirin was 2834 
denied a place at the Institute following complaints about the play – again, the tyranny of 2835 
the majority – which later led to Tirin being admitted to a mental asylum. The space of 2836 
art, here, assumes a mental trope, just as with the wall. This space of art is nevertheless 2837 
critical and relational, despite being denied by the orthodoxies and dogmatism of 2838 
institutional thinking. The space is dynamic, as it permits change, disruption and a 2839 
‘thirdring-as-Othering.’ 2840 
Later in the novel, Shevek meets a composer named Salas, who, like Tirin, has 2841 
been ‘punished’ for his artistic unorthodoxy and thus excluded by the Music Syndicate 2842 
for not being sufficiently ‘harmonious’: 2843 
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But the Music syndics don’t like my compositions. And nobody much else does, yet I can’t be a 2844 
syndicate all by myself, can I? . . . 2845 
You see, I don’t write the way I was trained to write at the conservatory. I write dysfunctional 2846 
music.” He smiled more sweetly than ever. “They want chorales. I hate chorales. They want wide- 2847 
harmony pieces like Sessur wrote. I hate Sessur’s music. I’m writing a piece of chamber music. 2848 
Thought I might call it The Simultaneity Principle. Five instruments each playing an independent 2849 
cyclic theme; no melodic causality; the forward process entirely in the relationship of the parts. It 2850 
makes a lovely harmony. But they don’t hear it. (Le Guin, 2011 (1974), pp. 227-228) 2851 
 2852 
The Music Syndicate is representative of the modern art space and institution: it is a 2853 
psychological bounded place (a wall) with a definite set of spatial practices, static in its 2854 
maintenance of an aesthetic orthodoxy and horizontal in its preservation of a view of 2855 
history that has turned into dogma and that is univocal, identitary and functional. The 2856 
Syndicate’s (positive) function is thus the maintenance of utopian dogmatism. Salas’s 2857 
artistic practice, on the other hand, by refusing to be assimilated by institutional 2858 
positiveness, creates a critical spatiality for artistic practice. 2859 
When Shevek is first confronted with Salas’ and Bedap’s testimonies, he refuses 2860 
to see how Anarres’ revolutionary principle has become a ‘functionalist orthodoxy’ 2861 
(Spencer, 2005, p. 106) that inhibits the critical practice of artistic production and its 2862 
institutional parameters. Thus, he asserts – and one cannot help but wonder if this remark 2863 
is, in any measure, directed to Morris’s dogmatic aesthetic, ‘I think Tir’s a born artist. 2864 
Not a craftsman; a creator. An inventor-destroyer, the kind who’s got to turn everything 2865 
upside down and inside out. A satirist, a man who praises through rage’ (Le Guin, 2011 2866 
(1974), p. 428).138 2867 
Cognisant of the institutionalisation taking place in Anarres, the space created by 2868 
the artistic practices of people such as Tirin and Salas allows for an articulation between 2869 
first and second space and the construction of Thirdspace, which is, after all, the space of 2870 
the critical utopia itself. Being utopia performed as a process, the space of art sets in 2871 
motion the process of ‘critical spatial practice’ in the sense envisioned by Rendell. Unlike 2872 
Rendell’s explanation of critical spatial practice as derived from self-reflexive 2873 
movements of art in space – being site-specificity self-aware in this case – it is unclear 2874 
whether Le Guin – through Tirin and Salas –consciously upholds such an artistic practice. 2875 
What is evidenced explicitly, however, is the institutional critique of the avant-garde 2876 
 
138 The apparent critique to craftsmanship and the distinction between fine art and craft has no elitist 
overtones to it as both artistic practices are integrated with the utopian ideals of community, individuality 
and equality. Rather, it serves to distinguish critical from noncritical artistic practices, being art, in Le 
Guin's utopia, truly social in the terms argued for in the first chapter of the present study.   
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movements that were demanding, by the time Le Guin was writing TD, the reformation 2877 
of the modern museum and art gallery. Such movements are always capable of being 2878 
assimilated, and it is precisely to counter this assimilation that the prefix ‘critical’ – 2879 
applied to both artistic practice and utopia – writes itself against in Le Guin’s utopian 2880 
vision. In Anarres, not all art spaces are postmodern, but it is in the dialogues between 2881 
these art spaces and modern art spaces that differences and dialogue may occur. In the 2882 
same way as Urras serves as a point of comparison that activates the revolutionary 2883 
principle that founded Anarres in the first place, the critical spatial practices of art serve 2884 
to activate the utopian principle. It is in the enactment of the plural micro-structures of 2885 
society that Le Guin explores the tension and ambiguity between ‘utopian ideals and 2886 
dystopian denials, of rebellion and cooptation, of synchronic unity and diachronic 2887 
movement toward a better world’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 90). Art is recognised, and its critical 2888 
and hermeneutic potential is what ultimately propels characters such as Shevek, Takver 2889 
and Bedap to act to maintain the principle of utopia as a continuous and alive critical 2890 
movement by preserving it at the level of individual and creative revolution and 2891 
expression of freedom. Much like critical spatial (artistic) practice, radical subjectivity is 2892 
enacted within the spatial, social and historical paradigm by actively reflecting and 2893 
transforming society’s values. 2894 
Similarly, in TOT, an artistic performance propels the inner journey of Bron, a 2895 
self-estranged unhappy ‘misfit in utopia’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 154), who is born in a 2896 
dystopian world (represented by Mars) and for whom the idea of difference shakes his 2897 
own identitary139 convictions. Bron’s attitude towards the free and liberal utopia of Triton 2898 
filters the experience of and life in utopia through a negative lens, ‘as Bron 2899 
misunderstands, misuses, and fails to adjust to life on Triton’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 154). 2900 
Delany thus chooses to focus on radically different individuals, either in relation to the 2901 
society in which they live or in relation to our own: Bron is a homophobic misfit, 2902 
Lawrence is an antisocial alcoholic homosexual, Sam is a criminal, the Spike is a 2903 
revolutionary artist, and some other minor characters with neurological disabilities are 2904 
introduced. Delany does not only show that heterogeneity is encouraged but also – as the 2905 
 
139 Bron’s resistance to this sexually freed society and negation of simplistic binaries have much to do with 
that fact that Bron – much like a modern man – derives his being-in-the-world from rigid identitary 
boundaries that, in his case, are related to his sexuality and the maintenance of genre and sexual identity 
boundaries. See Wendy Gay Pearson’s ‘Born to be Bron: Destiny and Destinerrance in Samuel R. Delany’s 
Trouble on Triton’. 
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diversity of these individuals’ characters demonstrates, especially the Spike and Sam – 2906 
highlights the kind of ‘creative potential that the utopian society can nurture’ (Moylan, 2907 
2014, p. 171). Thus, the society’s macro-structures try to guarantee freedom and the 2908 
preservation of self-determination and emancipation within society, including both 2909 
structures and instructions not only on how to conform to this utopian possibility, but also 2910 
on how to not conform and to either contest it or destroy oneself both physically and 2911 
psychologically.  2912 
‘If Le Guin’s is a utopia of the intellect, Samuel Delany's Triton is a utopia of the 2913 
streets’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 243), as the refunctioning of utopia is attained in the dynamic 2914 
opposition between Triton and Mars (Bron’s homeland), as well as through the book’s 2915 
approach to the licensed and unlicensed sectors. Delany offers a view of utopia ‘from the 2916 
underside, from urban streets rather than university towers, from the margins of even the 2917 
distant utopian center’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 163). As we first step into Triton, we are 2918 
confronted with a deeply heterogeneous space, starkly different from both traditional 2919 
utopias and Le Guin’s space. Triton is as dissimilar from them as it is similar to a 2920 
globalised large city of today, with its spaces of flows, visual saturation and crowdedness. 2921 
It is still recognisably utopian, however: it is dynamic, plural and relational, with different 2922 
forces playing a role in the making of its spaces and practices. The u-l, or the ‘unlicensed 2923 
sector’ – a space that is, according to the perspective of Bron, constructed so as to be 2924 
associated with a contemporary ghetto – is a place where marginal practices are permitted 2925 
and incorporated as a healthy spatial practice, the enforcement of homogeneity resulting 2926 
in the opposite effect. The u-l140 is described in the following terms: 2927 
At founding, each Outer Satellite city had set aside a city sector well no law officially held – since, 2928 
as the Mars sociologist who first advocated it had pointed out, most cities develop, of necessity, 2929 
such a neighborhood anyway. These sectors fulfilled a complex range of functions in the cities’ 2930 
Psychological, political, and economic ecology. Problems a few conservative, Earth-bound 2931 
thinkers feared must come, didn't: the interface between official law and official lawlessness 2932 
produced some remarkably stable unofficial laws throughout the no-law sector. . .. Today it was 2933 
something of a truism: “most places in the unlicensed sector are statistically safer than the rest of 2934 
the city.” to which the truistic response was: “But not all.” 2935 
Still, there was a definite and different feel to the u-l streets. Those who chose to live there – and 2936 
many did – did so because, presumably, they liked that feel.  (Delany, 1996 (1976), p. 8) 2937 
 2938 
 
140 Moylan makes a connection between the deliberate use of artistic space in the text with the language 
and artistic vision of the text itself, whose product is a plot that ‘provides a ‘spine’ around which the 
multiple images of decadent worlds and utopian moons, science-fiction critiques and dystopian descriptions 
are clustered and controlled as the ‘spine’ of a film narrative controls the visual and aural elements gathered 
around it. Film and the modern psychological novel, then, are proper analogues for the organization of 
Triton’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 248). 
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Bron’s own view of the unlicensed sector, however, is still cautious, and the opinions and 2939 
prejudices he has of that space in the book’s first pages reflect his reluctance and biases 2940 
towards what he considers a marginal space. These representations of space are, however, 2941 
frustrated once Bron meets the Spike in the u-l, which becomes a space for a street 2942 
performance of micro-theatre: 2943 
In the small square, a refuse can blazed, flaking light over the dark-haired girl’s guitar; she turned, 2944 
strumming slowly. The music (the acrobat preceding them did a final flip and, staggering and 2945 
laughing, stood) quickened. 2946 
Some man started singing. 2947 
Bron looked for him and saw the poster – mural rather – across the back wall: 2948 
A winged beast with near-naked rider rose through thrashing branches, the rider’s expression 2949 
ecstatic, flexed arms bound in bronze. . .. 2950 
A dozen people stood near the fire. One woman, seated on a crate, suckled a baby: in the warm 2951 
draft from the burning can, her chiffon lifted and fell. (Delany, 1996 (1976), pp. 14-15) 2952 
 2953 
The space of the u-l is as much transgressed as it is assimilated into the play, as are the 2954 
practices of Bron, turning the artistic place into a lived space where relations are enacted. 2955 
As in Tirin’s case, boundaries are blurred, and institutional space is denied. In contrast to 2956 
Tirin’s play, however, this play is filled by the context, which is assumed to be part of the 2957 
piece itself. The spatial form of the Spike’s play is at times confusing, but like Tirin’s 2958 
play, it is deeply political and social: the space asks to be contested and put into 2959 
perspective as part of the artistic creation. The opposition, on the one hand, and 2960 
reconciliation, on the other hand, between the space of art and the space of the city, 2961 
combined with the ambiguity regarding the identification of the performers and 2962 
spectators, serve to convey a message of artistic and creative (spatial critical) practice as 2963 
a powerful indicator of the relationships between society’s macro- and micro-structures 2964 
and the union ‘of the artistic and political vanguard’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 178), both of 2965 
which are highly estimated in the form of desired activism. According to Moylan, Delany 2966 
is suggesting that the post-industrial society needs not the terrorist or dystopian denial, 2967 
but political and artistic work in the construction of a better and Not-Yet realised world. 2968 
While the macro-structure of society is responsible for the preservation of the utopian 2969 
society, it does not exercise ideological, spatial or social control over the micro-structures 2970 
of society, nor does it control how people express themselves creatively and intimately. 2971 
In fact, the government of Triton endorses creative and critical practices because they are 2972 
constitutive of the life of a utopia that is constantly referring back to itself for change and 2973 
continual utopian demand. Moylan states: 2974 
The arts on Triton are abundant and endowed by the government and the university. Video is 2975 
available in both public channels and private, special interest ones. The ice opera is a popular 2976 
 102 
 
cultural form that is a combination of science fiction and television sitcoms and dramas. And, of 2977 
course, in the microtheater and epics of The Spike, the dramatist with whom Bron Helstrom 2978 
becomes romantically involved, the reader sees one aspect of avant garde art-an aspect that traces 2979 
its origins back to the Happenings and street theater of the 1960s (Moylan, 1980, pp. 246-247) 2980 
 2981 
The Spike thus represents a vanguard – heavily influenced by the avant-garde of Delany’s 2982 
own cultural historical backdrop – and her art demands the active involvement of the 2983 
citizens as a ‘creative part of the post-revolutionary ideological state apparatus’ (Moylan, 2984 
2014, pp. 177-178). This aspect reinforces critical creative thinking, which is perceived 2985 
as a constitutional basis for personal and communal growth. Moreover, by consciously 2986 
performing her plays, in different places – her performances are ‘seldom confined in a 2987 
formal theatrical space’ (Delany, 1996 (1976), p. 43), – The Spike – and, as a 2988 
consequence of her endorsement by the ‘Government Art Endowment’ (Delany, 1996 2989 
(1976), p. 17), the Government – is conscious of the critical and emancipatory role of 2990 
place, especially in its connection to art. The spaces created by her performance are thus 2991 
relational and unbounded, meant for the free dwelling and participation of spectators, who 2992 
are encouraged to engage in the artistic place of the performance and partake in the 2993 
construction of that space. By opening space to the meanings and practices of its dweller- 2994 
spectators, these art spaces become true 4D entities in which culture is asked to produce 2995 
and be produced by the contrasting and heterogeneous dimensions of the city space, its 2996 
history and its diverse forms of social relations. The space of art is not simply there to be 2997 
taken and perceived as a whole entity in itself but is being made at the same time as it is 2998 
being perceived – the use of drugs and the artist’s gesture of gratefulness to Bron are 2999 
testimony to this. 3000 
Thus, although critical and sometimes even disruptive of the surrounding space, 3001 
the spaces of art of these utopias are not heterotopias in the sense put forward by Foucault 3002 
because they do not constitute spaces that are different or concurrent with the meanings 3003 
of utopia. Nevertheless, these spaces are part of the constitution of utopia, even though 3004 
Delany chose ‘An Ambiguous Heterotopia’ as the subtitle to his book, due to not being 3005 
‘so interested in utopian consolation or obvious conflicts as . . . he is in the disturbing, 3006 
disordered – indeed, ambiguous and uncertain – image of a utopian society emerging 3007 
slowly out of the old Worlds’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 244). The reason for the argument is that 3008 
while Foucault’s concept involves a closure or form of boundedness whose relation to the 3009 
exterior is merely negative – as it stresses, by contrast, spaces that are other – the spaces 3010 
of utopia in Anarres and Triton are relational because they seek to communicate and 3011 
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articulate the binaries that they themselves would be part of if they were heterotopias, 3012 
rather than to reinforce them. Their critical spatial (artistic) practices are imagined as 3013 
processes of utopia due to the addition of the prefix ‘critical’, itself a processual space. 3014 
Hence, these critical utopian practices seek to perform as social monads whose 3015 
constitution is not merely destructive but also – and more importantly – constructive of a 3016 
true alternative centred on participation rather than negation of different discourses. 3017 
Undoubtedly, both TD and TOT possess institutional spaces of art – not in the traditional 3018 
forms of the modern museum or white cube, but in terms of their psychological 3019 
boundedness, abstract constitution and positiveness. These aspects serve to confirm the 3020 
utopian dogma and are constituted in much the same way as spaces of art in the traditional 3021 
utopia; however, they remain relational, as they are affected by the critical ideologeme of 3022 
the utopian text or society and the other postmodern spaces of art that demand to also 3023 
become part of the process of utopian transformation. Moylan articulates this movement 3024 
in the following terms: 3025 
Aware of the historical tendency of the utopian genre to limit the imagination to one particular 3026 
ideal and also aware of the restriction of the utopian impulse to marketing mechanisms, the authors 3027 
of the critical utopias assumed the risky task of reviving the emancipatory utopian imagination 3028 
while simultaneously destroying the traditional utopia and yet preserving it in a transformed and 3029 
liberated form that was critical both of utopian writing itself and of the prevailing social formation 3030 
(Moylan, 2014, pp. 41-42) 3031 
 3032 
Mindful of the limitations of the utopias that preceded them and placed within a cultural 3033 
background that was not only multiple and fluid but also marked by fear of the totalising 3034 
ideals of the modern utopia – ‘here, of course, is echoed the historic failure to achieve 3035 
perfection, a false goal in the first place’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 43) – these new forms of 3036 
literary utopia portray societies as having ambiguities, ‘faults, inconsistencies, problems, 3037 
and even denials of the utopian impulse in the form of the persistence of exploitation and 3038 
domination in the better place’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 43). In the book’s Appendix A, Delany 3039 
makes explicit his critique of the traditional utopia’s belief in a perfect system. This belief 3040 
rests on binary oppositions between ‘good’ and ‘evil’, which, according to Delany, reveal 3041 
nothing more than temperaments or preferences, which nevertheless impose the modern 3042 
idea that there is a truth referent to be derived from this opposition. Delany’s and Le 3043 
Guin’s utopian exercises instead try to surpass simple binaries and frame themselves 3044 
within a deconstructive postmodern attitude that therefore reveals ‘a multi-flex vision of 3045 
both the possibilities and dangers of [the] emerging societies’ no longer defined by 3046 
‘simplistic condemnation or praise’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 152). 3047 
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The utopian novel141 tended to valorise setting over plot and character and 3048 
therefore social ideals over the spatial stories enacted in everyday life, so much so that ‘it 3049 
no longer allowed the radical imagination to look beyond its present [and] the sense of 3050 
possible change in social system denied’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 44). The critical utopia, 3051 
however, reverses the structural depiction of its alternative society’s primacy, rather 3052 
articulating it in terms of the critical practices (plot) of the characters. ‘Where utopia as 3053 
system can only be passively wished for, utopia as struggle can be taken in a willed effort 3054 
to transform the social system’ (Moylan, 2014, pp. 48-49). This transformation is 3055 
integrated in the text itself via the depiction of transformative actions, such as artistic 3056 
practice enacted in space and towards (utopian) space. 3057 
Hence, the critical utopia conveys, through the dynamic between its micro- 3058 
structures of artistic practice and its subject, a form of resistance to institutional 3059 
dogmatism and is instead better understood in terms of these relational practices. ‘Le 3060 
Guin’s utopia, by contrast, upholds the value of difference. Like Samuel Delany’s Triton, 3061 
it is a heterodox rather than an orthodox book—in part because (again like Triton) it is 3062 
not written from a singular ideological perspective, but even more importantly because 3063 
of the ambiguous location of its utopian horizon’ (Davis, Introduction, 2005, p. XIX). 3064 
Rather than being fixed under an established form, Le Guin’s critical artistic practice and 3065 
utopian drive are defined as a method, with the actual mobility and dynamism of the 3066 
method the source of a variety of discourses that participate in utopian change. Once the 3067 
process is annulled – as in the traditional utopia – dialogues are interrupted between 3068 
society and the individual (who becomes one with the community), between space and 3069 
history (which must be eternalised and thus must become inoperative concepts) and 3070 
between same and other (whose existence is denied as conflict and difference are 3071 
abandoned and replaced by the homogenised human experience required for maintaining 3072 
a perceived blueprint that sees itself as a finished object). The space of art in the critical 3073 
utopia is thus crucial in establishing utopia’s function as a method and as enacted spatially 3074 
through thirdring-as-Othering.  3075 
Artistic practice is thus the product and producer of liminality and relationality, in 3076 
the midst of which the thinking subject meets the community. This relationship is 3077 
biconditional and hence co-implicative: the reference of criticality permitted by artistic 3078 
 
141 See Fredric Jameson’s The Political Unconscious. 
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practice is, counteractively, permitted by a utopian imagination that sees in its very act of 3079 
creation the dynamism necessary for the articulation of the concepts of utopia and art. As 3080 
Sousa Dias – and Bloch, from a different perspective – states that the very possibilities of 3081 
art and utopia are ontologically simultaneous and that one’s condition of happenstance 3082 
thus implies the other, so this synthesis is better understood under the function of the 3083 
critical that does not seek itself as stasis but as a continual method. Artistic practice in 3084 
utopia is thus simultaneously positive, negative and critical: it is utopia, reflects back 3085 
utopia as an unfinished product and reveals its own utopian condition via emancipatory 3086 
praxis. There is thus an active and pedagogical potential in the relationality of spatial 3087 
critical (artistic) practice in utopia and the critical utopia as textual reality. They both 3088 
demand – like the wall or, perhaps, Richard Serra’s Tilted Arc – that one is confronted 3089 
with their undeniable reality to inspire responsibility for ‘what is to be done, and how it 3090 
is to be done’ (Moylan, 2014, p. XIV) regarding utopia itself as a process of 3091 
transformation and not as a ‘fixed blueprint’ (Moylan, 2014, p. XIV) – and, as a 3092 
consequence, the utopian function of art as process rather than as ideal form. 3093 
 3094 
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Conclusion 3118 
The globe shrinks for those who own it; for the displaced and the dispossessed, the migrant or 3119 
refugee, no distance is more awesome than the few feet across borders and frontiers. (Bhabha, 3120 
1992, p. 88) 3121 
 3122 
By midday, with the tie, The Undiscovered Island, finally set to sea, searching for itself. 3123 
(Saramago, 2007, p. 39)142  3124 
 3125 
If we accept the trialectics established by authors such as Lefebvre and Soja and follow 3126 
their conclusions onto the work of authors such as Rendell, Kwon, or Osborne – that art 3127 
practices produce and are product of (social) space dialectically – then it becomes of 3128 
valuable interest to analyse the way their spatiality is constitutive of the production of 3129 
space in utopia (especially when bearing in mind they possess utopian functions by 3130 
themselves). Massey’s concept of ‘progressive sense of place’ – called elsewhere ‘4D 3131 
spatiality’ –, which demands not only the cooperation of history, space and society in 3132 
proposing a radical alternative to traditional binaries but also the engagement and 3133 
articulation of these to cultural and artistic forms, provides us a theoretical backdrop for 3134 
the theorisation of the relations being made in the present study, in a constellation-like 3135 
analysis. 3136 
The hypothesis finally takes shape: the spatial turn has implied, besides its 3137 
immediate consequences, a shift in aesthetic sensibilities143 that is accompanied by a 3138 
transformation of the utopian genre. The new postmodern aesthetic and spatial sensibility 3139 
has permitted to notice a shift both in the status of space and the artwork (that is now 3140 
perceived spatially, historically and socially). Similarly, the micro-topologies of the 3141 
utopian text and their relation to the artwork’s form and function has been transformed, 3142 
implicating a metamorphosis on the formal structure of the utopian text itself. In other 3143 
words, the movement from modern to postmodern spatial and aesthetic sensibilities has 3144 
represented, simultaneously, a change in the utopian function of art and its space both in 3145 
the imagined space of the text and in the real geospace in which authors live. This study’s 3146 
emphasis on a postmodern analysis – as both a deconstructive and constructive dialectical 3147 
 
142 Original text: ‘Pela hora do meio-dia, com a maré, A Ilha Desconhecida fez-se enfim ao mar, à procura 
de si mesma’. 
143 Much like is suggested by Jameson that, as has been exposed in the first part of the present study, relates 
the spatial turn to a transformation in aesthetic sensibility from modernism to postmodernism. 
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tool – reflects this new attitude and articulates, critically, objects in networks of relations 3148 
rather than through antagonistic binaries. 3149 
It was proven how the shift from modernism to postmodernism, via the spatial 3150 
turn, the institutional critique and the consequent reformulation of aestheticism, has 3151 
meant a shift from relations between macro- and micro- structures within the utopian text, 3152 
from traditional to critical utopia. By employing spatial methods into art spaces’ analysis 3153 
and applying it as analytical method144 in the close reading of the established traditional 3154 
utopias of Bellamy and Morris and the critical utopias of Le Guin and Delany, we were 3155 
permitted to conclude that these texts incorporate art in utopia through varying utopian 3156 
functions. Considering both Osborne’s theorisation of contemporary art as synthesis of 3157 
aestheticism and conceptualism in space, and Sousa Dias’ and Bloch’s argument of the 3158 
ontological bi-necessity of art and utopia, this study has proven how the conceptual and 3159 
the aesthetic express different modes of utopian functions in art, whose forms can be 3160 
extracted from their spatial enactment in/as modern and postmodern space. These 3161 
distinctions can, in turn, be articulated in terms of the role art occupies in utopia – namely, 3162 
the positive, the negative and the critical. Synchronically, these functions enable us to 3163 
understand in which ways the discrete and generic textual levels affect and are affected 3164 
by the iconic register, deepening the investigation made by Moylan.  3165 
Bellamy’s and Morris’s utopias were distinguished, via this method, in terms of 3166 
function but not of form. However, both were distinguished equally in terms of form and 3167 
function from the critical utopia. While the traditional utopia can be said proper to modern 3168 
utopian art in both form and function, the latter (largely because of their historical, social 3169 
and cultural context), the critical utopias under analysis reveal a postmodern aesthetic 3170 
sensibility, in both a destructive and reconstructive manner. 3171 
Louis Marin argues in Utopics: Spatial Play there is an order of ‘figurability’ in 3172 
the utopian text that takes the form of the spatial Other, ‘the negative of contemporary 3173 
social, historical reality’ that assumes the role of ‘the absent term, as such, of the figure 3174 
that refers to it’ (Marin, 1984, p. 196). These spatial figures are, as Tally145 would argue, 3175 
inspired by real geospace and inverted in the text. Bearing this in mind, the space of 3176 
utopian discourse produces real-and-imagined spaces as they both try to integrate and 3177 
 
144 That allowed the distinction between modern and postmodern spaces of art as well as the operative 
concepts of ‘thirdring-as-Othering’, critical spatial practices and progressive sense of place 
145 See The Routledge Handbook to Literature and Space and Spatiality. 
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transcend first and second space, if we consider the role of the author – and of ourselves 3178 
– as mediating figures. Still, once the modes, forms and functions of the micro-topologies 3179 
of artistic practice in Morris’ and Bellamy’s traditional utopias are analysed, it becomes 3180 
evident that this inversion is not of the type Marin defended. In fact, it has been proven 3181 
heretofore that these utopias’ spaces of art accommodate, in their structures, a modern 3182 
narrative, continuous to the spatial and artistic modes of their own time. Although the 3183 
aesthetic and spatial form of the real is contested, its discourses are not. Inside the text, 3184 
the modern logic is preserved as homogeneous, bounded, horizontal, eternal, functional 3185 
and univocal form, with an absolute view imposed upon difference. 3186 
There is beauty in Nowhere’s space, Dowling agrees, a powerful sense of 3187 
craftsmanship and architectural splendour – ‘there are pleasing bridges and houses as well 3188 
as charming friezes and mosaics in the public spaces’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 70) – however, 3189 
as Dowling explains, ‘the fine arts have been curiously displaced . . . ‘both drama and 3190 
music are neglected, while sculpture and painting are relatively insignificant’ (Dowling, 3191 
1996, p. 70); and literature has almost ceased to be produced as the Nowherians not only 3192 
do not cultivate the habit of reading146 but no longer endeavour on the act of writing 3193 
besides fairy-tale writing. This lack, Dowling contends, is ‘symptomatic . . . of a larger 3194 
tension or pattern of inconsistencies operating within the work, combining to impart a 3195 
dystopian dimension to Morris’s socialist paradise’ (Dowling, 1996, p. 70). I would not, 3196 
however, call this absence an inconsistency but rather a necessary consequence of the 3197 
traditional utopian form. Maybe this absence points to the authors’ own recognition of an 3198 
incompatibility between art as utopia – or transformative desire – and art in the traditional 3199 
utopian form. 3200 
Safeguarding my own perspective from ‘standard rejoinder to reach a critique of 3201 
Morris’s Nowhere’ that, Dowling adverts, ‘usually counter[s] that any such putatively 3202 
dystopian elements represent instead the critics’ own bourgeois misrecognition of the 3203 
condition of art in a socialist utopia’ (Dowling 70) and from imparting the present study 3204 
with my own ideological biases, I wish to disclaim that the conclusions here exposed do 3205 
not aim to condemn the traditional utopia or its positive function of art – critiquing it as 3206 
reifying or commodifying art. Instead, the goal is to reveal the blockages of the utopian 3207 
text as blueprint in the articulation of non-modern spaces of art. These spaces imply, in 3208 
 
146 As Ellen’s grandfather so vehemently makes apparent. 
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turn, a limitation of subjective, heterogeneous practices and thus the articulation of art as 3209 
a truly social, critical and dynamic object. Consequently, artistic practice, although 3210 
present in the text, assumes a positive function and only functions at the level of the iconic 3211 
register – giving it credibility instead of livelihood. 3212 
The uniformisation of artistic practice under a sole function, Noami Jacobs 3213 
contends, results from the long history of utopian thought. Traditional utopia was 3214 
‘quantifiable, material, and inorganic, its superiority could be seen, in the symmetry and 3215 
clarity with which it imitated an elegantly balanced and stable divine creation’ (Jacobs, 3216 
1989, p. 109) – tendency that can be traced back to the Greek ideals of order and balance, 3217 
Lewis Mumford suggests in ‘Utopia, the City and the Machine’. Although such ‘physical 3218 
and visual stability and balance’ made the traditional utopia an ‘object of contemplation 3219 
of great intellectual and aesthetic beauty’ (Jacobs, 1989, p. 109), it also reduced utopia to 3220 
static abstraction, whose commitment to the functions of art were passive – as becomes 3221 
evident in LB. Morris, on the other hand, subverts this ordered tendency – he is explicitly 3222 
critical of both Bellamy and the Greek tradition – and subverts mapped symmetry. Spaces 3223 
of art – as all spaces in Nowhere – are decentralised, their organisation organic, and the 3224 
hopes of mapping thwarted by a constellation-like distribution. This distribution is mainly 3225 
due to Morris’s own attempts to deconstruct what he perceived to be the aristocratic, 3226 
elitist forms of institutional art space of his own time.  3227 
Nevertheless, NFN, despite the growing expansiveness on utopian function of art 3228 
and of space, is still inserted in the tradition of the traditional utopia. The sense of 3229 
permanence, immutability and perfection is conveyed by the stativity of the form and 3230 
function of its spaces of art. In utopias such as Morris’s and Bellamy’s ‘the temporality 3231 
of the social process, the dialectics of social change . . . are excluded, while social stability 3232 
is assured by a fixed spatial form’ (Harvey, 2000, p. 160). Artistic practice, although 3233 
present and recognised as container of utopia possibilities, is neutralised under a ‘fixed 3234 
spatial form’ that denaturalises the very creative impulse and abstracts artistic practice as 3235 
an eternal, formal quality. Morris’s utopian discourse strives to disrupt ‘historical reality 3236 
through . . . figurative representation . . . hop[ing] to express historical reality by 3237 
deadening and shaping it into a closed system of ideas aimed at presenting a justified and 3238 
legitimated representation of it’ (Marin, 1984, p. 195). However, by disregarding the 3239 
implicit modern unidimensionality of spaces and art, Morris ends up just reversing their 3240 
neutralisation rather than critically integrating art and space. Morris’s case would, still, 3241 
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benefit from a deeper analysis that sought to establish further correlations between his 3242 
transgression of the traditional utopia’s art space and contextualisation in the historical 3243 
and artistic transition period he lived – possibly justifying the distinctions made between 3244 
LB and NFN. 3245 
Modernism, as a ‘culture of temporal abstraction, centred on that restless logic of 3246 
negation that makes up the temporal dialectic of the new’ (Osborne, 2001, p. 183), 3247 
mediates difference in terms of this negation – linked to artwork’s autonomy – and 3248 
temporal discourse. Because of this superimposition of a form of utopian reasoning and 3249 
a grand narrative that must be assessed indiscriminately, these modern utopias have been 3250 
described by authors such as Harvey and Lyotard ‘as forms of ‘terroristic meta-narrative’, 3251 
whereby dominant discourse act to squash individuality and restrict society to narrow, 3252 
forced growth’ (Ward, 2006, p. 46). In the traditional utopia, to forced eternalisation. 3253 
Traditional utopias’ emphasis on perfection makes both ‘history and narrative . . . 3254 
structurally obsolete’ (Riquet, 2017, p. 218) while re-enacting the implicit forms of real 3255 
space. It can thus be argued (Cf. Riquet 2017) that the island space is the archetypical 3256 
space of the traditional utopia, which is reproduced even when historical time is specified 3257 
(as in Edward Bellamy’s LB) and utopia is placed somewhere in the future. This future, 3258 
however, admits no future to itself, no continuation for utopian society, only permanence. 3259 
Temporality, spatiality, sociality and culture are turned into picture. The island, even 3260 
when it does not take the form of a piece of land surrounded by water on all sides, stands 3261 
as the traditional utopian space par excellence. Defence of the island space is similar to 3262 
the defence of the local, which can be shown either by bounded or reactionary spatial 3263 
attitudes – as is the case of Morris – or by identitary, ideological attitudes – as is the case 3264 
of Bellamy. Local attitudes in utopia thus pose a threat to themselves as utopian spaces 3265 
as they ‘often ‘devolve into a kind of primordialism that fixes and romanticizes social 3266 
relation and identity.’ Moreover, investment in local forms of identity can ‘hinder 3267 
recognition of shared problems and the formation of more effective political alliances’ 3268 
(Caroll, 2017, p. 164),147 homogenising social and spatial problems and identities.  3269 
Hardt’s and Negri’s approach, Siobhan Caroll reiterates, ‘rather than trying to 3270 
defend historical place . . . argue for ‘the concrete invention of the first new place in non- 3271 
 
147 Of course, local spatiality’s capacity for ‘more effective political alliances’ may enable it to constitute 
powerful forms of bottom-up initiatives that places the citizen at the core of its concerns but in order for 
this articulation to be done, they must not be identitary or reactionary, but relational and open to other 
spatialities and discourses. 
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place – new sites of identity situated within the twenty-first century flows’ (Caroll, 2017, 3272 
p. 164). It allows identitary plurality to be enacted in space as process. Similarly, critical 3273 
utopias reject bounded, local, identitary-based notions of space which are often 3274 
reactionary. Critical utopias provide, instead, critical spatial artistic practices that serve 3275 
as conscious manifestation against traditional utopia’s spatiality. Spaces of art in the form 3276 
of institutional space is of this sort: they preserve the artwork and its space as an eternal 3277 
monad apparently defending from the outside world. Critical utopias and critical (artistic) 3278 
spatial practices, by contrast, ally the local with the global, being progressive and 3279 
processual. Art spaces can be noticed clearly in the generic, iconic and discrete levels in 3280 
TD and TOT in which traditional utopian dogmatism is contested by postmodern critical 3281 
attitudes within utopia itself. These utopias, Moylan argued, have as a central concern 3282 
‘the awareness of the limitations of the utopian tradition so that these texts reject utopia 3283 
as blueprint while preserving it as dream (Moylan, 2014, p. 10)’  focusing ‘on the 3284 
continuing presence of difference and imperfection within utopian society itself and thus 3285 
render more recognizable and dynamic alternatives’ (Moylan, 2014, p. 11). Critical 3286 
utopias seek to invert the static character of the traditional utopia, transforming the island 3287 
into a ship, in a movement recalling José Saramago’s ‘The Tale of the Undiscovered 3288 
Island’ in which the quest for the island transforms the search vehicle (the ship) into an 3289 
island itself. Literary critical utopias’ space is dynamic, its artistic critical spatial practices 3290 
serve as paddles, and artistic utopia sets out to discover and build itself a continual utopian 3291 
self-improvement.  3292 
In Globalization: Social Theory and Global Culture, Roland Robertson argues for 3293 
this relational character of artistic practices and spaces as necessarily transformative 3294 
under globalisation which, ‘as a concept, refers both to the compression of the world and 3295 
classification of the world as a whole’ (Robertson, 1992, p. 8). Framed in this context, 3296 
artistic practices both demand and produce dialogues between notions of original and 3297 
global communities and social space, a ‘thirdspace of enunciation’ or a ‘in-between 3298 
space’ – as Bhabba puts it. This notion, Anna Maria Guash argues, is founded ‘on the 3299 
premise that all aesthetic intervention in the concept of ‘place’ and ‘subject’ provides new 3300 
bases for rethinking the issues of knowledge, agency and political commitment in a 3301 
globalized world’ (Guasch, 2014, n.p.). Comparably, to Massey places are forever 3302 
changing and cannot be taken as ‘fixed environments but as processes, ‘spatio-temporal 3303 
events’. Consequently, Massey maintains ‘that a “global sense of place” entails grasping 3304 
 112 
 
place in terms of its relations with what lies beyond it, as a “particular constellation of 3305 
social relations, meeting and weaving together at a particular locus”’ (Alexander, 2017, 3306 
p. 41). Thus, artistic practices must serve as ‘source of new forms of reflexivity that, 3307 
following Rob Wilson, provoke an “aesthetic of openness toward otherness”’ (Guasch, 3308 
2014, n.p.). New processes of spatialisation and artistic practice thus become co- 3309 
productive of new forms of critical engagement and dialogue whose relational character 3310 
allows them greater fluidity and margin for improvement and empowerment – since it 3311 
relates to the Other and not just to the Self. In this process resides the truly critical, 3312 
dynamic and utopian function of postmodern spaces of art. Not only are they now aware 3313 
of one another but produce new discourses, multiple and plural identities, and are 3314 
inclusive and heterogeneous. So, they are both utopian and resistant movements against 3315 
‘the economic structures of the art world producing not a commodity but a process’ 3316 
(Scarfone, 2007, p. 209). This process is, according to Kwon, generative, alternative and 3317 
non-traditional, producing inclusive spaces148 of ‘repressed ethnic history,  [of] a political 3318 
cause, [of] a disenfranchised social group’ (Kwon, 2002, p. 30). The art space becomes a 3319 
utopian project in the enactment of practice and difference, enclosing a possibility, a 3320 
potency a la Aristotle. This type of art space is produced by the artwork instead of the art 3321 
institution. It considers art both as autonomous and as a social fact. This space is cognisant 3322 
of its relation to city, as Osborne makes clear. Its futurity is grounded retrospectively and 3323 
not for its own sake. By occurring socially and spatially, the ‘aesthetic refuses to remain 3324 
‘indifferent’ in art spaces . . . The aesthetic as such [can] not be annihilated, or absolutely 3325 
removed from art, but rather . . . increasingly strategically incorporated or ‘contained’ 3326 
through the ongoing negation of various of its specific modes and the instrumental 3327 
refunctioning of others (Osborne, 2018, p. 195). Contrary to what happened to modern 3328 
spaces of art, the postmodern space of art’s relation to time is not of detachment but ‘of 3329 
dissatisfaction with the inability to fulfil experience’ (Maleuvre, 1999, p. 79). Art is tied 3330 
to its historical, spatial and social context without being subsumed by it. Remaining free 3331 
and autonomous it is only by recognising its own contextuality that the artwork presents 3332 
itself as truly critical and utopian, saving history, space and social relations from entropy; 3333 
 
148 Kwon uses the term sites throughout her analysis referring to the artistic practice of site-specificity, 
which links the artwork to a given location. When she refers to sites, nonetheless, she seems to be using it 
in the same way ‘place’ is being employed in the present study. However, when she refers to nomadic 
spatial practices and heterogeneous, processual production of space – as is the case here –, her use of the 
term ‘site’ seems more attuned to the conceptualisation of ‘space’ put forward in the first section of the 
present study. 
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the failure to do so relegates it to pure background or ‘mere ornamental documentation’ 3334 
(Dowling, 1996, p. 70). 3335 
Bearing this in mind, in Le Guin’s TD and Delany’s TOT artistic practices and 3336 
spatialities are regarded as processual since they undermine dogmatisation. In TD, 3337 
institutionalisation of the artistic practice although recognised, acts as inciter of change 3338 
and recuperation of the utopian ideal. This utopia is, in turn, not taken as static spatial 3339 
form but as a processual, creative, dialectic one. Art refuses to be prescriptive in function 3340 
(be it aesthetic or conceptual) and, instead, by epitomising the critical spatial practice here 3341 
theorised, incorporates both functions in its sociospatial action. 3342 
‘These works’ Philip Wegner argues, ‘are very much the products of the global 3343 
political, social, and cultural ferment of the late 1960s and 1970s, and, as a consequence, 3344 
a whole series of concerns – ecology, the environment, race, gender, and sexuality – are 3345 
given a prominence that had not been evident earlier in the genre’s long history’ (Wegner, 3346 
Utopia, 2005, p. 91). They reflect, in this regard, the new global consciousness of space 3347 
and a new consciousness of the utopian functions of art (both in the context of social 3348 
practice and of its theorisation in space as social practice). Largely sedimented in counter- 3349 
culture movements – critical utopia was embroiled in ‘the reflective period of the early 3350 
1970s [which] was marked by a renewed concern for theory and history as well as the 3351 
development of an opposition/radical culture’ (Moylan, 1980, p. 237) –, these texts reveal 3352 
both their artistic preoccupations towards institutionalisation and the power geometries 3353 
that are embedded in them. As such, the space of art in utopia serves both as a negative 3354 
and critical topos for emancipatory action to take place. Art spaces empower the utopian 3355 
narrative and its citizens as they demand (the impossible) reality of multiplicity, 3356 
simultaneity, difference and dynamism. By contrast, the modern art space is 3357 
comprehended as antithetical to the new needs of political, social and cultural life. 3358 
Moreover, TOT and TD ‘echo literature’s importance and offer necessary shifts 3359 
away from traditional valuation of the arts and humanities as crucial to critical thinking 3360 
alone, demanding readers to comprehend the value of creative expression […] that we 3361 
need to help us think galactically’ (Stallings, 2015, p. 227), that is, thinking critically 3362 
while recognising that all of our thoughts and experiences are sedimented in how we 3363 
‘understand time and space, life and death, being and feeling’ (Stallings, 2015, p. 227). 3364 
Thus, while in traditional utopias the separation between political life, science and art is 3365 
largely due to the modern positivist (and, with equal prejudice, idealist) tendency to 3366 
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overarching generalisation and eternalisation (which ‘has dictated the split between art 3367 
and science and between art and reality’ (Stallings, 2015, p. 225)), the merging of utopia 3368 
and science fiction in the critical utopia challenge these splits. As ‘systematic devaluation 3369 
of creativity and artistic expression in a society under capitalism can influence order and 3370 
system of values’ (Stallings, 2015, p. 226), so the traditional utopia’s devaluation of 3371 
artistic space and practice undermines the possibility of critical thought and subjectivity. 3372 
The move against the arts and the control over spatial fix under regulated institutions 3373 
impose not only specific ways of viewing the world but also external value to individual 3374 
experience and artistic sensibility. By undermining globalising systems of values, which 3375 
impose a spatial order to the mobilisation of difference and creative expression, critical 3376 
utopias undermine institutional spaces of art, both recognising the value of spatialisation 3377 
over social relations and the utopian possibilities of critical artistic practice that act within 3378 
society as radical process of change. 3379 
Thus, the utopian role of art must not be exercised in canonical, idealist form in 3380 
postmodernism – the disenchantment witnessed towards utopia in the post-war years 3381 
proves just that –, but in a critical, dynamic way. Traditional or modern utopian-orientated 3382 
art ‘tends to reify art and turn it into a device exactly measuring its dissociation from 3383 
social relevance (O'Doherty, 1986, p. 82). It secludes itself from society by being 3384 
detached from it. The utopias of the 1970s, aware of this new spatial and artistic demands, 3385 
reflect a new attitude toward society, art and utopia – or, perhaps, utopianism –, 3386 
perceiving it from an everyday life and everyday subject standpoint. They make utopia a 3387 
function of desire and of imagination. Artistic practice as a social fact enrols in a similar 3388 
endeavour. For establishing a new spatial and inclusive dialogue, as proposed by Soja 3389 
and Massey in the first chapter, the space of art must be capable of plurality and 3390 
relationality in this matter: 3391 
in precisely the unhinging of stable categories and subject position, in the interdisciplinary and 3392 
intermediary, in the conflictual and dividing, in the fragmented and permissive – in different 3393 
spaces of experience, as it were. We should begin to think of this contradictory and non-unitary 3394 
notion of a public sphere, and of the art institution as the embodiment of this sphere. (Sheikh, 3395 
2006, p. 194) 3396 
 3397 
The emphasis put on the critical function of artistic practice in the critical utopia provides 3398 
a reflective alternative to identitary and regressionist attitudes towards both space and art 3399 
endorsed by modernism whose aestheticism and spatiality is of an ethical order and 3400 
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constructed as ‘or’ sentences (i.e., through the construction of moral binaries of ‘good’ 3401 
or ‘evil’: good utopia or bad old society, good art or bad art, good space or bad space, 3402 
good citizen or bad citizen). The central question, Stallings argues, citing Sylvia Wynter, 3403 
‘remains unresolved’ in this system of antagonistic dichotomies: ‘which meaning, for 3404 
what group, and from which perspective – celebrant or dissident?’ (as cited in Stallings, 3405 
2015, p. 227). 3406 
This last conclusion could open the debate of modern and postmodern spatial artistic 3407 
practice onto further investigation of its impact on cultural, racial, feminist, sexual and 3408 
other studies. This could be done through the articulation of imaginary and real spatial 3409 
practices with cultural forms of artistic expression in utopia – the analysis of Joanna 3410 
Russ’s Female Man could prove useful in such an inquiry. 3411 
Consequently, the conclusions made so far are bound by theoretical limits as, for 3412 
example, regarding the articulation of issues of subjectivity, history and memory or the 3413 
relations between art spaces and the political affiliations of the text itself. (Strong 3414 
arguments could be made regarding capitalist production in Bellamy’s LB, in contrast to 3415 
the more Marxist approach of Morris and the anarcho-Marxist approaches of both Le 3416 
Guin and Delany). Moreover, a further sample of utopias, in a larger time span – including 3417 
utopias prior to the nineteenth century and posterior to the twentieth –, would surely 3418 
display further variation on artistic practices and functions in the literary utopia. This 3419 
quantitative limitation, however, leaves research space open, as the present study strength 3420 
lies on its methodological proposal. This limitation is also a consequence of one of the 3421 
chief obstacles found in the elaboration of the present study, namely, the shortage of 3422 
literature devoted to the subject of the role of art and its space in the literary utopia. 3423 
Although there is a vast amount of studies devoted to the utopian function of art, the 3424 
function both of space in utopia and of space in art, the articulation between art in utopia 3425 
has been hitherto greatly neglected. The reason for this neglect lies, I believe, in the fact 3426 
that many authors writing within the utopian tradition have lacked, themselves, a critical 3427 
articulation between utopia’s macro-structures and the role of art as an organic part of life 3428 
in utopia. The absence of critical articulations – although further research would have to 3429 
be done in matters of reception, raise and decline of genres or even a quantitative analysis 3430 
mapping the functions argued for in the present study – has significantly contributed to 3431 
the decline in utopian thought and optimism during a large part of the twentieth century. 3432 
Utopia was then an idealised modern state, not a place to live. The critical utopia, more 3433 
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attuned to these limitations brought about by history and cultural conditions, has 3434 
recuperated utopia as critical artistic space. 3435 
The present study thus sought to showcase this recuperation by trying to offer new 3436 
dynamics through which to consider utopia, framing it both historically and spatially and 3437 
making it relevant for contemporary preoccupations and issues. Through these 3438 
articulations, I expect to have proven that utopia and utopian art have remained an 3439 
important social method and function for the deconstruction of identitary and 3440 
regressionist forms of artistic, spatial and, consequently, of cultural discourses. In this 3441 
respect, the study of art spaces and their theorisation within postmodern discourses, 3442 
feminism, colonialism or race studies, knit to the field of utopian studies may, moreover, 3443 
produce new paths for interdisciplinarity, cooperation and solidarity. Thus, the present 3444 
study did not only open the discourses between aesthetics, architecture, geography, 3445 
cultural and literary studies but, by stressing the utopian dimension as critical method to 3446 
deconstruct and reconstruct bounds through relationality and alterity, enabled more 3447 
inclusive and cooperative practices that see in space and in art a form of utopian discourse 3448 
that unhinges static notions of fixed boundaries and reveals the potentialities of 3449 
hospitality and democracy underneath. A democracy that is not homogenising or 3450 
segregating but one that is cognisant of the array of discourses – the sustainable, the 3451 
feminist, the queer, the democratic, the youth, the refugee, and so on – that constitute 3452 
democracy and sees, in the interface between artistic, spatial and utopian practices, a 3453 
communication medium between these discourses. Utopia must thus value dialogue that 3454 
is suited to the new global conditions instead of promoting regressionist, reactionary or 3455 
identity discourses, with fear of processual change. It must regard globalisation as the 3456 
occasion for the promotion of diversity, alterity, internationality, learning, and so on. The 3457 
new utopia can, finally, be constructed as critical spatial artistic practice. The search for 3458 
new utopian islands has changed in the space of flows of our contemporary world and, 3459 
just like in Saramago’s short story, the island must turn to ship, and the ship to island, in 3460 
a synchronic rather than diachronic movement, rooted but floating, permanently seeking 3461 
itself as a utopia of dialogues and processes and constantly reimagining its own conditions 3462 
in a sea whose horizon is always moving, always nowhere. 3463 
 3464 
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Table 2. Presentation of Lefebvre's Unitary Theory of Space, taken from ‘Spatial Conceptualization in the Context of 3902 
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Table 3. ‘Spatial elements of a fictional text’ (Piati et al. 180), taken from ‘Mapping Literature: Towards a Geography 3908 
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